

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
OFFICE OF EMERGENCY PLANNING  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

JUL 27 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JOSEPH CALIFANO

Subject: Assistances for Detroit

In response to your request on this subject, there are no assistances we can provide without a "major disaster" declaration.

With a declaration under PL 81-875 we can provide this aid:

- Clearance of debris
- Repair of essential public facilities (building/utilities)
- Provision of temporary housing
- Protective health and sanitation measures
- Distribution of medicine, food and other consumable supplies.
- Repair and replacement of damaged emergency equipment (fire and police vehicles, etc.)
- Overtime of city employees (except police and fire)
- \* Repair of streets, roads, and bridges
- \* Repair of dikes, levees, and drainage facilities

\*(not believed applicable to Detroit)

Although reimbursement for expenditures for overtime of police and firemen and the costs incurred by the National Guard is not normally made by OEP, in a major disaster declaration the Director of OEP could authorize such reimbursements.

If a major disaster is declared under PL 875, loan programs of several Federal agencies would be triggered or liberalized (DHUD, VA, SBA, OE.)

  
Farris Bryant  
Director

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

JULY 27, 1967

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY

---

THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS TO  
THE NATION  
ON  
CIVIL DISORDERS  
THE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE

10:30 P.M. EDT

My fellow Americans:

We have endured a week such as no Nation should live through: a time of violence and tragedy.

For a few minutes tonight, I want to talk about that tragedy -- and I want to talk about the deeper questions it raises for us all.

I am tonight appointing a special Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders.

Governor Otto Kerner, of Illinois, has agreed to serve as Chairman. Mayor John Lindsay, of New York, will serve as Vice Chairman. Its other members will include Fred R. Harris, Senator from Oklahoma; Edward W. Brooke, United States Senator from Massachusetts; James C. Corman, U.S. Representative from California, 22nd District, Los Angeles; William M. McCulloch, the U.S. Representative from the State of Ohio, the 4th District; I. W. Abel, the President of the United Steel Workers; Charles B. Thornton, the President, Director and Chairman of the Board of Litton Industries, Inc.; Roy Wilkins, the Executive Director of the NAACP; Katherine Graham Peden, the Commissioner of Commerce of the State of Kentucky; Herbert Jenkins, the Chief of Police, Atlanta, Georgia.

The Commission will investigate the origins of the recent disorders in our cities. It will make recommendations -- to me, to the Congress, to the State Governors, and to the Mayors -- for measures to prevent or contain such disasters in the future.

In their work, the Commission members will have access to the facts that are gathered by Director Edgar Hoover and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The FBI will continue to exercise its full authority to investigate these riots, in accordance with my standing instructions, and continue to search for evidence of conspiracy.

But even before the Commission begins its work; and even before all the evidence is in, there are some things that we can tell about the outbreaks of this summer.

MORE

First -- let there be no mistake about it -- the looting, arson, plunder and pillage which have occurred are not part of a civil rights protest. There is no American right to loot stores, or to burn buildings, or to fire rifles from the rooftops. That is crime -- and crime must be dealt with forcefully, and swiftly, and certainly -- under law.

Innocent people, Negro and white, have been killed. Damage to property -- owned by Negroes and whites -- is calamitous. Worst of all, fear and bitterness which have been loosed will take long months to erase.

The criminals who committed these acts of violence against the people deserve to be punished -- and they must be punished. Explanations may be offered, but nothing can excuse what they have done.

There will be attempts to interpret the events of the past few days. But when violence strikes, then those in public responsibility have an immediate and a very different job: not to analyze, but to end disorder.

That they must seek to do with every means at their command: through local police, state officials, and, -- in extraordinary circumstances where local authorities have stated that they cannot maintain order with their own resources -- then through Federal power that we have limited authority to use.

I have directed the Secretary of Defense to issue new training standards for riot control procedures immediately to National Guard units across the country. Through the Continental Army Command, this expanded training will begin immediately. The National Guard must have the ability to respond effectively, quickly, and appropriately, in conditions of disorder and violence.

Those charged with the responsibility of law enforcement should, and must, be respected by all of our people. The violence must be stopped: quickly, finally, and permanently.

It would compound the tragedy, however, if we should settle for order that is imposed by the muzzle of a gun.

MORE

In America, we seek more than the uneasy calm of martial law. We seek peace based on one man's respect for another man -- and upon mutual respect for law. We seek a public order that is built on steady progress in meeting the needs of all of our people.

Not even the sternest police action, nor the most effective Federal Troops, can ever create lasting peace in our cities.

The only genuine, long-range solution for what has happened lies in an attack -- mounted at every level -- upon the conditions that breed despair and violence. All of us know what those conditions are: ignorance, discrimination, slums, poverty, disease, not enough jobs. We should attack these conditions -- not because we are frightened by conflict, but because we are fired by conscience. We should attack them because there is simply no other way to achieve a decent and orderly society in America.

In the past three and a half years, we have directed the greatest Governmental effort in all of our American history at these ancient enemies. The roll call of those laws reveals the depth of our concern: The Model Cities Act. The Voters Rights Act. The Civil Rights Act. The Rent Supplement Act. Medicare and Medicaid. The 24 educational bills. Head Start. The Job Corps. The Neighborhood Youth Corps. Teacher Corps. Manpower Development and Training. And many, many more acts too numerous to mention on television tonight.

We will continue to press for laws which would protect our citizens from violence: like the Safe Streets and Crime Control Act now under consideration in the Congress and the Gun Control Act.

Our work has just begun. Yet there are those who feel that even this beginning is too much. There are those who would have us turn back even now, at the beginning of this journey.

Last week in Congress, a small but important plan for action in the cities was voted down in the House of Representatives. The members of that body rejected my request for \$20 million to fight the pestilence of rats -- rats which prowl in dark alleys and tenements, and attack thousands of city children. The passage of this legislation would have meant much to the children of the slums. A strong government that has spent millions to protect baby calves from worms could surely afford to show as much concern for baby boys and girls.

There are some tonight who feel that we cannot afford a Model Cities program. They reduced my request for funds this year by two-thirds.

There are some who feel that we cannot afford additional good teachers for the children of poverty in urban areas. Or new efforts to house those who are most in need of housing. Or to aid in education to those who need to read and write.

Theirs is a strange system of bookkeeping.

MORE

I believe we should be counting the assets that these measures can bring to America: cities richer in opportunity; cities more full of promise; cities of order, progress, and happiness. Instead, some are counting the seeds of bitterness.

This is not a time for angry reaction. It is a time for action: starting with legislative action to improve the life in our cities. The strength and promise of the law are the surest remedies for tragedy in the streets.

But laws are only one answer. Another answer lies in the way our people will respond to these disturbances.

There is a danger that the worst toll of this tragedy will be counted in the hearts of Americans: in hatred, in insecurity, in fear, in heated words which will not end the conflict, but prolong it.

So let us acknowledge the tragedy; but let us not exaggerate it.

Let us look about tonight. Let us look at ourselves. We will see these things:

Most Americans, Negro and White, are leading decent, responsible and productive lives.

Most Americans, Negro and white, seek safety in their neighborhoods and harmony with their neighbors.

Nothing can destroy good will more than a period of needless strife and suspicion between the races.

Let us condemn the violent few. But let us remember that it is law-abiding Negro families who have really suffered most at the hands of the rioters. It is responsible Negro citizens who hope most fervently -- and need most urgently -- to share in America's growth and prosperity.

This is not the time to turn away from that goal.

To reach it will require more than laws; more than dollars. It will take renewed dedication and understanding in the heart of every citizen.

I know there are millions of men and women tonight who are eager to heal the wounds that we have suffered; who want to get on with the job of teaching and working and building America.

In that spirit, at the conclusion of this address, I will sign a proclamation calling for a day of prayer in our Nation throughout all of our States. On this Sunday, July 30, I urge the citizens in every town, every city, and every home in this Land to go into their churches -- to pray for order and reconciliation among men.

I appeal to every Governor, every Mayor, every preacher and every teacher and parent to join and give leadership in this National observance.

This spirit of dedication cannot be limited to our public leaders. It must extend to every citizen in this land. And the man who speaks to break the peace must feel the powerful disapproval of all of his neighbors.

Tonight, I call upon every American to search his own heart.

To those who are tempted by violence, I would say this: Think again. Who is really the loser when violence comes? Whose neighborhood is made a shambles? Whose life is threatened most?

If you choose to tear down what other hands have built,

-- You will not succeed;

-- You will suffer most from your own crimes;

-- You will learn that there are no victors in the aftermath of violence.

The apostles of violence, with their ugly drumbeat of hatred, must know that they are now heading for disaster. And every man who really wants progress or justice or equality must stand against them and their miserable virus of hate.

For other Americans, especially those in positions of public trust, I have this message:

Yours is the duty to bring about a peaceful change in America. If your response to these tragic events is only "business as usual" -- you invite not only disaster, but dishonor.

My fellow citizens, let us go about our work. Let us clear the streets of rubble and quench the fires that hatred set. Let us feed and care for those who have suffered at the rioter's hands -- but let there be no bonus or reward or salutes for those who have inflicted that suffering.

Let us resolve that this violence is going to stop and there will be no bonus to flow from it. We can stop it. We must stop it. We will stop it.

And let us build something much more lasting: faith between man and man, faith between race and race. Faith in each other -- and faith in the promise of beautiful America.

