

THE DETROIT POLICE DEPARTMENT
AND THE
DETROIT CIVIL DISORDER

Compiled by
Albert Callewaert and Arthur Yim
Mayor's Inspection Team

December, 1967

PREFACE

The Mayor of the City of Detroit, the Honorable Jerome P. Cavanagh, directed that a record be compiled of the actions of the Detroit Police Department during the recent civil disturbance (see Exhibit 1). It is intended that this report will serve as more than the mere description of a past event. Through an evolutionary study of a disturbance of this nature, we can better understand what really took place and to what degree, and how to cope with what may develop in the future.

METHODOLOGY

The correct approach required an overriding frame of reference composed of a chronological presentation of indicative disorder events and the subsequent reactions and strategies of the Detroit Police Department to this changing pattern of behavior. Special emphasis was placed on the events of Sunday, July 23, 1967, the first day of the disturbance. The goal of this fact-finding study by definition and assignment was a description of the involvement of the Detroit Police Department, as opposed to analysis of their actions. The actual form of the report involved an incorporation and interpretation of various existing and requested Detroit Police Department reports blended with open-end personal interviews with pivotal Detroit Police personnel.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The assistance and cooperation extended by Police Commissioner Girardin and the Detroit Police Department during the course of this hectic study is hereby gratefully acknowledged. We are especially indebted to two members of the Research and Development Bureau of the Detroit Police Department, Sergeant Sylvester A. Lingeman and Patrolman John Tsampikou.

Albert Callewaert, Senior Governmental Analyst
Arthur Yim, Assistant Corporation Counsel

Detroit, Michigan
December 10, 1967

City of Detroit

EXECUTIVE OFFICE

JEROME P. CAVANAUGH
MAYOR

October 30, 1967

Commissioner Ray Girardin
Police Department
1300 Beaubien
Detroit, Michigan

Dear Commissioner Girardin:

Subject: Study of police actions during the
civil disturbance.

I feel it would be beneficial for your department and the City to have an official record of police actions during the July civil disturbance. Such a record would be of value in improving our police procedures and documenting exactly what took place during those days.

As you know, we have attempted this on a piecemeal basis for such things as the reply to the Common Council on police actions during the earlier hours and to a degree for the \$9 million bond issue. However, I feel that we should have a complete chronology of that period. Therefore, I have asked James L. Trainor to oversee a study team working out of my office to compile such a record. The members of that team will be Mr. Arthur Yim and Mr. Albert Callewaert.

I would like you to provide two members from your office to work with these men. I would anticipate that the entire task could be done in four weeks and I would like to see the report on my desk by December 15.

Sincerely,

Jerome P. Cavanaugh
Mayor

JPC/ba

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INTRODUCTION - THE PRE-DISORDER SCENE

Environment

The civil disorder activity must be localized in order to portray the pre-riot environment. Since this is a study of Detroit Police Department reactions and strategies, it would seem proper to employ a Detroit Police Department area unit. The police precinct serves this purpose best, both because of base size, and the fact that most of the disorder activity took place in five police precincts, Numbers 2, 5, 7, 10 and 13 (see Exhibit 2). Exhibit 3 affords a brief demographic sketch of these Precincts. Exhibits 4, 5, and 6 disclose a relatively higher level of crime in these precincts. The Detroit Police Command at the beginning of July is set down in Exhibit 7. The deployment of the Detroit Police Department at the beginning of July is the subject matter of Exhibit 8. The daily and platoon assignments of the Detroit Police Department are correlated in great part with the incidence of crime. Exhibits 9 and 10 show that crime is at its bottom early Sunday morning.

Police Communications

For communication purposes, the Detroit Police Department has divided the city into four radio districts. Each of these districts has two frequencies, one for police mobile radios and one for PREP radios (personally radio equipped patrolman).




Exhibit 3

STATISTICAL SKETCH OF PRECINCTS 5, 7, 10 AND 13

PRECINCTS	PRECINCT POPULATION	AREA IN SQUARE MILES	SCOUT CAR TERRITORIES
2	87,000	6.47	15
5	142,000	8.66	15
7	94,000	6.81	15
10	148,000	6.52	18
13	81,000	5.68	14

Source: Detroit Police Department, 1966 Annual Report, P. 14.

