

Governor GEORGE ROMNEY

Transcript of Press Conference on Detroit riot events.

Held at Cobo Hall, Detroit, 12 Noon, Monday, July 31, 1967.

Due to the fact that apparently the White House elected to make available to at least to the New York Times correspondent in Washington a purported chronology of what happened last Sunday night and Monday morning, I thought I would review what happened against the reported indication of their interpretation of what happened. Now obviously I don't have an actual official statement from them but I assume that this article by Max Frankel of the New York Times service was based on material made available from official sources.

Now the chronology of the state involvement was as follows:

I was called about 8:00 o'clock in the morning by my legal aide, Robert Danhof, and he told me that rioting had started over in the 12th street area. And he indicated that on-the-spot State Police observers viewed it very seriously and recommended that we urge the Detroit Police Department and the Mayor to do everything possible to curb the situation.

And so I asked my legal advisor, Robert Danhof, to get in touch with the Mayor and to indicate that, based on such information as we had, this could be a very serious situation and that we wanted him to know of the ready availability of State Police and National Guard personnel.

We happened to have had about 1,200 National Guard personnel doing some drill work at the Detroit Armory Sunday morning. Now ordinarily they would have been released after a few hours of drill work and gone home, but because of our information as to the seriousness of the situation, we kept those men on alert all day and kept them there at the Armory so we could have them out on the streets immediately.

It was about at that time that the Commissioner of State Police, Colonel Davids, first alerted the state guard. This was about 8:00 in the morning. Then we had optimistic reports that the handling of the situation and so the state guard alert was relaxed and they were taken off alert on the basis of reports we were given. And then later in the morning they were again put on the alert as the situation worsened.

And about 12:00 I had the first call from Mayor Cavanagh in which he indicated he thought they could handle the situation but in any event he knew he could contact me if he needed State Police help or if he needed National Guard help, and he told me where he was going to be.

We received a call between 1:45 and 2:00 P.M. from the Mayor requesting Michigan State Police. This call went to Mr. Danhof and he called me. And as a result of talking to me he also called the National Guard and talked with General Schnipke with respect to Guard use. As a result of the call to General Schnipke he dispatched General Moore of the National Guard, who was up in Grayling at the encampment, down here to take command of the National Guard in the event they should be called.

At 2:30 we again received calls from various sources indicating that things might be better. But at 4:00 P.M. we received a call from the Mayor indicating he wanted the Guard and so we made the Guard troops available. Now by that time we had also alerted Guard personnel in Flint and in Grand Rapids; we had about 350 in each place to augment the 1,200 we had down here in Detroit.

Now at 6:00, on my instructions, Danhof called Schnipke at Grayling and indicated that he'd better begin to think about how he could get the complete Guard here in Detroit in the event we might need them, because after all we had 200 miles to contend with, and I also asked him to ascertain the transportation problem, the problem of length of time.

The situation continued to worsen and the result was that I went down to Detroit Police Headquarters at about 8:15 or 8:30, conferred briefly with Mayor Cavanagh and Police Commissioner Girardin. Mayor Cavanagh left to take a helicopter flight over the city and shortly after he left I left to do the same thing. And we returned about the same time at the Detroit Police Headquarters at, as nearly as I can remember, it was somewhere around 10:00.

Now it was around 11:00 o'clock or thereabouts, as I recall it, as a result of taking a look at the mounting figures and as a result of the survey of the city, that I called Schnipke and ordered the National Guard to be brought to Detroit as soon as they could get them here. Now this was, as I say, a significant transportation job. But in any event it was around that time that we mobilized the complete National Guard except for the Air National Guard.

At about 2:00 o'clock with the arson, the looting, and the sniping was obviously spreading through the metropolitan area. The problem no longer was limited to the western part of the city, with arson and looting and sniping moving into the eastern

part of the city and quite far north, too, because there were fires as far north as 6 Mile and as far down as below Olympia and there was about a two and one-half by three and one-half mile area by that time in flames. The nearest thing I can compare it to is a battlefield; it looked like the city had been bombed and was burning from the bombing. That's what it looked like.