Let us pray for the day when "mercy and truth are met together; righteousness and peace have kissed each other." Let us pray -- and let us work for better jobs and better housing and better education that so many millions of our own fellow Americans need so much tonight.

Let us then act in the Congress, in the city halls, and in every community, so that this great land of ours may truly be "one Nation under God -- with liberty and justice for all."

Goodnight and thank you.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

(2)

July 28, 1967  
Friday, 12:30 p.m.

FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM Joe Califano *jay*.

Attached is a statement which Cy Vance is now making on his meeting this morning with Governor Romney and Mayor Cavanagh.

Attachment

July 28, 1967

Statement to be made by Mr. Vance when he opens Press Conference commencing at Noon today. Conference will be conducted by Vance, Romney and Cavanagh

As you know, the President yesterday sent a wire to the Governor and Mayor indicating his determination to help meet the emergency health, food and safety needs of Detroit which cannot be met from state and city resources. The President instructed federal officials to move without delay to meet the needs of those who have suffered at the hands of the rioters.

To that end, we held a comprehensive discussion, starting at 8:30 AM this morning, with Governor Romney and Mayor Cavanagh. I emphasized our readiness to respond to such requests in the area of emergency health, food and safety needs.

Let me give a rundown on the points we discussed:

As to food, the Mayor indicated that the availability of food does not seem to be a problem, though there may be a distribution problem in some places. We expressed our readiness to be helpful in the event that a shortage of food arises.

As to health, the City Health Commissioner will be giving us by noon today a specified list of medicine and drugs which are in short supply. We expect to be able to respond promptly to requests which the Health Commissioner may make.

On another health matter, to meet the emergency shelter needs of riot victims, the local office of Housing Administration has leased to the Detroit Housing Commission, at the nominal cost of \$1.00 a month, 68 houses, some containing more than one unit. If there are additional emergency shelter needs, we are prepared to look further for federal resources.

As to safety, we have already taken the first steps to shift certain federal funds for the spot demolition of riot-damaged buildings which are hazardous to public safety. We are investigating the availability of additional federal funds for demolition of riot-damaged buildings.

In the field of safety, we are prepared to provide additional helmets and ammunition to civic police if a survey now being made



Let me give a rundown on the points we discussed  
in the area of emergency needs, 1000 and  
I emphasized our readiness to report to  
the Governor, with Governor Romney and  
his cabinet, we have a comprehensive plan  
to deal with the situation of the city.  
I have discussed this with the  
Michigan National Guard and the  
Michigan State Police and we are  
prepared to report to the Governor  
and his cabinet on the situation  
of the city and the state.  
I have discussed this with the  
Michigan National Guard and the  
Michigan State Police and we are  
prepared to report to the Governor  
and his cabinet on the situation  
of the city and the state.

shows that their supplies are depleted. Federal forces have already made 30 caliber ammunition available to city or state police.

The Federal Government has already made available facilities at the Milan Correctional Institution for detention of persons arrested during the riots. If more facilities prove to be needed, we are prepared to survey other federal activities for additional appropriate federal space. Hopefully, this will not be necessary in view of the substantial progress which is being made, but we are prepared to be of further assistance if required. Secondly, in a step toward returning ultimate responsibility for the security of Detroit to civilian law enforcement agencies, the 46th Infantry Division has been assigned responsibility for the security of the 1st, 7th and 13th Police Precincts as of 8 AM today. Troops of the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions, which have been stationed in these areas since last Tuesday, were withdrawn to assembly positions nearby in the metropolitan area.

Thirdly, 600-800 Air National Guards men will be defederalized and returned to state control. This will give Governor Romney additional state troops for use elsewhere.

Troop alignment: One battalion of regular troops has been relieved in the 7th Precinct by elements of the 46th Division and is moving to an assembly position elsewhere within northeast Detroit. A second battalion has been relieved by the 46th in the 1st Precinct and has moved to an assembly position on the state fair grounds. One company of regular troops has been relieved by the 46th in the 13th Precinct and is also assembled on the fair grounds.



THE JOINT STAFF

THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

29 July 1967  
0530 EDT


MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subject: FACT SHEET # 23 GARDEN PLOT (DETROIT)

1. During the past 24 hours, the city of Detroit has continued its return to normalcy with the curfew remaining in effect.
2. The following deployment of troops and law enforcement personnel has been, or is being, accomplished:
  - a. 300 State Police have been released to their home posts.
  - b. Elements of the 46th Infantry Division (ARNG) are securing the 1st, 7th and 13th Police precinct.
  - c. 600 to 800 Michigan National Guardsmen will be defederalized as soon as possible.
  - d. The 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division and the 2d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division and supporting units are being withdrawn to assembly areas within the city of Detroit. It is anticipated that these units will remain within the Detroit area until next week.

Distribution:  
WHITE HOUSE SIT ROOM  
SECDEF  
DEPSECDEF  
OSD GENERAL COUNSEL  
CJCS (3)  
DJS  
VDJS  
CNO  
CSA  
CSAF  
CMC  
J-30  
J-31  
J-32  
J-34

DDO  
ADDO  
CCOC  
PA DESK  
NA DESK  
STATE

  
JAMES A. SHANNON  
Brigadier General, USAF  
Deputy Director for  
Operations (NMCC)

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

July 29, 1967  
9:15 pm, Saturday

FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM Larry Levinson *LEL*

Tom Johnson and I have gone over the Detroit riot chronology in great detail and have checked with the principals involved.

We have added some additional material and made some technical corrections in some of the times.

The chronology now conforms as closely as possible to the events and facts as they occurred.

Attachment

THE DETROIT RIOTS  
CHRONOLOGY

SUNDAY (JULY 23)

3:30 pm: Based on FBI report, Joe Califano (White House Staff) notifies President that situation in Detroit may be getting worse ~~but that Romney has not requested federal assistance.~~ President asks to be kept fully informed.

9:30 pm: FBI Command Post advises Larry Levinson (White House Staff) that rioting has intensified, that ~~Romney has~~ the guard<sup>ed</sup> out and that 8,000 guardsmen, as well as 4,000 state and local police can be made available. ~~Romney does not request help.~~ Levinson immediately notifies President. President asks that close watch be kept on situation.

11:55 pm: Cavanagh and Romney discuss situation with Attorney General Clark by telephone.

MONDAY (JULY 24)

Early Morning Hours: Romney calls Clark at 2:40 AM. Clark calls Romney at 3:40, 5:15, and 6:50 AM. Romney says he may need federal troops but does not request them.

2:45 am: Clark calls President <sup>we put to rest</sup> advising him of Detroit situation. President authorizes Army ~~to start planning for~~ troop deployment. Clark notifies Army Secretary Resor who contacts Army Chief of Staff General Johnson to begin planning.

3:30 am: Resor goes to Pentagon Command Post with General Johnson. Command Post put on emergency condition.

4:20 am: General Johnson issues "alert orders" to paratroop units at Fort Bragg, North Carolina and Fort Campbell, Kentucky.

8:55 am: Romney calls Clark to discuss situation further.

9:45 am: Romney calls Clark and says there is <sup>1/</sup>reasonable doubt <sup>1/</sup>law and order can be maintained and that he will be formally requesting 5,000 federal troops. He reads Clark text of telegram he will send shortly to President.

10:05 am: President is already meeting with McNamara on troop deployment should a request be made, when Clark tells President that Romney is now about to request by telegram the use of federal troops. McNamara recommends Vance be sent to Detroit because of his prior first-hand experience with civil disturbances "from Oxford on". ~~Vance is in Washington that day after the burial of his Mother several days before hand.~~ President decides to send Vance to Detroit for on-the-spot assessment.

10:40 am: President gets from Califano text of wire as dictated over the phone from the Attorney General's Office. Official wire has not yet been sent. President orders Mr. Wright in White House message center to be on alert for Romney's wire.

10:43 am: President calls meeting in Cabinet Room with McNamara, Clark, Roger Wilkins (head of Community Relations Service), Warren Christopher (newly confirmed Deputy Attorney General who was on McCone Commission on Watts riots), John Doar (Assistant Attorney General

THE DETROIT RIOTS  
CHRONOLOGY

SUNDAY (JULY 23)

3:30 pm: Based on FBI report, Joe Califano (White House Staff) notifies President that situation in Detroit may be getting worse but that Romney has not requested federal assistance. President asks to be kept fully informed.

9:30 pm: FBI Command Post advises Larry Levinson (White House Staff) that rioting has intensified, that Romney has the guard out and that 8,000 guardsmen, as well as 4,000 state and local police can be made available. Romney does not request help. Levinson immediately notifies President. President asks that close watch be kept on situation.

11:55 pm: Cavanagh and Romney discuss situation with Attorney General Clark by telephone.

MONDAY (JULY 24)

Early Morning Hours: Romney calls Clark at 2:40 AM. Clark calls Romney at 3:40, 5:15, and 6:50 AM. Romney says he may need federal troops but does not request them.

2:45 am: Clark calls President advising him of Detroit situation. President authorizes Army to start planning for troop deployment. Clark notifies Army Secretary Resor who contacts Army Chief of Staff General Johnson to begin planning.

3:30 am: Resor goes to Pentagon Command Post with General Johnson. Command Post put on emergency condition.

4:20 am: General Johnson issues "alert orders" to paratroop units at Fort Bragg, North Carolina and Fort Campbell, Kentucky.

8:55 am: Romney calls Clark to discuss situation further.