CRIMINAL OFFENSES BY PRECINCT JUNE 1 THROUGH JUNE 30, 1967

	PRECINCT NO.	1	2	4	5	6	7	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	HM	TOTAL
HOMICIDES																
CRIMINAL		1	3		5	2		1		2	1		1	1	1	18
NON-CRIMINAL			1					1								2
MANSL. BY NEGLIGENCE																2
TOTAL		1	4		5	2	1	2		2	1		1	1		22
RAPE																
FORCIBLE		2	2	1	4	3	3	7		1	5					28
STATUTORY FORCIBLE		1	1	1	2	1	1	3		1	1			1	1	12
ATTEMPT RAPE		1	2	2	3	2	1	5		2	4		1			24
TOTAL		4	4	4	9	6	4	15		3	10		1	1		64
ROBBERY																
ARMED		52	45	11	25	10	38	60	10	16	46	12	10	7	1	343
NOT ARMED		68	52	15	47	15	41	58	10	13	36	22	12	5	1	395
ATTEMPT ROBBERY		12	11	6	10	7	2	16	5	2	11	3	3	1		89
TOTAL		132	108	32	82	32	81	134	25	31	93	37	25	13	2	827
AGGRAVATED ASSAULTS																
FELONIOUS ASSAULTS		47	61	28	51	25	71	98	19	13	70	12	13	3	4	515
ATTEMPT MURDER				1	1											2
MAYHEM																
OTHER ASSAULTS		46	41	10	24	27	41	27	33	20	20	22	23	21	1	356
TOTAL		93	102	39	76	52	112	125	52	33	90	34	36	24	5	873
BURGLARY																
B+E BUSINESS		47	79	46	60	65	78	83	66	72	65	81	64	42	2	850
B+E DWELLING		46	112	49	147	70	99	417	34	143	129	75	49	30		1400
B+E OTHERS		10	58	50	81	17	42	52	18	34	27	37	30	43	3	502
ATT B+E BUSINESS		4	17	5	18	13	23	22	11	9	13	10	15	18		178
ATT B+E DWELLING		2	6	2	12	9	22	40	1	20	18	8	10	3		153
ATT B+E OTHERS		1	5	2	2	2		1	1		4	1	2	1		20
TOTAL		110	277	154	320	174	264	615	131	278	256	212	170	137	5	3103
LARCENY \$50.00 + OVER																
GRAND LARCENY		60	35	22	64	31	46	38	27	45	58	42	41	31	2	542
LARCENY FROM AUTO		87	53	24	50	29	29	35	17	34	111	42	42	45		598
LARCENY FROM PERSON		23	4	2	3	2	3	6	1	3	9		1			57
TOTAL		170	92	48	117	62	78	79	45	82	178	84	84	76	2	1197
LARCENY UNDER \$50.00																
SIMPLE LARCENY		109	107	101	163	145	125	123	142	186	109	297	255	185	10	2057
LARCENY FROM AUTO		40	50	19	30	20	38	53	15	30	55	40	30	19	2	441
LARCENY FROM PERSON		37	13	4	10	6	5	18	7	4	19	3	3	1	1	131
ATT LARCENY		1	3		3	1	5	9	3	5	9		2			44
ATT LARCENY FROM AUTO		1	4	5	1	2		8	4	2	4	4				35
ATT LARCENY FROM PERSON		2	1		3	1	2		1							10
TOTAL		190	178	129	210	175	175	211	172	227	196	344	290	208	13	2718
GRAND TOTAL ALL LARCENY		360	270	177	327	237	253	290	217	309	374	428	374	284	15	3915
TOTAL AUTO THEFT		73	108	66	110	113	95	203	72	93	132	94	88	57	2	1306
TOTAL ABOVE OFFENSES		773	873	472	929	616	810	1384	499	749	956	805	695	517	32	10110
OFFENSES NOT LISTED ABOVE		221	273	179	253	210	306	291	182	215	223	268	197	220	15	3053
GRAND TOTAL ALL OFFENSES		994	1146	651	1182	826	1116	1675	681	964	1179	1073	892	737	47	13163