But in any event, by that time it was clear that the rioting was spreading through the city generally and the fire department was having extreme difficulty in dealing with the fires because they were being sniped at and they were being obstructed in undertaking to put out fires. And it was during that period that I was working with the Mayor and the Police Commissioner and the Chief of the Fire Department and the two commissioners that were on the job constantly, to augment the Detroit Fire Department because obviously they couldn't handle it. So with Colonel Davids help, who's the fire marshal, we proceeded to just enlist fire departments from all over the area, including Windsor.

Right after we got through taking the steps necessary to mobilize the fire department, Mayor Cavanagh left briefly and Girardin and I were reviewing the situation. I said to him that in my opinion we ought to take a look at whether or not we had sufficient manpower — Detroit Police, State Police, and National Guard combined — to deal with the problem on almost a city-wide basis. And I thought he ought to go down and sit down with his superintendent Reutter and Nichols and determine whether or not the 1,500 Detroit Police that we could have on the streets at any one time, the 350 to 400 State Police, and at our peak 4,000 National Guard commitment when they would arrive — and we knew they wouldn't arrive until sometime Monday — whether we could deal with the situation with the force just short of 6,000 men.

They went down and commenced that study. About 15 minutes later I joined them and they had arrived at the conclusion that it could not be dealt with by the available local and Michigan personnel. And they had formed the judgement that they needed 3,000 additional men. I reviewed the figures with them and said, "Now we've got to be on the safe side; we've got to make sure that we get enough men so we can contain this thing, so we can keep this thing from getting any further out of hand." And so I recommended that we increase that figure to 5,000, which we did.

We then went back to Girardin's office and shortly after the Mayor and Colonel Davids joined us. We reviewed these figures with the Mayor and Colonel Davids and they agreed that we needed the additional 5,000 men and that we should therefore seek Federal assistance.

At that point the Mayor and Girardin left the room and in looking for them I found them in the room later occupied by Vance. The Mayor was talking to the Vice President about the situation and our need, and he asked me if I wanted to talk to the Vice President who was in Minneapolis. I said I did, and I talked to him, too. And he told both of us that if we felt we needed Federal assistance that at that hour of night we should call the White House and ask for the Attorney General; that the Attorney General was the member of the executive branch designated to handle such requests at that time of day.

So the Mayor then put in a call for Attorney General Clark. Now this was shortly before 3:00 o'clock. He talked to him briefly and then I talked to him. And I reviewed the analysis we made of the situation, the scope of the riot, the magnitude of the looting, the fires, and our conclusion that we could not control the situation with certainty with the men we had available, and therefore we wanted federal assistance and we wanted 5,000 troops as soon as we could get them.

The Attorney General at that time suggested that I give very careful consideration to this request because it represented a precedent. He also said that the last time federal troops had been asked for was when they were asked into Michigan in 1943 and he thought we ought to be very sure of what we were doing. I assured him we were. And I then asked him if my oral request was enough to get the troops, and I was told by him that he didn't need anything other than my oral request.

Shortly after 3:00 o'clock we decided to hold a press conference, which I think some of you were at, where Mayor Cavanagh and I reported to you that we had requested federal troops. During that press conference I received a note indicating that Attorney General Clark was on the line and wanted to talk with me. So, as you will recall, I left the press conference and went out and took the Attorney General's call.

In this call he said two things. Number one, that an oral request would not be enough; they had to have a written request. Number two, that since my talk with him he had talked with the Commanding General of the 5th Army, it's Matukis or something like that, as I recall the name, and that General Matukis had talked with General Simmons who by that time

was in Detroit, General Simmons being the commanding general of the National Guard. As we decided to mobilize the full guard he came down and took command from Moore. And that General Simmons had indicated to General Matukis that in his opinion we could handle the riot without federal troops. And on that basis I told the Attorney General that I'd get into the matter further. I did not withdraw my oral request. I told him I'd get into the matter further and I'd call him back.

I then came back into the press conference, as you will recall, and said that as a result of unexpected developments it would be necessary to re-evaluate the request for the National Guard (Federal troops). Following the press conference we proceeded to assemble all those who had been in on the original discussions and I called General Simmons and asked him to come from his headquarters at the Armory down to the Police Headquarters because, after all, he'd put some sand in the process by indicating a view contrary to the view of the local and state officials who were actually in command. It took a little while for him to get there. After he got there it took some time to discuss the whole situation again and to determine whether or not General Simmons agreed with the rest of us that we needed federal troops. He agreed after he got all the information that we needed federal troops.