9:45 am: Romney calls Clark and says there is reasonable doubt law and order can be maintained and that he will be formally requesting 5,000 federal troops. He reads Clark text of telegram he will send shortly to President.

10:05 am: President is already meeting with McNamara on troop deployment should a request be made, when Clark tells President that Romney is now about to request by telegram the use of federal troops. McNamara recommends Vance be sent to Detroit because of his prior first-hand experience with civil disturbances "from Oxford on". Vance is in Washington that day after the burial of his Mother several days beforehand. President decides to send Vance to Detroit for on-the-spot assessment.

10:40 am: President gets from Califano text of wire as dictated over the phone from the Attorney General's Office. Official wire has not yet been sent. President orders Mr. Wright in White House message center to be on alert for Romney's wire.

10:43 am: President calls meeting in Cabinet Room with McNamara, Clark, Roger Wilkins (head of Community Relations Service), Warren Christopher (newly confirmed Deputy Attorney General who was on McCone Commission on Watts riots), John Doar (Assistant Attorney General

for Civil Rights). George Christian, Tom Johnson, Larry Levinson of White House Staff.

- 10:46 am: Romney dispatches wire to President requesting troops but does not mention number of troops.
- 10:56 am: Romney wire received at White House and immediately brought to Cabinet Room by William Hopkins (White House Staff).
- 11:02 am: President directs McNamara to have troops ready to move to Selfridge AFB (30 miles from Detroit - there are no closer available airports.)
- 11:03 am: McNamara immediately calls Secretary Resor and tells him to start loading troops on aircraft.
- 11:15 am: Meeting begins. Clark reviews local situation citing prior precedents and laws. They indicate that federal troops can be sent only upon the request of the Governor (when State Legislature is not in session) and the local authorities are "unable, fail or refuse" to maintain law and order. McNamara reviews the troop situation, stating that Lt. General John Throckmorton will be in command. Response to Romney's telegram is prepared by President in consultation with Clark and McNamara. President says Governor's request must be honored promptly. The purpose of federal troops is to assist and support -- not to supplant -- local forces. Federal troops would be used only if necessary. President tells McNamara that troops should be moved into immediate position for deployment but that Vance's on-the-spot assessment is essential before federal troops are used.
- 11:40 am: President, from Cabinet Room, personally places call to Romney to have text of telegram read. Romney is unavailable.
- 11:42 am: President's wire to Romney dispatched.
- 11:47 am: Senator Griffin calls President. President tells him to get Vance to Detroit and that he is ordering federal troops to the area.
- 11:57 am: Romney sends Clark wire requesting 5,000 troops.
- 12:01 pm: Romney returns President's call. Clark reads Romney text of wire. Vance arrives in Cabinet Room, and talks to Romney and says that he will be leaving for Detroit to confer with him and Mayor Cavanagh as soon as possible.
- 12:10 pm: President calls Senator Hart and notifies him of the situation. President then leaves Cabinet Room but asks to be kept informed.
- 12:20 pm: Vance assembles team (Christopher Wilkins (Graduate of University of Michigan Law School), Doar and Al Fitt, Army General (and a native Detroit). Vance talks to General Throckmorton, the federal troop commander and tells him to proceed at once to Selfridge.
- 12:35 pm: Clark receives Romney's telegram requesting 5,000 troops.
- 12:45 pm: Following Presidential directive, McNamara orders two brigades to move at once to Selfridge.

- 1:30 pm: Vance and team leave Washington by air for Selfridge.
- 2:00 pm: First troop carrier plane leaves Fort Bragg, beginning airlift of 2400-man brigade from 82nd Airborne. Air time to Selfridge: 2 hours, 10 minutes.
- 2:05 pm: First troop carrier plane leaves Fort Campbell, beginning airlift of 2400-man brigade from 101st Airborne. Flight time to Selfridge: about 2 hours.
- 2:15 pm: Airlift underway. 50 troop carrier aircraft are at Fort Bragg but others must come from air bases in other parts of the country -- 28 from Langley, Virginia; 28 from Lockbourne, Tennessee; 15 from Seward, Tennessee; 10 from Dyess, Texas; and 10 from Forbes, Kansas. Planes leave at 5 minute intervals. Brigades move with their trucks, ambulances, and about 100 tons of cargo. Over 140 aircraft are used.
- 2:25 pm: Clark calls Romney and tells him Vance will be arriving just after 3 PM.
- 3:00 pm: General Throckmorton arrives at Selfridge.
- 3:07 pm: Vance and team arrive at Selfridge. Vance and Throckmorton immediately confer and learn that Governor and Mayor are at Detroit Police Headquarters, about 30 miles from Selfridge. Vance and Throckmorton then proceed by car to Police Headquarters.
- 4:05 pm: First airlift arrives at Selfridge; others begin landing at 2 1/2 minute intervals. 5th Army has provided 100 busses leased from the Detroit Bus Company to move troops into the city.
- About  
4:30 pm: Vance and Throckmorton meet with Governor Romney, Mayor Cavanagh, their staffs and Police Commissioner Girardon. Vance is advised by local officials that 700 state policemen, 900 local police (out of about 3,000), 3,000 National Guardsmen (out of 7000 available) were actually on the streets. Vance suggests that the Guard commit the remainder of the troops.
- 5:00 pm: Vance, Romney, Cavanagh, Christopher, Throckmorton, and Doar tour riot area. Situation is quiet.
- 5:05 pm: 1500 paratroopers have now landed at Selfridge.
- 6:07 pm: President discusses riot situation at White House meeting with Congressional Leadership.
- 6:45 pm: President calls meeting with McNamara, Clark, Army Secretary of War, Army Chief of Staff General Johnson, to review situation and receive on-the-spot report from Vance.
- 6:50 pm: Vance reports to President that he has met with Romney and Cavanagh and has completed a tour of the riot area. He says that there are many more state guardsmen on the streets than there were last night, that Detroit has an excellent police force and a good National Guard and that it is always best to use local police and troops, as long as the situation is under control.

Based on his survey, discussions with local officials, Vance says it is too early to commit federal forces because the situation appears under control. This is primarily because more guardsmen are on organized street patrols and that there were about 10,000 police and guardsmen in the area.

McNamara asks what the addition of 5,000 federal troops would mean at this point to help the situation. Vance says that it is still too early to tell, and he will follow the situation on a close basis, reporting back continually. Vance also reports that "there is a sharp division among community leaders" whether federal troops should be committed, with the Mayor urging their immediate deployment while others saying to hold back.

- 7:00 pm: Vance meets with Romney, Cavanagh, Congressmen Diggs and Conyers and other community leaders.
- 7:30 pm: After receiving Vance's report, White House meeting breaks up, with the next meeting scheduled for 8:30 pm, awaiting Vance's report.
- 8:15 pm: Airlift to Selfridge is in high gear. More than 4,000 troops are now on the ground. Over 170 flights have been completed.
- 8:16 pm: President asks J. Edgar Hoover to come to the White House to meet with him on the Detroit situation.
- 8:30 pm: Romney and Vance hold press conference in Detroit. Romney says: The situation is hopeful. The community is better organized. There are three times the number of National Guardsmen available tonight as last night. Last night we were scrambling. There is a rising desire on the people to see this thing ended. The policy is to be firm and fair. I am very hopeful that we will be able to lift the bans and let the people go back to work. There is reason to hope.
- Cavanagh says: He sees some hopeful signs but he would still like to see Federal troops committed. He wants to restore sanity and order and get people back to work.
- 8:32 pm: Meeting begins at Mansion with President, McNamara, General Johnson, Hoover, Secretary Resor and Clark. Vance reports that incident rate has picked up, and that it would be wise to move three battalions from Selfridge to the Fair Grounds where they would be close to the riot area. President approves.
- 9:30 pm: President moves meeting to Oval Room. Follows FBI and ticker reports. Reads New York Times of June 21, 1943 on FDR proclamation sending troops to Detroit to quell race riots. Vance is making continual reconnaissance of the riot area, meets with Governor, is in constant contact with open line to the President's Office.
- 10:03 pm: Christopher advises Clark that incidents are increasing and that two more guardsmen have been wounded.
- 10:08 pm: Vance calls. Reports that the situation is continuing to deteriorate. 1200 persons are now detained in Felony Court. Reports of incidents have increased 20% in the last hour. President asks Vance what is



fastest way to bring troops into the riot area. Vance advises that he and Throckmorton considered and most efficient way is to move troops to Fair Grounds, where they would be available for immediate deployment as required.

- Around  
10:20 pm: Vance now reports that incident rates are rising sharply and has been advised that all available resources have been deployed by the Governor and local officials. All concerned -- the Governor, General Throckmorton and local officials -- recommend that federal troops be brought into the area and the guard federalized. President tells Vance that his recommendations will be followed and tells Vance to start troops moving down immediately. Vance and Throckmorton advise that positioning troops would take some time because the area covered was large. The President tells Vance to make a last-minute radio-television appeal for law and order before the troops arrive (Vance makes such an appeal shortly after 11 PM).
- 10:31 pm: President signs Proclamation ordering rioters to disperse. (This is a necessary preliminary under the law before federal troops can be sent in). President begins work with his advisers on his television statement, after making decision to speak to the American people.
- 11:22 pm: Executive Order signed.
- 11:30 pm: The two brigades begin to assemble at the Fair Grounds to receive their last minute checks -- equipment and orders. In keeping with tactics for civil disturbances, reconnaissance patrols are dispatched to the riot area in which troops will be deployed.
- 11:43 pm: President tells Vance that he has signed the Executive Order.
- 11:55 pm: President addresses Nation from TV studio at White House.

