

THE NEED FOR CHANGE

The need for a police department turnaround was spotlighted during the late 1960's by rising tensions in police-community relations, and a sharply rising crime trend.

In 1970, crime reached an all-time peak in the city, with a total of 192,886 crimes of all types reported. This represented an increase of 25 percent in only three years. Robberies, the most frequently reported crime involving personal violence, rose even faster, by 92 percent over a three-year period, to a total of 23,038 in 1970.

ROOTS OF THE TURNAROUND

The passage of the Omnibus Crime and Safe Streets act greatly expanded federal aid to the criminal justice system. The first federal funds to reach Detroit in 1970 arrived as crime approached its peak.

The efforts of the community, including the Greater Detroit Chamber of Commerce and privately funded groups such as New Detroit, Inc., aided the planning and cohesive actions of municipal government and the police to augment the fight against crime.


The new city administration under Mayor Roman S. Gribbs placed top priority on support for effective counter-crime measures and improvement of police operations.

Within the department, a move to bureau organizational structure was begun.

The city administration joined with the leadership of the Police Department in a search for additional outside help, including substantial funding and management research manpower to help develop a coordinated approach to total department improvement, and put it into effect.

All these essentially long-range moves had no immediate effect on the rising crime trend through 1970.

CRIME IN DETROIT 1966-1972
(ALL REPORTED CRIME—IN THOUSANDS)



SPECIFIC PROBLEMS AND PROGRAMS

The increasing local traffic in narcotics was believed by most criminal justice experts to have a multiplier effect on other types of crime, particularly robberies, larcenies and burglaries committed by addicts with expensive drug habits.

This consideration served as an additional stimulus to moves by city, county, state and Federal authorities to improve direct action against drug-law violators.

To fight organized crime and the major traffickers in illegal drugs, a Wayne County Task Force and a so-called "Metro Squad" were created, composed of Detroit police and representatives of other locally-based law enforcement agencies.

The city administration inaugurated a methadone program to provide hard-drug addicts with a low-cost substitute, to ease the economic pressure to commit crimes of theft.

The Detroit Police Department manned and equipped a new narcotics intelligence unit, with part of the earliest OCJP infusion of Federal funds, and organized new neighborhood anti-narcotics strike forces at the precinct level. These precinct narcotics units went into operation late in 1970, and have been raiding local narcotics pads on an average of two a night somewhere in the city, ever since.

Another short-term move instituted to have quick impact on street crime was the concept of zero visibility patrol. The plan, titled Stop The Robberies, Enjoy Safe Streets, involved the use of certain plainclothes officers of the existing Precinct Support Unit to flush out muggers in high street crime areas, by posing as unwary potential victims.

Management consultants joined the police team in force, early in 1971. A proposal for a total coordinated Federal grants program was developed, and an initial major package of more than \$2 million was awarded before midyear. To date, total OCJP commitments, from the earliest funding provided in 1970 to programs still pending through 1974, have surpassed \$10 million. About two-thirds of this amount has actually been received and spent.

Under the conditions of the Federal grants program, matching funds equal to 25 percent of the cost of the total project were provided by the City of Detroit, partly in cash and partly in "in kind" services, and by the State of Michigan, with the approval of the State Legislature.

In addition, since 1970 the Mayor and Common Council have provided increases in the annual department budget, in response to demonstrated need, of \$17.4 million in 1970, \$14.7 million in 1971, and \$16.9 million in 1972, for a three-year increase of 59.5 percent. Because of inflation and other factors, much of this increase was required just to maintain the existing level of police service.

The combination of factors—the support of civic government, citizens and civic groups, and state and Federal agencies, innovative programs within the department, and the large investment of Federal dollars—all have contributed to the drastic revision of department organization, policy, administration, operating methods and techniques now well under way.

THE FRUITS OF CHANGE

Some fruits of this wave of change already can be itemized, in terms of cost-efficiencies, and speedier, more thorough police service.