Now by then it was after 5:00 o'clock and I called the Attorney General and indicated that we had reviewed the matter again with General Simmons sitting in and that he agreed with us that we needed these federal troops. In this conversation he discussed the number and he also indicated at that time that he not only needed a written request but he needed a written request that would indicate that we had an insurrection that was out of control.

I told him that I was in no position to indicate with complete certainty that with the arrival of the National Guard we couldn't control the situation but that none of us believed we could, and the reason we had requested federal troops was because we wanted to be sure we had enough forces to prevent this thing from getting out of control; that if we had to wait until the thing was out of control to get federal troops, we'd have a much worse situation to deal with than if we could have adequate personnel to deal with it at that stage.

Well, he didn't relent. I had the impression personally he was making more of a political request than a legal request everything considered, the background up to that point. Nevertheless I told him we would consider his request and be in further touch with him.

We then continued our discussions about requesting federal troops and decided to take another tour of the city, Cavanagh and me, and while taking this tour of the city to have Danhof and Harmon prepare their separate drafts for the request of federal troops. On our return I took the two drafts that they had prepared and prepared the telegram that was sent to the Attorney General that morning.

I called him somewhere between 7:00 and 8:00 o'clock, as I recall it, and I read him this first telegram in which I recommended the sending of federal troops and spelled out all of the circumstances that caused us to recommend the sending of federal troops. Incidentally, in the course of these discussions, he had indicated he was in touch with the White House so I knew that he was keeping in touch with the President. I mean he made this perfectly clear. I'll answer questions.

Q. What time was this?

A. This call? This was somewhere between 7:30 and 8:00 as I recall it, right in that area. And I called him and read him this telegram and he indicated it wasn't adequate, and again we had a very lengthy discussion about whether they were going to wait until this thing was out of control and I would certify that we had an insurrection that was out of control. And finally as a result of that lengthy discussion he indicated that if instead of recommending I would request and indicate that there was a reasonable doubt of our being able to control, that he thought that would be adequate.

So I indicated that we would go to work on that, which we did, and we prepared another telegram which was the second telegram. And when I called him back, which as I recall it was somewhere between 9:00 and 9:30, I read him the second telegram which was addressed to him, and he said the telegram should be addressed to the President but made no other comment on the telegram to indicate any inadequacy in it.

Now this first telegram was a pretty lengthy one. We had a single stenographer in the office — she is not a very fast typist — and she took an inordinately long time typing that first telegram (and we couldn't get the second one out until we got the first one out. And that delayed the telegrams getting off a good deal, including the second telegram. But in any event we sent the second telegram sometime shortly before 10:00 o'clock.

Now the next thing I had was a call from the Attorney General at home — I went home to get lunch — and he called me there about noon. He read me the telegram that the President had sent in reply to my telegram earlier in which he indicated that they were responding to my request and sending troops and that he was appointing Cyrus Vance as assistant to the Secretary of Defense to represent him in the matter and that he would come and confer with us. The Attorney General then put Secretary Vance on the telephone. Secretary Vance indicated that he was leaving Washington right then and he'd be there in a hour and a half at Selfridge Field. That meant that he would be in Selfridge at 1:30, so after we hung up I immediately called and arranged to have all the key personnel, city and state, there at 2:00 to 2:15.

I got down there about 2:00 o'clock. Most of them were there. We waited for quite awhile and checked with the Selfridge Field and they had not arrived. So I then suggested that we — Cavanagh wasn't there by that time — I then suggested that we begin to do some planning ourselves; that up to that point we had been responding to reports of fires, arson or sniping on a spot basis and sending out task forces to try and do something about it and that I thought we ought to have a well organized plan to deal more effectively with the whole situation. The night before we'd learned in connection with the fire fighters that by assigning a few law enforcement personnel directly to the fire department they were better able to protect their firemen.