TUESDAY (JULY 25)

- 12:08 am: Presidential statement ends.
- 2:30 am: Reconnaissance patrols have been completed. Main body of paratroopers proceeds into riot area. These troops displace the now federalized guard troops and occupy the entire area east of Woodward Avenue (the main thoroughfare). The guard moves to occupy the area west of Woodward Avenue.
- 3:05 am: At a press conference, General Throckmorton says: "My troops, including elements of the 82nd Airborne Division from Ft. Bragg, North Carolina and the 101st Airborne Division from Fort Campbell, Kentucky, which have been rapidly deployed to McPherson Air Force Base, now have begun to patrol the streets of Detroit to augment city and state police forces and men of the Michigan National Guard who are now under my command.
- "All of my troops including regular Army and Guard forces have been ordered to use the minimum force necessary to complete their mission in helping to restore law and order to this city.
- "At the same time, they have been told to take all appropriate action to safeguard lives and property. Cooperation with

city and state forces has been outstanding, and I am certain that this will continue to be the case.

"As the troop commander, I call on all citizens to cooperate with civilian and military authorities to eliminate lawlessness and restore order to this community. My troops will do that which is necessary to achieve its crucial goal as rapidly as possible."

Note: The Army regards the deployment as first-rate operation. The basic tactical plan drawn up by the Army "Strike Command" -- stated that "complete closure time for both brigades is about 12 hours" -- possibly longer if the airlift was slowed down. The troops began leaving their bases at 2:00 pm -- and were in the riot area at 2:00 am -- a 12 hour interval.

## ROMNEY

DETROIT (AP)-GOV. GEORGE ROMNEY SAID TODAY "WE WERE PLEADING FOR FEDERAL TROOPS AS FAST AS WE COULD GET THEM" DURING THE EARLY HOURS OF THE DETROIT RIOTS AND HE LISTED, POINT BY POINT, THE DELAYS THAT AROSE BEFORE FEDERAL AUTHORITIES RESPONDED TO HIS APPEAL.

"YOU CAN DRAW YOUR OWN CONCLUSIONS," THE GOVERNOR SAID IN AN INTERVIEW. "I'M JUST TELLING YOU WHAT HAPPENED."

GRIMLY, ROMNEY SAID NEARLY 24 HOURS ELAPSED BETWEEN THE TIME HE FIRST ASKED WASHINGTON FOR HELP AND THE MOMENT WHEN THE FEDERAL AIR BORNE TROOPS WERE COMMITTED TO THE RIOT ZONES.

THE RACIAL EXPLOSION TOOK 41 LIVES AND HIT DETROIT WITH AN ESTIMATED LOSS OF \$500 MILLION IN PROPERTY DAMAGE.

IN THE INTERVIEW, ROMNEY MADE THESE POINTS:

1. HE SAID U.S. ATTY. GEN. RAMSEY CLARK "CHANGED HIS POSITION" WITH RESPECT TO REQUIRING A WRITTEN, NOT JUST AN ORAL, REQUEST TO SEND THE FEDERAL TROOPS TO DETROIT.

2. AFTER PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S REPRESENTATIVE, CYRUS R. VANCE, ARRIVED IN DETROIT, NINE HOURS PASSED BEFORE VANCE AGREED TO COMMIT THE FEDERAL TROOPS.

3. FEDERAL AUTHORITIES DEMANDED A "CERTIFICATION OF AN INSURRECTION," ROMNEY SAID, "MY BASIC POINT WAS THAT THE FEDERAL TROOPS SHOULD BE SENT BECAUSE I DIDN'T WANT TO LET THE SITUATION GET OUT OF HAND. THAT'S WHAT WE WERE TRYING TO PREVENT."

LT1021AED 7/31

LDA to WHITE HOUSE

For: Mr Richard Moose  
Press Room

31 JULY ROMNEY PRESS CONFERENCE  
TO BE LIX'D ONE PAGE AT A TIME  
AS TRANSCRIPT IS FINISHED. PAGE 1

Governor Romney, July 31, 12:00 Noon

Governor Romney: Apparently the White House elected to make available to - to meet the New York Times correspondent in Washington a purported chronology of what happened last Sunday night and Monday morning. I thought I would review what happened against the reported indication of their interpretation of what happened. Now, obviously, I don't have the national official statement from them, but I assume that this article by <sup>7/31</sup> Frankel of the New York Times Service is based on material made available from official sources.

Now, the chronology of the State involvement is as follows:

I was called about 8:00 in the morning by my Legal Aide, Robert Danhoff, and he told me that rioting had started over in the 12th Street area, and he indicated that on-the-spot State Police observers viewed it very seriously, and recommended that we urge the Detroit Police Department and the Mayor to do everything possible to curb the situation. And so I asked my legal advisor, Robert Danhoff, to get in touch with the Mayor and to indicate that based on such information as we had this could be a very serious situation and that we wanted him to know of the ready availability of the State Police and National Guard personnel. We happened to have had about 1200 National Guard personnel doing some drill work at the Detroit Armory Sunday morning. Now ordinarily they would have been released after a few hours drill work and gone home, but because of our information as to the seriousness of the situation, we kept those men on alert all day and kept them here at the Armory so we could have them out on the streets immediately.

It was about at that time that the Commissioner of State Police, Colonel Davis, first alerted the State Guard. It was about 8:00 in the morning, and then we had optimistic reports about the handling of the situation, and so the State Guard alert was relaxed and they were taken off alert on the basis of reports we were given. Then later in the morning they were again put on the alert as the situation worsened, and at about 12:00 I had the first call from Mayor Cavanaugh in which he indicated he thought they could handle the situation but in any event he knew he could contact me if he needed State Police help or if he needed National Guard help and he told me where he was going to be.

LDX to WHITE HOUSE

For: Mr Richard Moore  
Press Room

31 JULY ROMNEY PRESS CONFERENCE  
TO BE LDM'D ONE PAGE AT A TIME  
AS TRANSCRIPT IS FINISHED. PAGE 2.

Gov. Romney (contd)

2.

We received a call between 1:45 and 2:00 p. m. from the Mayor requesting Michigan State Police. This call went to Mr Danhoff and he called me. As a result of talking to me, he also called the National Guard and talked with General Schnipke with respect to Guard use. As a result to the call to General Schnipke, he dispatched General Moore of the National Guard, who was up in Lansing -- up in Grayling at the encampment down here to take command of the National Guard in the event they should be called. At 2:30 we again received calls from various sources indicating the things might be better but at 4:00 p. m. we received a call from the Mayor indicating he wanted the Guard and so we made the Guard troops available.

By that time we had also alerted Guard personnel in Flint and in Grand Rapids. We had about 350 in each place to augment the 1200 we had down here in Detroit. Now at 6:00, on my instructions, Danhoff called Schnipke at Grayling and indicated that he'd better begin to think about how he could get the complete Guard here in Detroit in the event we might need them. Because, after all, we had 200 miles to contend with, and I also asked him to ascertain the transportation problem, the problem of length of time.

The situation continued to worsen, and the result was that I went down to Detroit Police Headquarters at about 8:15 -- I got there about 8:15, 8:30 - conferred briefly with Mayor Cavanaugh and Police Commissioner Gerarden. Mayor Cavanaugh left to take a helicopter flight over the city and shortly after he left, I left to do the same thing. We returned about the same time to the Detroit Police Headquarters at, as nearly I can remember, somewhere around 10:00.

It was around 11:00 or thereabouts, as I recall it, as a result of taking a look at the mounting figures as a result of the survey of the city, that I called Schnipke and ordered the National Guard to be brought to Detroit as soon as they could get them here. This was, as I say, a significant transportation job, but in any event it was around that time that we mobilized the complete National Guard, except for the Air National Guard.

At about 2:00 with the arson, the looting and the arson, and the sniping obviously spreading through the metropolitan area, the problem no longer limited to the western part of the city, with arson and

LDX to WHITE HOUSE

For: Mr. Richard Moore  
Press Room

31 JULY ROMNEY PRESS CONFERENCE  
TO BE LDX'D ONE PAGE AT A TIME  
AS TRANSCRIPT IS FINISHED. PAGE 3

(Governor Romney - continued)

3.

looting and sniping moving into the eastern part of the city, and quite far north too because there were fires as far north as Six Mile and as far down as below Olympia, and there was a 2-1/2 by 3-1/2 mile area by that time in flames. The nearest thing I can compare it to is a battlefield. It looked like the city had been bombed and was buffing from the bombing. That is what it looked like. But in any event, by that time it was clear that the rioting was spreading through the city generally and the Fire Department was having extreme difficulty in dealing with the fires, because they were being sniped at and they were being instructed in undertaking to put out fires.

It was during that period that I was working with the Mayor, the Police Commissioner and the Chief of the Fire Department and the two Commissioners were on the job constantly, Mr. Angolan and Harris, to augment the Detroit Fire Department, because it was perfectly obvious they couldn't handle it. With Colonel David's help, who is the Fire Marshall, we proceeded to just lift fire departments from all over the area, including Windsor.