- \$1.5 million worth of man hours per year already is being saved by more effective use of detective time for criminal investigation.
- Institution of the new city-wide Emergency Medical Service already has reduced the number of sick-and-injury runs handled by police cars by 80 percent and will be worth at least \$500,000 a year to the police department in man-hour savings.
- Citizen phone calls to police "lost" because of line tie-ups have been reduced from 12 percent of all calls, to less than two percent.
- The number of emergencies during which citizens have had to wait for police service, because all available scout cars were tied up on other runs, has been reduced from nearly 23 percent of all calls in mid-1971, to between two and three percent.
- The number of precinct scout cars actually in service to respond to calls has been raised from 79 percent of the total vehicle roster two years ago, to 98 percent.
- Paperwork savings of \$100,000 a year have been achieved through elimination of duplicate or excessive reports.
- A 90 percent reduction in false alarms—from 22,000 to 2,000 a year—is anticipated when a new city emergency telephone system has been completed.
- Television monitors being phased into certain city precincts eventually will save \$1.5 million worth of police man hours a year previously spent on station "guard duty."
- 300 administrative-type positions in the department have been identified, which could be manned by civilians. When and if the additional civilian employment could be financed, additional police man hours, worth \$1.9 million a year, would be freed for anti-crime assignments.

THE DROP IN CRIME


However one may choose to assess the causes, a turnaround in the trend of reported crime has occurred, coincidentally with the moves to improve department performance.

After five years of steady increases, all reported crimes in Detroit dropped 3.6 percent in 1971 versus the previous year, and another 14.7 percent in 1972.

On a month-by-month basis, robberies—a priority target—declined for the first time in five years in February, 1971. All crimes dipped in March, 1971, beginning a steady downward trend that has been sustained almost without interruption ever since.

A calculation based on F.B.I. estimates of the loss to each victim of certain property crimes, suggests that the Detroit crime decrease has saved potential victims a total of more than \$6 million in two years, just in these crime-categories alone.

**DETROIT MONTHLY CRIME FIGURES 1971-72
PERCENTAGE CHANGE VS. PRIOR YEAR**



Crime	Net Decrease 1970-1972	Average Loss to Victim per Crime*	Total Losses Avoided by Two-Year Decrease
Robbery	- 5,858	\$226	\$1,324,000
Burglary	- 8,305	312	2,591,000
Larceny + \$50	- 7,260	246	1,786,000
Larceny - \$50	-10,756	15	161,000
Auto Theft	- 342	933	319,000
TOTAL LOSSES AVOIDED, 1970-1972			\$6,181,000

*From "Crime in the United States", FBI Uniform Crime Reports—1971, Table 19, "Offense Analysis 1971", p. 113.

THE DEPARTMENT'S COMMITMENT

With the sustained help and support of our citizens, the government of the City of Detroit, the Michigan Office of Criminal Justice Programs, and the Federal Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, the Detroit Police Department is continuing to bend all its energies toward achieving the level of service and performance that the citizens of Detroit demand and deserve.


DETROIT POLICE DEPARTMENT

Executive group and bureau chiefs:

(Clockwise from far left)—Chief of Patrol John J. Bowyer; Superintendent and First Deputy Commissioner Anthony Bertoni; Second Deputy Commissioner Stanley C. Rich; Chief Robert R. Bullock, Inspectional Services Bureau; Chief Edward T. Walsh, Technical Services Bureau; Chief Theodore S. Sienski, Administrative Services Bureau; Thomas G. Ferrebee, Recruiting Division; Commissioner Philip G. Tannian; Commander Sylvester A. Lingeman, Executive Assistant to the Commissioner; Inspector John M. Tsampikou, Management Analysis Section; Assistant to the Commissioner Delbert W. Russell, Jr.; Chief William T. Morris, Criminal Investigation Bureau; Chief Gordon R. Smith, Youth Services Bureau (not shown).



CHANGES AT THE PRECINCT LEVEL



Police service to citizens is provided mainly by the patrolman on the street, and it is in the precinct that he chiefly does his work. Of the Detroit Police Department's nearly 5,600 sworn personnel, about three-fourths are police officers (men and women). Three out of every five police officers are assigned to the precincts, which are the local headquarters for neighborhood police protection.

There are 13 precincts in Detroit, although the precinct numbers run to 16. Three old precincts were eliminated over the years through redistricting.

Here is a look at how new approaches over the past two years have influenced the way in which the individual police officers come to grips with crime in their neighborhood precincts . . . when and where they are assigned . . . and how their work-effort is directed and controlled to produce the maximum benefit.

Command is not a "lonely post" in a Detroit police precinct. The inspector in charge shares his command, and frequently his desk and office space, with his executive officer and his platoon lieutenants, who report on different shifts.