So I said first we ought to set aside a certain number of men to be under the command of the fire department so they can work right with the fire department. We had the chief and the commissioners there and worked out an understanding as to how many men they needed — about 180.

Then I suggested that we determine how many men we'd need around through the city in order to give reasonable protection and be able to move quickly and then how many we ought to retain to be assigned on a spot task force basis. And before Vance arrived we had worked out some plans of this type.

Vance arrived at Selfridge Field about 3:07. He got down to the police headquarters about 4:25. We immediately conferred with him. He indicated to us that he didn't want to put the troops on the streets. He indicated to us that he didn't want to bring the troops from Selfridge Field to the fairgrounds. He didn't want to bring them into Detroit because he thought it would be better if we could handle it without federal troops.

The Mayor and I again indicated to him as forcefully as we could that we needed the federal troops, that we needed them as soon as we could get them and we wanted them as soon as we could get them. He adhered to his position.

I then said to him, "Mr. Secretary, I don't want any difference of viewpoint over semantics to keep us from getting the needed federal assistance. Do you need any further action on my part to get the troops in Detroit and out in the street?" And he said he did not need any further action on my part. But he said he wanted to jointly assess the situation to see whether the situation could be handled without bringing the federal troops in.

Mayor Cavanagh and I then took Secretary Vance and General Throckmorton on a tour of the city so they could see firsthand what we were dealing with. While we had been waiting for the Secretary and General Throckmorton to arrive, a group of Negro citizen leaders, one of whom was Congressman Diggs, had asked to see me and Girardin. We were the two there at the time. So we went in and talked with them and they indicated that they'd like to enlist Negroes to serve with the law enforcement personnel. They thought this might be helpful in quelling the situation. We told them that we were on the verge of having federal troops come in (change of tapes).

When we got back from the tour of city — the Secretary had indicated before we left, as a matter of fact, that he wanted to meet with this Negro group — and we enlarged it and we met with about 18 or 20 Negroes, Negro leaders. In this meeting all of the Negro leaders except two indicated that they wanted the troops on the streets and they wanted them right then. Again the Secretary indicated his belief it might be handled without the federal troops. We then went into the press conference about 8:00 and met with you folks.

Now while we had been riding around the city viewing the damage, the Secretary urged the Mayor and me to do all we could to increase the effectiveness of our own effort and to give some hope to the community under the circumstances by indicating that Monday night we'd have many more men on the street; that we'd be better organized to deal with the situation.

And so at that press conference I led off and I did what the Secretary asked me to do. That represented no modification of the request of federal troops. He then made his comments about believing we could handle it without federal troops and then the Mayor spoke and in speaking, the Mayor made

a very ambiguous statement, the importance of which I didn't realize until after the press conference. He indicated that he wanted the troops there right away but there were other gentlemen that didn't necessarily agree with that position. And I didn't realize until after the press conference that some of the members of the press corps thought that I had taken a contrary position to the Mayor. Nothing could have been further from the truth.

After the press conference the Mayor and I went into the Secretary's office with the Secretary and General Throckmorton and we again pled with him to put the troops on the street and get them out of Selfridge Field, and he still adhered to his position. From then until about 9:30 I took the half-hourly reports of incidents and the mounting picture of rioting, looting, sniping, burning into the Secretary and General Throckmorton and used them to urge them to get the troops on the streets.

When the 9:30 report came in it was 92 for the half hour, and General Throckmorton came in to Deputy Superintendent Nichols' office the same time as I was there looking at them and I said to him, "General, those figures are higher than they were last night. We've got to have those troops."

I then accompanied him back into the Secretary's office and discussed it again with the Secretary. And in this discussion I indicated that no one realized better than I did that my requesting the troops might be a factor in the reluctance to commit them. But that I thought I was running the major risks in requesting troops and that I wanted him to know that I wanted them regardless of the consequences to me personally; that we needed those troops.

So he asked me to go over in the corner with himself and Christopher, the Deputy Attorney General, and he then confronted me with the question that Clark confronted me with in the morning: Are you ready to certify that you have an insurrection that is out of control? And I said I couldn't certify that because our National Guard was not yet completely on the streets, that I didn't believe we could control it, that we needed the federal troops as a matter of fact we'd been arguing to get them on the streets before dark — that we needed the federal troops and we needed them urgently.