Right after we got through taking the steps necessary to mobilize the Fire Departments, Mayor Cavanaugh left briefly and Gerardon and I were reviewing the situation, and I said to him that in my opinion we ought to take a look at whether or not we had sufficient manpower, Detroit Police, State Police and National Guard combined, to deal with the problem on almost a city-wide basis. I said I thought he ought to go down and sit down with his Superintendent Reuter and Nichols and determine whether or not the 1500 Detroit Police that we could have on the streets at any one time, the 350-400 State Police, and as our peak National Guard commitment when they arrived -- and we knew they wouldn't arrive until some time Monday, 4,000. Whether we could deal with the situation with a force just short of 6,000 men.

They went down and commenced that study. About 15 minutes later I joined them and they had arrived at the conclusion that it could not be dealt with by the local and Michigan personnel. They had formed the judgment that they needed 3,000 additional men. I reviewed the figures with them and said now we've got to be on the safe side. We have to

BOX to WHITE HOUSE

For: Mr Richard Moose  
Press Room

31 JOHN ROMNEY PRESS CONFERENCE  
TO BE LEX'D ONE PAGE AT A TIME  
AS TRANSCRIPT IS FINISHED. . PAGE 4

(Governor Romney - continued) 4.

make sure we get enough men so we can contain this thing, so we can keep this thing from getting any further out of hand.

So I recommended that we increase that figure to 5,000, which we did. We then went back to Gerarden's office and shortly after the Mayor and Colonel Davids joined us. We reviewed these figures with the Mayor and Colonel Davids and they agreed that we needed the additional 5,000 men and that we should therefore seek Federal assistance.

At that point, the Mayor and Gerarden left the room, and in looking for them I found them in the room that was occupied by the Commissioner and the Mayor was talking to the Vice President in Minneapolis about the situation and our needs. He asked me if I wanted to talk to the Vice President, who was in Minneapolis, and I said I did and I talked to him, too. He told both of us that if we felt we needed Federal assistance that at that hour of the night we should call the White House and ask for the Attorney General, that the Attorney General was the member of the Executive Branch designated to handle such requests at that time of day. The Mayor then put in a call for Attorney General Clark, now this was shortly before 3:00. He talked to him briefly and then I talked to him. I reviewed the analysis we had made of the situation, the scope of the riot, the magnitude of the looting, the fires, and our conclusion that we could not control the situation with certainty with the men we had available and therefore we wanted Federal assistance, and we wanted 5,000 troops as soon as we could get them here.

The Attorney General at that time suggested that I give very careful consideration to this request because it represented a precedent. He also said that the last time Federal troops had been asked for was when they were asked into Michigan in 1943 and he thought we ought to be very sure of what we were doing. I assured him we were, and I then asked him if my oral request was enough to get the troops, and I was told by him that he didn't need anything other than my oral request.

Shortly after 3:00 we decided to hold a press conference, which I think some of you were at, where Mayor Cavanaugh and I reported to you that we had requested Federal troops. During that press conference I received a note indicating that Attorney General Clark was on the line and wanted to talk with me, so as you will recall I left the press conference and went out and took the Attorney General's call.

LDX to WHITE HOUSE

For: Mr Richard Moose  
Press Room

31 JULY ROMNEY PRESS CONFERENCE  
TO BE LEX'D ONE PAGE AT A TIME  
AS TRANSCRIPT IS FINISHED. PAGE 5

(Governor Romney - continued)

5.

In this call he said two things. No. 1, that an oral request would not be enough, they had to have a written request. No. 2, that since my talk with him he had talked with the Commanding General of the 5th Army - Matookis or something like that as I recall the name -- and that General Matookis had talked with General Simmons, who by that time was in Detroit, General Simmons being the Commanding General of the National Guard -- as we decided to mobilize the full Guard, he came down and took command from Moore -- and that General Simmons had indicated to General Matookis that in his opinion we could handle the riot without Federal troops. On that basis I told the Attorney General I would get into the matter further. I did not withdraw my oral request. I told him I would get into the matter further and I would call him back.

I then came back into the press conference, as you will recall, and said that as result of unexpected developments it would be necessary to reevaluate the request for the National Guard. Following the Press Conference we proceeded to assemble all of those who had been in on the original discussions and I called General Simmons and asked him to come from his Headquarters at the Armory down to the Police Headquarters because, after all, he put some sand in the process by indicating a view contrary to the view of local and state officials who were actually in command.

It took a little while for him to get there. After he got there, it took some time to discuss the whole situation again and to determine whether or not General Simmons agreed with the rest of us that we needed Federal troops, and he agreed after he got all the information that we needed Federal troops. Now, by then, it was after 5:00 and I called the Attorney General and indicated that we had reviewed the matter again with General Simmons sitting in, and he agreed with us that we needed these Federal troops. In this conversation he discussed the number and he also indicated at that time that he not only needed a written request, but he needed a written request that would indicate that we had an insurrection that was out of control. I told him that I was in no position to indicate with complete certainty that with the arrival of the National Guard, we couldn't control the situation, but that none of us believed we could and the reason we had requested Federal troops



LDX to WHITE HOUSE

For: Mr Richard Mooss  
Press Room

31 JULY ROMNEY PRESS CONFERENCE  
TO BE EX'D ONE PAGE AT A TIME  
AS TRANSCRIPT IS FINISHED. PAGE 6

(Governor Romney - continued)

was because we wanted to be sure we had enough forces to prevent this thing from getting out of control, that if we had to wait until the thing was out of control to get Federal troops we'd have a much worse situation to deal with than if we could have adequate personnel to deal with it at that stage.

Well, he didn't relent. I had the impression personally that he was making more of a political request than a legal request, everything considered, the background up to that point. Nevertheless I told him we would consider his request and be in further touch with him. We then continued our discussions about requesting Federal troops and decided to take another tour of the city, Cavanaugh and me, and while taking this tour of the city to have Danhoff and Harmon prepare their separate drafts of a request for Federal troops.

On our return, I took the two drafts they had prepared and prepared the telegraph that was sent to the Attorney General that morning and I called him somewhere between 7:00 and 8:00, as I recall it, and I read him this first telegram, in which I recommended the sending of Federal troops and spelled out all of the circumstances that caused us to recommend the sending of Federal troops. Incidentally, in the course of these discussions, he indicated that he was in touch with the White House, so I know he was keeping in touch with the President. He made this perfectly clear.

Question: What time was this?

Governor Romney: This call? This was somewhere between 7:30 and 8:00, as I recall it, right in that area. I called him and read him this telegram and he indicated it wasn't adequate and again we had a very length discussion about whether they were going to wait until this thing was out of control and I would certify that we had an insurrection that was out of control. Finally, as a result of that length discussion, he indicated that if instead of recommending I would request and indicate that there was a reasonable doubt of our being able to control, that he thought that would be adequate.

INDEX to WHITE HOUSE

For: Mr Richard Moose  
Press Room

31 JULY ROMNEY PRESS CONFERENCE  
TO BE INDEX'D ONE PAGE AT A TIME  
AS TRANSCRIPT IS FINISHED. PAGE 7

(Governor Romney - continued) 7.

So I indicated we would go to work on that, which we did. We prepared another telegram, which was the 2nd telegram, and when I called him back, which as I recall it was sometime between 9:00 and 9:30, I read him the 2nd telegram which was addressed to him. He said the telegrams should be addressed to the President, but made no other comment on the telegram to indicate any inadequacy in it.

Now this first telegram was a pretty lengthy one. We had a single stenographer in the office. She's not a very fast typist and she took an inordinately long time in typing that first telegram, and we couldn't get the second one out until we got the first one out. That delayed the telegrams getting off a good deal, including the 2nd telegram. But in any event, we sent the 2nd telegram sometime shortly before 10:00.

The next thing I had, was a call from the Attorney General at home. I went home to get lunch and he called me thereabout noon and he read me the telegram the President had sent in reply to my telegram earlier, in which he indicated they were responding to my request and sending troops and that he was appointing Cyrus Vance as Assistant to the Secretary of Defense to represent him in the matter and that he would come and confer with us.

The Attorney General then put Secretary Vance on the telephone. Secretary Vance indicated he was leaving Washington right then and he would be in there in an hour and one half at Selfridge Field. That meant he would be at Selfridge Field at 1:30, so after we hung up, I immediately called and arranged to have all the key personnel, city and state, there at 2:00 - 2:15. I got down there about 2:00. Most of them were there. We waited for quite a while and checked with Selfridge Field and they hadn't arrived. I then suggested that -- Cavanaugh wasn't there by that time -- I then suggested that we begin to do some planning ourselves, that up to that point we had been responding to reports of fires or arson or sniping on a spot basis, and sending out task forces to do something about it, and I thought we ought to have a well organized plan to deal more effectively with the whole situation.

LEX to WHITE HOUSE

Port Mr Richard Moose  
Press Room

31 JULY ROMNEY PRESS CONFERENCE  
TO BE LEX'D ONE PAGE AT A TIME  
AS TRANSCRIPT IS FINISHED. PAGE 8

(Governor Romney - continued)

8.

The night before we had learned in connection with the fire fighters that by assigning a few law enforcement personnel directly to the Fire Department they were better able to protect their firemen. So I said first we ought to set aside a certain number of men to be under the command of the Fire Department so they can work right with the Fire Department. We had the Chief and the Commissioner there and worked out an understanding of how many men they needed - about 180.

Then I suggested that we determine how many men we would need throughout the city to give reasonable protection and be able to move quickly, and how many we should retain to be assigned on a spot task force basis. Before Vance arrived, we had worked out some plans of this type.