On a wall nearby there is a map of the precinct and its scout car territories. At the inspector's hand on his desk is a file of the new management reports that help him keep track of where his men are and how well they are doing, not only week by week, but day by day.

NEW MANAGEMENT CONTROLS

A new citywide service summary warns him when his scout cars are unable to answer certain citizen calls, and tells him on which shifts the problems are occurring.

This new report, designed and introduced for use in 1972, measures the promptness of the police in responding to citizen calls, precinct by precinct, and platoon by platoon.

"This is one of the key improvements over the way we used to do things," one precinct commander says. "The function of the Police Department is to serve the citizens. You've got to have the men and cars on the street, and they've got to be able to respond right away, when a citizen calls for help."

"Before this new system, we didn't even know that a certain period of time on a platoon we didn't have any cars available, unless a dispatcher downtown would occasionally call the platoon lieutenant

and ask him where all the cars were.

"Now we can identify the amount of no-response time immediately, see when it's occurring, check the activity logs to find out why, and do something about it.

"Sometimes it could be as simple as scout car crews taking time to bring minor preliminary complaint reports into the station, while still on patrol. These reports should be picked up on the street by the patrol sergeants."

As the accompanying exhibits indicate, an early analysis made in 1971 before the new system was introduced, showed some platoons in some busy precincts unable to handle additional calls as much as 79 percent of the time. Then the city-wide average had been a startling 23 percent; now it is reduced to two to three percent.

POLICE RESPONSE VEHICLES: CITY-WIDE SERVICE SUMMARY
(Sample Week, 1971)

PRECINCT	1	2	4	5	6	7	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	City Wide
Platoon #1 % Time all full duty resources exhausted	15.1	13.2	12.2	38.2	20.8	20.9	9.3	21.2	6.5	26.2	12.9	7.5	10.6	16.5
Platoon #2 % Time all full duty resources exhausted	79.3*	15.0	15.1	37.1	30.4	12.9	64.7	38.1	17.7	76.6	21.1	12.6	2.4	32.5
Platoon #3 % Time all full duty resources exhausted	49.2	11.0	4.5	24.7	10.2	39.4	45.0	14.2	16.3	20.3	14.7	13.3	8.1	20.8
Total % Time all full duty resources exhausted	47.9	13.1	10.6	33.3	20.5	24.4	39.7	20.0	13.2	41.0	16.4	11.1	7.1	22.9**

(Sample Week, 1973)

Platoon #1 % Time all full duty resources exhausted	16.8*	13.1	1.5	0	7.3	0	11.5	6.1	7.9	6.5	2.1	0	4.5	6.7
Platoon #2 % Time all full duty resources exhausted	4.3	1.6	0	0	0	0	0.5	4.4	0	0	0	0	0	0.8
Platoon #3 % Time all full duty resources exhausted	4.4	0	0.6	0.6	2.3	.42	0	0	0.5	0.1	0.6	0	1.2	0.8
Total % Time all full duty resources exhausted	8.5	4.9	0.7	0.2	3.2	.14	4.0	3.5	2.8	2.2	0.9	0	1.9	2.8**

*High figure **City-wide Average

NEW APPROACH TO PATROL

What did it? Not just a new reporting system, but a whole new approach to patrol operations, citywide, involving police management, and the effective utilization of Federal funding and management consultants.

Precinct boundaries were changed and scout car territories reassigned, to reduce differences in workload. The creation of a citywide Emergency Medical Service sharply reduced the involvement of police vehicles in sick-and-injury type runs.

A more exact method of measuring differences in workload by the frequency and timing of response-runs, instead of a statistical analysis of the frequency and timing of major crimes, was developed and computerized.


"Our response records are 100 percent accurate," says another precinct commander. "Our crime statistics show the time of commission for only 60 percent of the crimes."

A mathematical formula was developed and used to "program" the department computer to receive personnel, workload and vehicle data from the precincts, and plan almost instantaneous personnel and vehicle assignment schedules by platoon, using existing computer terminals in the precincts. Included in the calculation were provisions for the right proportion of two-man cars for "heavy" runs, and one-man cars for "service" runs.

A new organizational table for all precincts was created, which changed the method of assignment from manning the scout car positions first, to manning the minimum essential "inside" positions first.