Christopher spoke up and indicated that I either had to certify that or I had to give them facts to indicate that we had to have the troops, and I said, "Mr. Secretary and Mr. Christopher, I gave the Attorney General the facts this morning in a telegram and I gave him the exact request that he said he had to have to give us the troops. Now we need the troops." And I left.

Q. What time was that?

A: About 9:45.

At about 10:00 the Secretary and General Throckmorton came in and said that they had decided to move the troops from Selfridge Field to the fairgrounds, the first 1,800. They had not yet decided to commit the troops to the streets.

The figures continued to mount. It was not long after 10:30 that they came in and indicated that they were going to commit the troops to the streets. It was after 2:00 A.M. the next morning that they got the troops on the streets.

Now that's the chronological history of what happened as far as I was concerned. I know that throughout that period the Attorney General and the Assistant Secretary were in constant touch with the White House. Now I'd like to review a few of the inconsistencies in what has been said about this chronology.

In his first speech the President said, "This plan proceeded precisely as scheduled. Approximately 5,000 federal troops were on their way by air lift to Detroit within a few hours. Mr. Vance, Lt. General John L. Throckmorton and others were in Detroit and in conference with Governor Romney by the middle of the afternoon.

"Their initial report was that it then appeared that the situation might be controlled without bringing the federal troops from the Selfridge Air Base into Detroit. They, therefore, recommended to me that the troops be maintained on a 30-minute alert and they advised me that they would be in continual touch with the situation with Defense Secretary McNamara and me."

The clear implication being that I had joined the Secretary and the General in this recommendation, and there could be nothing further from the truth than that.

Now I have here the article by Max Frankel. He says in this article, "Governor Romney's indecision for nearly 20 hours about the need for troops, the relatively poor training and use of the National Guard, . . ." Even if you don't know anything about what I've told you, if you'll take a look at what was made public, the Assistant Secretary of Defense indicated at a press conference at 8:00 that he wasn't going to commit the troops.

Now he indicated in a subsequent press conference the following day that I happened to walk into — I didn't know it was going to take place but I happened to walk into it — that he

decided not to commit the troops because there was a divided viewpoint on the part of community leaders. (That) he'd reviewed his conversations with me and the Mayor in the afternoon and then we met with the community leaders and he said there was a divided viewpoint on the part of community leaders, the part of state and local officials as well as the Negro leaders with whom we met. There were only two Negro leaders who participated in that one conference who didn't think the troops should be on the streets immediately and that left the impression that was erroneous.

Now Frankel also says that, "At no point during the crisis nor since then have the two men conferred directly by telephone." The reason I didn't confer with the President by telephone was because Vice President Humphrey told us we were to talk to the Attorney General and the Attorney General told me he was handling it with the White House. Otherwise, we would have contacted the President.

Now it says here (Frankel), "Early Monday, Romney called Attorney General Ramsey Clark four times—2:40, 3:30, 5:15 and 6:50 — describing the trouble and, according to officials here, repeatedly changing his mind about whether to call for the Army and make the legally necessary admission that events were beyond his control." My problem was to keep up with their changes in position. In my first call I was assured that my oral request was adequate. In my second call I was told that my own National Guard commander, that they had talked to around my back, said we didn't need the federal troops. So I had to get that straightened out. The first telegram didn't meet their written requirements so we composed the second one. But there was no change in viewpoint about the need for troops and the need as fast as we could get them.

Then it says here (Frankel), "In a fifth call at 9:45 A.M. Romney told the Attorney General he had some doubt about his ability to contain the riot for another night and thought he would request federal intervention on that basis." I had already requested it earlier than 3:00 A.M.

"By 10:45 just as Western Union said it was filing Romney's message also signed by Democratic Mayor Cavanagh" . . . that's not important, that particular part of the article.

Now here's the statement that, "At 7:00 McNamara called Vance who said his team felt it was too early" — that's 7:00 in the evening — "At 7:00 McNamara called Vance who said his team felt it was too early to commit the Army troops, that with many more Guardsmen and policemen on hand than the night before the situation seemed under control; (that) there was sharp disagreement in the community, he said" — there were two Negroes out of 18 or 20 and that's all — "there was sharp disagreement in the community, he said, with the Governor and most Michigan congressmen opposing the use of federal troops at that moment and the mayor and others strongly in favor."