Vance arrived at Selfridge Field about 3:07. He got down to the Police Headquarters about 4:25. We immediately conferred with him. He indicated to us that he didn't want to put the troops on the street. He indicated to us that he didn't want to bring the troops from Selfridge Field to the Fairgrounds. He didn't want to bring them into Detroit because he thought it would be better if we could handle it without Federal troops.

The Mayor and I again indicated to him, as forcefully as we could, that we needed the Federal troops and we needed them as soon as we could get them, and we wanted them as soon as we could get them. He adhered to his position. I then said to him, "Mr. Secretary, I don't want any difference of viewpoint over semantics to keep us from getting the needed Federal assistance. Do you need any further action on my part to get the troops in Detroit and out on the street?"

He said he did not need any further action on my part, but he said he wanted to jointly assess the situation to see whether the situation could be handled without bringing the Federal troops in.

Mayor Cavanaugh and I then took Secretary Vance and General Throckmorton on a tour of the city so they could see first hand what we were dealing with. While we had been waiting for the Secretary and General Throckmorton to arrive, a group of Negro citizen leaders, one of whom was Congressman Dix (?), had asked to see me and Gerarden. We were the two there at the time so we went in and talked with them. They indicated that they would like to enlist Negro

LDX to WHITE HOUSE

For: Mr Richard Moore  
Press Room

31 JULY ROMNEY PRESS CONFERENCE  
TO BE LEX'D ONE PAGE AT A TIME  
AS TRANSCRIPT IS FINISHED. PAGE 9

(Governor Romney - continued) 9.

serve with the law enforcement personnel, they thought this might be helpful in quelling the situation. We told them that we were on the verge of having Federal troops come in, and I had been told by the Attorney General, and this was one of the things he told me in those earlier telephone conversations, that as a rule that if they came in, they federalized the National Guard and took over and took command, I thought we ought to wait until the Secretary got there, Secretary Vance, before answering their request.

When we got back from the tour of the city, the Secretary had indicated before we left as a matter of fact, that he wanted to meet with this Negro group and we enlarged it. We met with 18 or 20 Negro leaders, and in this meeting all the Negro leaders except two indicated that they wanted the troops on the streets and they wanted them right then. Again the Secretary indicated his belief that it might be handled without the Federal troops. We then went into the press conference, it was about 8:00, we met with you fellows.

Now while we had been riding around the city viewing the damage, the Secretary urged the Mayor and me to do all we could to increase the effectiveness of our own effort and to give some hope to the community under the circumstances by indicating that by Monday night we would have many more men on the street, that we would be better organized to deal with the situation, and so at that press conference I led off and I did what the Secretary had asked me to do.

It represented no modification of the request for Federal troops. He then made his comments about believing we could handle it without Federal troops and then the Mayor spoke. In speaking, the Mayor made a very ambiguous statement -- the importance of which I didn't realize until after the press conference. He indicated that he wanted the troops there right away but there were other gentlemen who didn't necessarily agree with that position. I didn't realize until after the press conference that some of the members of the press corps thought that I had taken a contrary position than that of the Mayor. Nothing could have been further from the truth.

After the press conference, the Mayor and I went into the Secretary's office with the Secretary and General Throckmorton and we again plead with him to put the troops on the street, to get them into Solfridge Field,

LOX to WHITE HOUSE

For: Mr. Richard Moose  
Press Room

31 JULY ROMNEY PRESS CONFERENCE  
TO BE LEXED ONE PAGE AT A TIME  
AS TRANSCRIPT IS FINISHED. PAGE 10

(Governor Romney - continued)

10.

and he still adhered to his position.

From then until about 9:30 I took the half-hourly reports of incidents and the mounting picture of rioting, looting, sniping, burning into the Secretary and General Throckmorton and used them to urge them to get the troops on the street. When the 9:30 report came in, it was 92 for the half hour, and General Throckmorton came into Deputy Superintendent Nichols' office at the same time I was there looking at them, and I said to him, "General those figures are higher than they were last night. We've got to have those troops."

So I then accompanied him back into the Secretary's office and discussed it again with the Secretary. In this discussion I indicated that no one realized better than I did that my requesting the troops might be a factor in the reluctance to commit them, but that I thought I was running the major risk in requesting the troops and I wanted him to know I wanted them regardless of the consequences to me personally, that we needed those troops. He asked me to go over in the corner with himself and Christopher, the Department Attorney General, and he then confronted me with the question that Plack (sp.) confronted me with in the morning, "Are you ready to certify that you have an insurrection that's out of control?"

I said I couldn't certify that because our National Guard was not yet completely on the street, that I thought I didn't believe we could control it, that we needed the Federal troops, and as a matter of fact, we had been arguing to get them on the streets before dark. We needed the Federal troops, we needed them urgently. Christopher spoke up and indicated that I either had to certify that or I had to give them facts to indicate that we had to have the troops. I said, "Mr. Secretary and Mr. Christopher, I gave the Attorney General the facts this morning in a telegram, and I gave him the exact request he said he had to have to give us the troops. Now, we need the troops." And I left.

LDX to WHITE HOUSE

For: Mr Richard Moose  
Press Room

31 JULY ROMNEY PRESS CONFERENCE  
TO BE LEXID ONE PAGE AT A TIME  
AS TRANSCRIPT IS FINISHED. PAGE 11

(Governor Romney - continued)

11.

Question: What time was this?

Governor Romney: About 9:45. At about 10:00 the Secretary and General Throckmorton came in and said they had decided to move the troops from Selfridge Field to the Fairground, the first 1,800. They had not yet decided to commit the troops to the street. The figures continued to mount. It was not long after 10:30 that they came in and indicated they were going to commit the troops to the street. It was after 2:00 a. m. the next morning they got the troops on the street.

Now, that's the chronological history of what happened as far as I was concerned. I know that throughout that period the Attorney General and the Assistant Secretary were in constant touch with the White House.

I'd like to review a few of the inconsistencies in what has been said about this chronology.

In his first speech the President said, "This plan proceeded... precisely as scheduled. Approximately 5,000 Federal troops are on their way by airlift to Detroit within a few hours. Mr. Vance, Lt. General John L. Throckmorton and others were in Detroit and in conference with Governor Romney by the middle of the afternoon. Their initial report was that it then appeared that the situation might be controlled without bringing the Federal troops from the Selfridge air Base into Detroit. They therefore recommended to me that the troops be maintained on a 30-minute alert and they advised that they would be in continual touch with Defense Secretary Robert McNamara and me." The clear implication being that I had joined the Secretary and the General in this recommendation, and that there could be nothing further from the truth than that. That is a complete and absolute distortion of what had happened.

Now, I have here the article by Max Frankel. He says in this article, "Governor Romney's indecision for nearly 20 hours about the need for troops, the relatively poor training and use of the National Guard, etc." Even if you don't know anything about what I have told you, if you take a look at what was made public, the Assistant Secretary of Defense indicated at a press conference at 8:00 that he wasn't going to commit the troops. Now he indicated in a subsequent press conference the following day that I happened to walk into -- I didn't know it was going to take place, but I happened to walk into it -- that he decided not to commit the troops because there was a divided viewpoint on the part of

LDX to WHITE HOUSE

For: Mr Richard Moore  
Press Room

31 JULY ROMNEY PRESS CONFERENCE  
TO BE LXD ONE PAGE AT A TIME  
AS TRANSCRIPT IS FINISHED. PAGE 12.  
(Governor Romney - continued)

community leaders. He reviewed his conversations with me and the Mayor in the afternoon and then we met with community leaders and he said there was a divided viewpoint on the part of community leaders, indicating there might have been a divided viewpoint on the part of state and local officials as well as the Negro leaders with whom we met. There were only two Negro leaders who participated in that one conference who didn't think the troops should be on the streets immediately, and that left an impression that was erroneous.

Now, as Frankel also said, "At no point during the crisis and not since then have the two men conferred directly by telephone." The reason I didn't confer with the President by telephone was because Vice President Humphrey told us we were to talk to the Attorney General and the Attorney General told me he was handling it with the White House. Otherwise, we would have contacted the President.

The second telegram didn't meet their written requirement so we composed, I mean, -- the first one didn't, so we composed the second, but there was no change in viewpoint about the need for troops and the need as fast as we could get them.

And it says here in the 5th column, "At 9:45 a. m. Romney told the Attorney General he had some doubt about his ability to contain the riots for another night and thought he would request Federal intervention on that basis." I had already requested them earlier than 3:00. "By 10:45 just as Western Union said it was filing Romney's message, also signed by Democratic Mayor Cavanaugh" -- well, that's not important -- that particular part of the article.

Now, here's the statement that at 7:00 McNamara called Vance. He said his team felt it was too early -- this is 7:00 in the evening, "At 7:00 McNamara called Vance, who said his team felt it was too early to commit the Army troops, that with many more Guardsmen and policemen on hand than the night before the situation seemed under control, but there was sharp disagreement in the community he said. "There were 2 negroes out of 18 or 20 and that's all. "There was no dissent among the public officials responsible for the problem, but there was sharp disagreement in the community, he said, with the Governor and most Michigan Congressmen opposing the use of

LDX to WHITE HOUSE

For: Mr Richard Moore  
Press Room

31 JULY ROMNEY PRESS CONFERENCE  
TO BE INDEXED ONE PAGE AT A TIME  
AS TRANSCRIPT IS FINISHED. PAGE 13

(Governor Romney - continued)

13.

Federal troops at that moment and the Mayor and others strongly in favor."