This had the effect of "squeezing" excess personnel from inside or standby details, and making a larger number available for response. The available response personnel were then allocated on the basis of the changing workload from month to month, as indicated by the computer calculations, made each month on the basis of the previous month's experience.

The total number of scout car territories was reduced, and more evenly divided among precincts. This helped to create a reserve of men and cars within each precinct for "special operations," not tied to a specific territory, but on the street at varying times and places to deal with particular crime problems, and peaks of response activity.



SPECIAL OPERATIONS


The precinct's Special Operations unit may include marked and unmarked cars and scooters, and plainclothes as well as uniformed officers. Some precincts also employ combination foot-and-scooter beats, on each of which a quartet of patrolmen work with two vehicles. For half the shift, one pair of men patrols a limited area on foot, while the other two men cover a wider area on the scooters. At midshift, the two pairs switch assignments.

Special Operations also includes the precinct's anti-vice ("morality") and anti-narcotics units. The Precinct Narcotics Units, with their daily raids on narcotics "pads," have been the principal source of increased arrests for narcotics violations.

These special operations forces are frequently called the "fourth platoon." They overlap the normal shifts, some working 6 A.M. to 2 P.M., 2 to 10 P.M., 9 A.M. to 5 P.M., or 7 P.M. to 3 A.M.

"What happens is this," says a precinct commander. "On our afternoon (third) shift, we'll have cars in each of the assigned territories, but also we may have several additional special operations cars out. For an hour or two we might have five cars flooding a single territory where we've been having trouble with purse-snatchings and strong-armings. Then for another couple of hours, later in the evening, we might flood another territory where we've been having trouble with business burglaries."

Total sworn personnel assigned to the precincts was increased, and the number of sergeants increased for more effective street supervision. Total precinct personnel increased by 300 men during 1972 over the previous year. Since the department as a whole had a net increase of slightly over 100, this reflects substantial reassignment of men to the precincts from supporting units.




AREA PATROL

Additional sergeants made it possible for precincts to put into effect an area-patrol concept. Usually the executive lieutenant handles the scheduling.

"The idea," one executive officer says, "is that a sergeant and designated patrolmen should be regularly assigned to a certain area of the precinct over an extended period of time, so that they can become better acquainted with the area, the people, each other, and area problems. This way they should be able to provide better service because they're more alert to what's really going on."

"What we've done is divide the precinct into three areas of three or four scout car territories each. We have a sergeant assigned to each one of those areas, for each platoon. As much as possible, the same patrolmen work for him consistently. When the sergeant rotates to a different platoon, the same men rotate with him."

DAILY ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSE AND BACKUP UNITS (REPRESENTATIVE PRECINCTS)



IMPACT ON CRIME

The impact of all these innovations on crime in the precinct is charted on the wall, usually near the precinct commander's desk. Month by month in virtually every precinct, the wall chart has been showing less crime than the same month of the previous year, consistently since early in 1971. Robberies show one of the largest decreases.

"The crime figures really started dropping for the first time after the precinct narcotics unit went into operation two years ago," says a precinct commander. "But everything has made a difference. More men and more cars out there, at the right time and place. Faster response. Fewer missed calls. Better service can't help but pay off."

"Over all, we're just planning better. Now when we say we're going to put a certain number of response units on the street at a certain time, we rarely miss the goal by more than one or two percent."

"Before the new methods went into operation, we might be as much as 25 to 30 percent short of the units scheduled. No wonder we were having trouble getting cars to citizens on time."

PUTTING STATE BLOCK GRANTS TO WORK

LEAA-OCJP GRANTS TO THE DETROIT POLICE 1970-1973 PRINCIPAL AREAS OF POLICE OPERATIONS INVOLVED:


	Funds Committed
Patrol	\$ 1,861,000
Criminal Investigation	1,001,000
Communications	3,740,000
Personnel Improvement	1,998,000
Administration	910,000
Community Action	1,164,000
TOTAL	\$10,674,000*

Grants assistance has made a significant contribution to improving police service in many areas of operations.

WHAT THE FUNDING IS PAYING FOR:

Equipment, Supplies, Facilities	\$ 5,284,000
Services (including management consulting, education and training)	3,583,000
Additional personnel	1,807,000
TOTAL	\$10,674,000*

OCJP FUNDING—DETROIT 1970-73 BY YEAR AND CUMULATIVE



*Unaudited total including both actual spending on completed projects and anticipated spending on continuing grants.