Mayor Cavanagh and I were in agreement at all times and on Tuesday, July 25, in his letter to the President, the Mayor said, "Some would make it appear that you and I were bitterly divided on this issue (that's talking about his position and the President's). Those are not the facts. That is not the truth. On the basis of the information which I had from personal observation and extensive intelligence, I felt that the use of federal troops was necessary when I supported Governor Romney in his request."

Now whoever's feeding stuff out of the White House to Max Frankel, and I don't think it's second level, distorts it by indicating that there was "sharp disagreement in the community," which is not true — but I've always said a substantial unanimity existed when you get 90 per cent of the people wanting a particular course of action, you have got substantial unanimity, and that's what you had in the Negro community, and you had complete unanimity on the part of state and local officials — "sharp disagreement in the community, he said, with the Governor and most Michigan congressmen opposing the use of federal troops at that moment and the mayor and others strongly in favor." One of the two who said they were willing to leave it up to Vance was a Michigan congressman, only one.

Now fourth point, it says here (Frankel). "The Governor, according to White House reports, described the situation as hopeful but the mayor disagreed. Vance, privately finding the Governor very cagey, noted publicly that Romney was not then 'requesting' federal troops." I never ceased hounding him for federal troops or Attorney General Clark and through them the White House, because they were representing the President. "About 9:00 P.M., Vance told the President that he still favored restraint but found the incident rate rising and planned another quick reconnaissance."

Now there's a fifth point in here (Frankel), "Romney was said to be expressing doubt again about the ability to control events." This was supposed to be after 10:00 o'clock. "Romney was said to be expressing doubt again about his ability to con-

trol events but would not make the official finding that they were out of control." I've already covered the picture from that standpoint.

Now there is one other point that may have some relevance in the review of this record at some later date and that's this. In my discussions with Attorney General Clark I did not raise the question of the impact on insurance policies in Michigan of asserting that we had an insurrection out of control. I didn't learn about that until early in the afternoon when Secretary Vance and General Throckmorton and the Mayor and I went on the survey of the city after his arrival. I told him that if he decided, if and when he decided to bring the troops into the city, I hoped he would keep in mind the fact that he would nullify most insurance policies in the State of Michigan if he did it on the basis of an insurrection out of control. By that time I knew of that factor. I did not know that factor earlier. I will be glad to answer questions.

Q: Do you believe that the troops were kept out of Detroit that first evening for political reasons?

A: I think the President of the United States played politics in a period of tragedy and riot.

Q: To protect the Great Society or to embarrass you, Governor?

A: You will have to ask him.

Q: Is this the rebuttal of that first speech, Governor?

A: No, I haven't discussed the two speeches. As a matter of fact, if you will take a look at the record I just reported and the two speeches, I think you'll find the second speech a very excellent indictment of the first.

Q: Of the president's speech?

A: Yes. I think you'll find his second speech a complete indictment of the first and the record of what happened.

Q: Why did he play politics, Governor? Can you support that a little more?

A: You'll have to ask him.

Q: Governor, when did you first become aware or feel that there was a political factor involved?

A: When the Attorney General began to insist on this certification that we had an insurrection that was out of control and didn't seem to be particularly impressed with the fact that we needed the troops to keep the situation from getting out of control.

Q: Governor do you feel that Democratic Mayor Cavanagh perhaps agreed with you?

A: I don't know. In any event, his letter to the President, he indicated that he was supporting my request for the federal troops. I indicated — let me cover another part of the record.

Some of you will recall that press conference where he indicated that some other gentlemen might not agree with him. Now the next morning we had a joint press conference, the Secretary, the Mayor and me. And in the course of that press conference, the Mayor indicated that he regretted having to do so but he wanted to say something to correct the record. And he proceeded to discuss the fact of his consistent request for federal troops on the streets. And when he concluded, I indicated that in light of the Mayor's remarks, I felt I should say something to correct the record, and I proceeded to indicate that at no time had I had any other position than that our need for troops as fast as we could get them. I had seen the evening before in Doc Greene's column — sometimes particular columnists tend to be quite revealing — that Jerry Cavanagh extracted these additional troops from Vice President Hubert Humphrey late last evening.

