Fortifying the Police and the People

Point three of Mayor Young’s Ten Point Plan, behind  only drug traffic and increasing police accountability, was to ensure “the people and the police work together” (Young, 1973).  In a campaign address, he proposed mini-stations “staffed with small police squads - aided by civilian office workers… established in neighborhoods and commercial centers” (Young, 1973). Police mini-stations became the hallmark of Mayor Young’s initiative to build a positive relationship between the Detroit Police Department and the people. 

Upon his inauguration, in February of 1974, Mayor Young issued an executive order to Police Commissioner Tannian to reform the DPD. He ordered the formal termination of the STRESS program and the relocation of officers to fifty new mini-stations around the city.  The mayor continued to argue that community involvement was central and necessary to the success of the mini-stations.  Between 1974 and 1976, the DPD would construct and operate approximately 42 police mini-stations acrtoss the city.

Connections to National Trends in Community Policing

Mayor Young’s police reforms were highly reflective of his “law and order, with justice” platform; he embraced solutions that he thought would simultaneously control crime and alleviate racism within the DPD. Police-community relations were a central focus of his efforts. His campaign vow that “The People and the Police Will Work Together” ultimately translated into a focus on community policing, an approach to law enforcement that was becoming popular in cities nationwide.

The establishment of police mini-stations throughout Detroit between 1974-1977 became the Mayor’s primary innovation in community policing.  On the surface, the intention of the mini-station program was to promote regular contact between police officers and community members.  Internal correspondence indicates that this public focus on relationship building was not the principal driver for the program.  Rather, the primary goal of the mini-station initiative was crime prevention and control—with community involvement being only a supplemental benefit.

The Geography of Mini-Stations

The mini-stations, as advertised, were embedded into neighborhoods. They were deliberately placed amongst local establishments and functioned as tactical mobile units. They were also sometimes constructed inside the lobbies of public housing developments and community centers. 

Housing discrimination was particularly threatening to Black lives in Detroit throughout the 20th century.  The scarce public housing initiatives that emerged following liberal initiatives at the turn of the century were almost exclusively racially segregated.   The Brewster-Douglass, Sojourner Truth, and Jefferies Projects were three of Detroit’s primarily Black public housing communities.  At least three police mini-stations were deliberately constructed either inside or within one mile of these communities during the program’s first two years.  Federal funds were allocated for the construction and operations of mini-stations in two of these locations (within the Brewster-Douglass and the Jefferies Projects).

The construction of mini-stations within segregated public housing projects advanced discrimination on two fronts: it concentrated racialized poverty in tightly controlled urban space, and then deployed intensive policing resources within the local community. The placement of mini-stations contributed to the criminalization of both poverty and Blackness, as suggested by Elizabeth Hinton in From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime.  The police department advertised the mini-station program as an initiative to make citizens feel safe in their own communities.  However, this degree of police omnipresence indisputably contributed to the arrest of thousands.

Public Housing & Mini Station Locations 

Operating the Mini-Stations

The DPD set out idealistic expectations for how its mini-stations would function: a September 1975 draft of its "Handbook on Mini- Station Operational Procedures" called for recruiting top-flight officers whose responsibilities would be tightly circumscribed to the communities where they worked. Officers were to actively strategize with both their colleagues and community members to respond to crime in real time; indeed, they were supposed to follow up personally on every reported crime in their mini-station's jurisdiction. 

Yet a May 1976 evaluation of the program, when read between the lines, cast significant doubt on whether the program lived up to internal expectations. While the researchers at Michigan State University heralded its popularity with the public, most of their recommendations involved implementing the baseline standards DPD had already set. In other words, the program wasn't adhering to even its most most basic tenets. The report paints a picture of mini-stations staffed by officers who were not only reluctant to engage with the community, but seemingly loathe to leave the buildings at all. As such, the researchers concluded (perhaps charitably, given their sympathy for its mission) that the program was unsuccessful in both its community-building and crime-fighting missions. Moreover, DPD officers assigned to mini-stations also assaulted citizens and abused their power, as documented in a series of complaints, showing that the mini-station program was not immune from the longstanding patterns of brutality that characterized the DPD.

Execution: Different Perceptions of Success

By putting more cops on the beat, the mini station program inevitably led to an increase in arrests.  Law enforcement officials interpreted increased enforcement as a sign of the initiative's success--resting on the assumption that any program that increases arrests at least appears to be controlling crime. This concept undoubtedly contributed to the success of James Bannon, commander of the Mini Station Administration Unit, in promoting the initiative.  In a 1976 memo to Mayor Young, Bannon engaged in statistical distortion, noting that “the data period prior… would be substantially zero.”  The increasing arrest rates were also appealing from a federal standpoint, as much of the mini-station funding was derived from LEAA grants.  Indeed, it had been apparent since the 1973 LEAA grant proposals that the federal government saw the initiative primarily as a form of crime control--entirely excluding community engagement as a goal and relegating it to status as an auxiliary benefit. 

In a short time, it became clear to many law enforcement officials that the mini-station program failed or did little to fulfill any efforts to promote community engagement.  Mini-station personnel were encouraged to perform that role while on-duty, including by visiting local businesses, schools, and community meetings. 

Quantitative reports of mini-station activities, however, highlight the minuscule contributions made to the community aside from law enforcement.  In 1976, the mini-stations made upwards of ~7,000 arrests and visited ~14,500 businesses, but only visited ~1,100 schools and under ~200 community meetings.  In 1977, the same activities have consistent reported numbers for the first six months and even become more specific regarding youth enforcement.  The period highlights an upward trajectory in all categories for the first six months, but most significantly in arrests.  These reports are indicative of the slim efforts made by mini station personnel to engage with the community--despite recommendations and efforts made from senior law enforcement officials.

Civilian Complaints Involving Mini Station Officers, 1974-1977 (incomplete) 

Sources for this page:

Coleman A. Young Collection, Walter Reuther Library, Wayne State University, Detroit, MI.

Coleman A. Young Papers,  Burton Historical Collection, Detroit Public Library, Detroit, MI.

Hinton, E. (2016). From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime. Harvard University Press.

Stauch Jr, Michael. "Wildcat of the Streets: Race, Class and the Punitive Turn in 1970s Detroit." PhD diss., Duke University, 2015.