Mayor Cavanaugh and I were in agreement at all times, and on Tuesday, July 25, in his letter to the President, the Mayor said, "Some would make it appear that you and I were bitterly divided on that issue" -- that is talking about his position and the President's "those are not the facts. That is not the truth. On the basis of the information which I have from personal observation and intensive intelligence, I felt that the use of Federal troops was necessary when I supported Governor Romney in his request."

Now, whoever is ever feeding stuff out of the White House to Max Frankel, and I don't think it's second level, distorts it by indicating that there was sharp disagreement in the community which is not true. What I have always said is substantial unanimity existed when you get 90% of the people wanting a particular course of action, you have substantial unanimity. That's what you had in the Negro community, and you had complete unanimity on the part of state and local officials.

"Sharp disagreement in the community," he said, "with the Governor and most Michigan Congressmen opposing the use of Federal troops at that moment and the Mayor and others strongly in favor." One of the two who said they were willing to leave it up to Vance was a Michigan Congressman. Only one.

Now a fourth point, it says here, "The Governor, according to White House reports described the situation as hopeful, but the Mayor disagreed. Vance privately finding the Governor very cagey noted publicly that Romney was not then requesting Federal troops." I never ceased hounding him for Federal troops, or Attorney General Clark, and through them the White House, because they were representing the President.

"About 9:00 p.m. Vance told the President he still favored restraint and found the incident rate rising and planned another quick reconnaissance."

There was a fifth point in here, "Romney was said to be expressing doubts again by the ability to control events." This was supposed to be after 10:00. "Romney was said to be expressing doubt again about his ability to control events but would not make the official finding again



LDX to WHITE HOUSE

From: Mr Richard Moose  
Press Room

31 JULY ROMNEY PRESS CONFERENCE  
TO BE LEX'D ONE PAGE AT A TIME  
AS TRANSCRIPT IS FINISHED. PAGE 14.

(Governor Romney - continued)

14.

I have already covered the picture from that standpoint. Now, there is one other point that may have some relevance in the review of this record at some later date and that is this.

In my discussions with Attorney General Clark, I did not raise the question of the impact on insurance policies in Michigan of ascertaining we had an insurrection out of control. I didn't learn of that until early in the afternoon. When Secretary Vance, General Throckmorton, the Mayor, and I went on the survey of the city after his arrival, I told him that if we if and when he decided to bring the troops into the city, I hoped he would keep in mind the fact he would nullify most insurance policies in the State of Michigan if he did it on the basis of an insurrection out of control. I did not know of that factor earlier. (Next two or three sentences garbled and unable to be transcribed.)

I'll be glad to answer questions.

Question: Governor Romney, do you believe that troops were kept out of Detroit that first evening for political reasons?

Governor Romney: I think the President of the United States played politics in a period of tragedy and riot.

Question: To protect the Great Society or embarrass you?

Governor Romney: You'll have to ask him.

Question: . . . that first speech, Governor?

Governor Romney: I haven't discussed the two speeches. As a matter of fact, if you will take a look at the record I have just reported, in the two speeches I think you will find the second one a very excellent indictment of the first.

Question: You're talking about the President's speeches?

Governor Romney: Yes, I think you will find his second speech a complete indictment of the first and the record of what happened.

Question: About playing politics, can you support that a little more?

LDX to WHITE HOUSE

For: Mr Richard Mooss  
Press Room

31 JULY ROMNEY PRESS CONFERENCE  
TO BE LDX'D ONE PAGE AT A TIME  
AS TRANSCRIPT IS FINISHED. PAGE 15

(Governor Romney - continued)

15.

Question: Governor, when did you first become aware or feel there was a political factor involved?

Governor Romney: When the Attorney General began to insist on this certification that we had an insurrection, that it was out of control and didn't seem to be particularly impressed with the fact that we needed the troops to keep the situation from getting out of control.

Question: Governor, do you feel the Democratic Mayor Cavanaugh agreed with you?

Governor Romney: I don't know. In any event, in his letter to the President he indicated that he was supporting my request for the Federal troops. I indicated -- let me cover another part of the record.

Some of you recall that press conference where he indicated that some other gentlemen might not agree with him. Now the next morning we had a joint press conference -- the Secretary, the Mayor, and me. In the course of that press conference the Mayor indicated that he wanted -- he regretted having to do so, but he wanted to say something to correct the record. He proceeded to discuss the fact of his consistent request for Federal troops on the street, and when he concluded I said indicated that in light of the Mayor's remarks, I felt I should say something to correct the record, and I proceeded to indicate that at no time had I had any other position than our need for troops as fast as we could get them.

I had seen the evening before in Doc Green's column -- sometimes particular columnists tend to be quite revealing -- that Jerry Cavanaugh extracted these additional troops from Vice President Humphrey late last evening.

Question: During through this whole period of time, did you have Throckmorton there on your staff, present?

Governor Romney: Yes. I was making these calls in the presence of the -- the Humphrey call I made in the presence of Commissioner Gerarden, the Mayor, and Colonel Davis. The second call from Clark I've forgotten who was in the room with me because there were people in the press conference. Chuck, do you remember. (A: There were some people there.) There may or may not have been people there on the second call because they were in the press conference and I came out and took it in Gerarden's office. I don't recall who was there, but the other calls were made while Gerarden, Harmon, Danhoff, and in

LDX to WHITE HOUSE

For: Mr Richard Moore  
Press Room

31 JULY ROMNEY PRESS CONFERENCE  
TO BE INDEXED ONE PAGE AT A TIME  
AS TRANSCRIPT IS FINISHED. PAGE 16.  
(Governor Romney - continued)

16.

some instances, the Mayor, in some instances, Colonel Davis was present.

Question: Had Federal troops moved in earlier, that would have made it Monday afternoon. Do you think the destruction of Monday night and Tuesday morning would have been halted?

Governor Romney: I think it would have made a difference. I indicated in my first telegram, after citing all the damage the first day, "All this has occurred in just one day and the experience of similar outbreaks in other parts of the country, most notably Los Angeles, Watts and Newark, indicates that they are rarely limited to a period of one day and night. It is the unanimous judgment of state and local officials and the Michigan military establishment that our situation may continue at least through tonight."

Question: Do you feel the mention made of your inability to control a riot was partisan politics?

Governor Romney: You mean the President? Well, again, I'll let you be the judge against the chronological record of what took place.

Question: What was the determination as to where the troops should be sent? Most of the violence was on the West Side.

Governor Romney: I have no criticism of the deployment of the Federal troops after they arrived. When General Throckmorton and Secretary Vance arrived Monday afternoon and Monday evening, the violence was spreading to the East Side. The destruction had been so great on the West Side that the view was expressed by several that the probability was that the action would be greater on the East Side than on the West Side, and in my opinion that is why they put the Federal troops on the East Side. I don't fault them in any way in respect to their deployment. I think based on the information they had at that time and the indicated direction of things, that that was the place where it looked like the action would be.

Question: Do you have any idea of when the President was appraised of the situation?

Governor Romney: I don't have anything except this Frankel article and that says he was appraised of it at 3:30 in the morning. I know the Attorney General was in contact with him early. I talked

LDX to WHITE HOUSE

For: Mr Richard Moose  
Press Room

31 JULY ROMNEY PRESS CONFERENCE  
TO BE LEX'D ONE PAGE AT A TIME  
AS TRANSCRIPT IS FINISHED. PAGE 17

(Governor Romney - continued)

17.

him then or whether he waited until our second call which was just after 3:30. It says in here, "He first learned of it just from the FBI." I can't answer that with certainty.

Question: How do you feel that the hesitance of Secretary Vance in putting the troops on the street will do to his own evaluation or do to his input to the White House?

Governor Romney: I have no way of knowing with certainty, but I know he was in regular contact with the President.

Question: (Unintelligible)

Governor Romney: I don't think there is any question but that if we had Federal troops on the streets before dark Monday that it would have had an effect. They didn't get on the streets until after 2:00. We made every effort to get out National Guard people on the streets before dark because of the effect it would have.

Question: Governor, did the fact that the Federal Government offered Federal troops to Democratic Governor of New Jersey without his request influence you in your opinion that this was a political . . .

Governor Romney: I didn't honestly know that when I was dealing with this situation. I only learned of it afterwards. I think it stands in marked contrast to what happened in Michigan.

Question: Does that reinforce your feeling on this?

Governor Romney: I'll leave that up to the judgment of any individual with any degree of common sense.

Question: Governor Romney, before you made your first plea for Federal troops, would you have handled the situation any differently if this should happen again? Do you think you possibly could handle it before calling for Federal troops?

Governor Romney: You mean the local and state aspects? I haven't been discussing that and I'm not going to get into that here.

LDX to WHITE HOUSE

For: Mr Richard Moose  
Press Room

31 JULY ROMNEY PRESS CONFERENCE  
TO BE LEXID ONE PAGE AT A TIME  
AS TRANSCRIPT IS FINISHED. PAGE 18.

(Governor Romney - continued)

18.

Question: How much delay was there in deploying the Federal troops in Detroit?

Governor Romney: We could have had the Federal troops on the street by 6:30 - 7:00 instead of 2:00 a. m. in the morning.

Question: Governor, are you ruling out the possibility that it was an honest error in judgment on the part of the White House?

Governor Romney: Well, let me say this, that if it was an honest error in judgment, the President certainly over-reacted in his speech that night to the American people.