Q: Through this whole period of time, when you were having discussions, did you have someone there on your staff who was present?

A: Oh, yes, I was making these calls in the presence of — the Humphrey call I made in the presence of Commissioner Girardin, the Mayor and Colonel Davids. The second call from Clark, I forgot who was in the room with me because there were people in the press conference. Chuck, do you remember? There may or may not have been people in that second call because we were in the press conference and I came out and took it in Girardin's office and I don't recall who was there. But the other calls were made while Girardin, Harmon, Danhof, and in some instances the Mayor, some instances Colonel Davids was present.

Q: Had the federal troops moved in earlier, that would have made it sometime Monday afternoon, do you think that the destruction of Monday evening and Tuesday morning could have been halted?

A: I think it would have made a difference. I indicated in my first telegram, after citing all of the damage of the first day, "All of this has occurred in just one day and the experience of similar outbreaks in other parts of the country, most notably in Los Angeles and Newark, indicates that they are rarely limited to a period of one day and night. It is the unanimous judgment of state and local officials and Michigan military establishment that our situation may continue at least through tonight.

Q: Governor, specifically was his frequent mention of your inability to control a riot a part of the politics he was playing in the first speech?

A: You mean the President?

Q: Yes.

A: Well, again, I'll let you be the judge against the chronological record of what took place.

Q: Governor what was the determination then as to where the federal troops should be sent? Most of the violence was on the west side.

A: I have no criticism of the deployment of the federal troops after they arrived. When General Throckmorton and Secretary Vance arrived Monday afternoon and Monday evening, the violence was spreading to the east side. The destruction had been so great on the west side that the view was expressed by several that the probability was the action would be greater on the east side than the west side. And in my opinion that's why they put the federal troops on the east side. I don't fault them in any way with respect to their deployment. I think, based on the information they had at that time and the indicated direction of things, that was the place where it looked like the action would be.

Q: Governor, do you have any idea when the President was appraised of the situation?

A: Well, I don't have anything except this Frankel article. In there it says he was appraised of it at 3:30 in the morning. I know the Attorney General was in contact with him early. I talked with the Attorney General sometime before 3:00. Whether he called him then or whether he waited until our second call, which was just after 3:30. It says in here he first learned about it from the FBI. I can't answer that with certainty.

Q: Do you feel that the hesitancy of Secretary Vance in putting the troops on the streets was due to his own evaluation or due to influence from the White House.

A: I have no way of knowing with certainty but I know he was in regular contact with the President.

Q: I'd like you to make one point quite clear, Governor. It seems to me you're saying that 20 hours of lack of action by the federal government contributed to the toll of lives and property.

A: I don't think there is any question but that if we'd have had federal troops on the streets before dark Monday, that it would have had an effect. They didn't get on the streets until after 2:00. We made every effort to get our National Guard people on the streets before dark, because of the effect it would have.

Q: Governor, did the fact that the federal government offered federal troops to the Democratic Governor of New Jersey in their incident, without his request, influence you in your opinion that this is a political . . .

A: I didn't honestly know that when I was dealing with the situation. I only learned of it afterwards. I think it stands in marked contrast to what happened in Michigan.

Q: Does that reinforce your feeling on this?

A: Well, I'll leave that up to the judgment of any individual with any degree of common sense.

Q: Before you made your first plea for federal troops, would you have handled the situation any differently if this should happen again? Do you think it was possibly mishandled before you personally asked for federal troops?

A: Do you mean the local and state aspect? Well, I haven't been discussing that and I'm not going to get into that here.

Q: How long a delay do you think there was in deploying the federal troops in Detroit?

A: Oh, we could have had the federal troops on the streets by 6:30, 7:00, instead of 2:00 A.M. in the morning.

Q: Governor, are you ruling out the possibility that it was an honest error in judgment on the part of the White House?

A: Well, let me say this. If it was an honest error of judgment, the President certainly overreacted in his speech that night to the American people.