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

*Detroit file*

4 August 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. LARRY LEVINSON  
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Inquiry on 1943 Detroit Race Riot

The following information was extracted from "The Detroit Race Riot - A Study in Violence", by Robert Shogan and Tom Craig. Chilton Book Publishers 1964.

20 Jun 1943	1400-2300	Buildup of tension and incidents.
21 Jun 1943	2300-0900 0940	Riot - police trying to control. Detroit Mayor Jeffries to Michigan Governor Kelly requesting aid in controlling riots.
	1100	Governor Kelly talked to 6th Svc Cmd in Chicago (Maj. Gen. Aurand) about requesting federal troops.
		(Aurand alerted troops and moved MP Bn from Custer to River Rouge. Gen. Guthner was sent to Detroit to take command in the event the Governor formally requested federal troops.)
	1100-2125	Legal discussion and riots continued. Confusion existed as to procedure for requesting and furnishing federal troops.
	1800	Governor Kelly alerted the State militia.
	2000	Governor Kelly called the State militia. Of 2000 supposedly available, only 32 were actually available; therefore, no state militia was actually committed.

COAST  
to Detroit  
Cincinnati  
(Wash. D.C.)


1 SEP 1943  
11 11 11

SUBJECT: Inquiry on 1943 Detroit Race Riot

- 2125 Governor formally requested Gen. Aurand to use federal troops.
- 2125 Gen. Aurand ordered Guthner to send the MP Bns into action.
- 2355 Governor Kelly officially requested the President for use of federal troops. At the same time the President signed the Proclamation and Gen. Guthner issued the Proclamation. (By 2355 federal troops already had the situation under control.)

Note that in this instance the federal troops were employed 2 1/2 hours prior to the Presidential Proclamation, but 10 1/2 hours after Governor Kelly first requested them. Governor Kelly thought he had done all he needed to do at 11:00 a. m., but General Aurand was waiting for the Governor to make his request directly to the President. A misunderstanding as to the requirement for martial law contributed to the delay. When Governor Kelly announced to General Aurand that he was making an official request to the President, General Aurand committed federal troops without waiting for the President to sign the Proclamation.

Hope this answers your inquiry. If not, please call me at OX 7-6806.

  
GEORGE M. BUSH  
Colonel, GS  
Military Assistant, OUSA

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
WASHINGTON

AUG 8 - 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Interviews with 496 Negro Men Arrested in the Detroit Riot.

Four hundred and ninety-six Negro men arrested in the Detroit riot were interviewed (by interviewers using a previously prepared questionnaire) before they were released. The questionnaires have been reviewed, the answers tabulated, and the attached report prepared, under forced draft.

This report is dangerous, in its present form. The data are being carefully analyzed. I am satisfied, however, that the present form of the report is reliable enough, to be significant and to require consideration.

I propose to transmit the report, unless you have different advice, to Governor Kerner and David Ginsburg. It will be hard to keep it confidential. At least 25 people have worked on it -- including a private group (Behavior Research Institute of Detroit) which had started the interviewing before we picked up the project. (They did all of the interviewing; our Manpower Administration people have done the tabulation and preliminary summarization.) The present copies are all marked under control so far.

Here are some of the clearest indications from this preliminary report (referring to the 496 interviewees -- all Negroes -- as the rioters).

1. Most of the rioters were in their twenties or early thirties; only 20% were under 20; about 20% were over 35.
2. Four out of five of the rioters had jobs and were working at the time of the riot.



- More than half of those working were earning more than \$110 a week. The largest grouping (almost one-third) were earning between \$120 and \$150 a week.
  - But most of the employed group reported that they had been out of work at some time during the past year.
  - The evidence is incomplete on whether the 20% not working (which is a high unemployment rate) were or were not trying to get work.
3. Those over 25 had more years of education than the general Negro population of the same age group.
  4. Asked "What do you think caused this trouble in Detroit?"
    - 101 answered "police brutality".
    - 66 answered in terms of tensions and frustrations resulting from Negroes' efforts to gain equality.
    - 65 said they didn't know.
    - 20 said lack of job opportunities.
    - 17 said poor housing conditions.
    - 17 said "outside agitators."
  5. A smaller group (157 of the 496 total) were asked about their military experience.
    - \* About 1 in 4 said they had served in the Armed Forces. (But these answers are suspect.)
    - \* Only 1 of the 157 was a Viet Nam veteran.

6. About half said they were in debt.

\* Three-fourths of these said their debts were for back rent or medical expenses or both.

\* Half of the reported indebtedness was under \$200. Twenty-five percent was \$200 to \$500.

7. There is considerable evidence of over-crowded housing. The average number of persons per household is over 5. About 12% live in houses with 8 or more.

8. Asked whether they thought conditions in Detroit for themselves and Negroes in general had become better, worse, or had stayed about the same in the last few years:

-- 53%: "have become better".

-- 25%: "stayed about the same".

-- 22%: "have gotten worse".

9. Asked who was their favorite Negro leader, 363 answered:

-- King	178
-- Carmichael	52
-- Powell	24
-- Muhammed Ali	21
-- Malcolm X	20
-- Elijah Muhammed	12
-- Other	56

- 4 -

10. Four out of five had lived in Detroit five years or more. Over half were born in the Deep South or in the Border States.

11. One out of six had participated in a Federal training or poverty program.

There is a great deal of additional information in the 496 questionnaires. This is being analyzed. I will keep you informed.

*W. W. Wirtz*  
Willard Wirtz  
Secretary of Labor

Attachment

XERO COPY

XERO COPY

XERO COPY

XERO COPY

# 1

Confidential

A PROFILE OF 500 NEGRO MALES ARRESTED IN THE DETROIT RIOT

U. S. Department of Labor  
Manpower Administration  
August 1967

## CONTENTS

	Page
I INTRODUCTION -----	3
II FINDINGS -----	5
III SUMMARY TABLES -----	28
IV SOME QUESTIONS RAISED BY THE SURVEY -----	35
V APPENDIX NOTE -----	37
VI QUESTIONNAIRE -----	40

I INTRODUCTION

## INTRODUCTION

This study of 496 Negro men arrested during the July 1967 riot in Detroit was undertaken in order to find out more about the people against whom charges had been placed. Information was collected on the characteristics of the prisoners, their economic and personal status, their views as to the causes of the riot, their involvement in the communicative aspects of the riot, and their ranking of Negro leaders.

The findings reveal that the prisoners over the age of 25 had attained higher levels of education than the general Negro population of the same age group. Four out of 5 had jobs and more than half earned at least \$110 a week. Most of the prisoners thought that conditions for themselves as well as for other Negroes had improved in recent years.

The majority of the prisoners appear to live in overcrowded housing. Nearly half of those over 25 were not "heads of families."

The most prevalent reason given by the prisoners as a cause of the riot was "police brutality." Almost 50 percent of the men indicated that their favorite Negro leader was Martin Luther King.

About 1 in 4 of the 157 prisoners who reported on their military experience had served in the Armed Forces. Only one man was a Vietnam veteran.

About half of the 157 prisoners reporting on their indebtedness status indicated that they were in debt. Three-fourths of those in debt owed for back rent or medical expenses. Almost 50 percent of those in debt owed under \$200. Twenty-five percent owed between \$200 and \$500.

II FINDINGS



FOUR OUT OF FIVE OF THE PRISONERS HAD JOBS: MORE THAN  
HALF OF THEM EARNED MORE THAN \$ 110 A WEEK

More than half of the employed prisoners had jobs which paid more than \$110 a week. This equaled the average wage in manufacturing for the Nation as a whole, but was below the approximate \$150 per week earned by the average factory worker in the Detroit area. Even the employed youngsters (both the 16- to 19-year olds and those 20 to 24) averaged between \$80 and \$100 per week. Two out of 3 of the teenagers and 3 out of 4 of the men in their early twenties reported they were working.

Unemployment (22 percent) was nevertheless high--about five times higher than the unemployment rate (about 4.5 percent) for the entire Detroit metropolitan area. Unemployment was highest among the teenagers (although the 1 out of 3 jobless may have been overstated because some of these youngsters were presumably still attending school). Unemployment was not much lower for the 20- to 24-year olds (27 percent compared to 33 percent for the teenagers) even though, nationally, unemployment rates among Negroes tend to drop off very sharply between the teenagers and the early twenties. The drop in rates among the group surveyed occurred among those over 25, among whom unemployment averaged about 15 percent.

Employment Status and Salary

Selected characteristics	Total	Age							
		Under 20	Under 16	16-19	20-24	25+	25-29	30-44	45+
Total.....	496	93	2	91	127	276	112	138	26
Employment status									
Employed.....	383	61	1	60	91	231	98	114	19
Not employed...	107	30	1	29	34	43	14	22	7
Not reported...	6	2	-	2	2	2	-	2	-
Not employed rate.....	21.8	33.0	(50.0)	32.6	27.2	15.7	12.5	16.2	26.9
Salary									
Under 10.....	15	7	-	7	3	5	3	-	2
41-60.....	31	12	-	12	4	15	3	8	4
61-80.....	42	6	-	6	8	28	8	18	2
81-100.....	74	16	-	16	18	40	19	17	4
101-120.....	80	9	-	9	29	42	20	19	3
121-150.....	113	12	-	12	25	76	40	33	3
151-200.....	23	1	-	.1	10	17	4	9	4
Over 200.....	19	-	-	-	3	16	4	12	-
Not reported...	94	30	2	28	27	37	11	22	4