CRIMINAL OFFENSES BY PRECINCT FOR FIRST 6 MONTHS 1967 WITH SAME PERIOD LAST YEAR

HOMICIDES	PRECINCT NO.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	HM	TOTAL
CRIMINAL	15	11	5	5	14	5	3	16	2	2	2	11	1	4	3	1	92
NON-CRIMINAL	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	7	4	1	1	1	1	6	1	1	19
MANSL. BY NEGLIGENCE	4	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	1	3	1	6	1	1	22
TOTAL	20	13	7	7	15	6	11	20	5	5	4	15	1	10	4	2	133
RAPE	12	29	7	7	15	11	14	39	3	3	6	39	6	1	3	3	185
FORCIBLE	2	5	6	6	12	5	2	11	4	4	4	4	2	2	3	3	62
STATUTORY FORCIBLE	15	14	5	5	13	9	8	25	4	4	4	14	5	2	2	2	120
ATTEMPT RAPE	29	48	18	18	40	25	24	75	11	14	57	13	5	8	8	8	367
TOTAL	328	255	78	226	173	215	215	453	71	137	332	113	105	65	2	2	2553
ROBBERY	294	224	59	236	107	259	321	51	115	285	96	82	31	5	5	5	2165
ARMED	118	80	25	72	49	68	117	25	39	72	34	16	8	8	8	8	673
NOT ARMED	690	559	162	534	329	542	891	147	291	689	243	203	104	7	7	7	5391
ATTEMPT ROBBERY																	
TOTAL	209	350	138	213	130	251	324	58	70	326	50	44	32	6	6	6	2201
AGGRAVATED ASSAULTS	3	1	3	4	3	3	1	1	1	3	2	1	1	1	1	1	22
FELONIOUS ASSAULTS	237	235	94	163	182	224	180	102	114	130	100	134	89	4	4	4	1988
ATTEMPT MURDER	449	586	236	380	312	478	505	160	185	460	152	178	122	10	10	10	4213
MAYHEM																	
OTHER ASSAULTS																	
TOTAL	248	411	303	465	403	510	531	362	415	411	561	421	331	4	4	4	5376
BURGLARY	215	695	272	778	469	585	2273	306	743	784	447	460	194	194	194	194	8221
D+E BUSINESS	54	217	200	293	136	193	198	107	131	149	158	143	203	11	11	11	2193
B+E DWELLING	38	78	45	101	65	90	94	49	61	83	89	87	68	68	68	68	948
B+E OTHERS	5	65	20	69	39	48	241	37	90	76	55	67	45	5	5	5	857
ATT B+E	1	15	11	11	5	5	5	5	4	13	11	8	5	8	8	8	99
ATT B+E DWELLING																	
ATT B+E OTHERS																	
TOTAL	561	1481	951	1717	1117	1431	3342	866	1444	1516	1321	1186	846	15	15	15	17694
LARCENY \$50.00 + OVER																	
GRAND LARCENY	433	225	138	259	184	224	215	124	204	271	232	247	151	2	2	2	2909
LARCENY FROM AUTO	533	272	113	234	153	181	213	143	340	474	326	265	199	1	1	1	3447
LARCENY FROM PERSON	115	22	12	24	17	35	46	7	18	47	15	12	2	2	2	2	372
TOTAL	1081	519	263	517	354	440	474	274	562	792	573	524	352	3	3	3	6728
LARCENY UNDER \$50.00																	
SIMPLE LARCENY	669	533	386	717	678	575	631	523	686	606	1091	972	735	17	17	17	8819
LARCENY FROM AUTO	295	265	135	207	157	270	229	118	218	293	269	266	193	6	6	6	2921
LARCENY FROM PERSON	178	80	29	99	30	82	99	23	36	111	45	29	4	1	1	1	846
ATT LARCENY	18	27	6	23	9	28	19	14	16	32	14	17	14	237	237	237	237
ATT LARCENY FROM AUTO	11	10	13	8	5	3	18	5	7	13	11	8	7	1	1	1	120
ATT LARCENY FROM PERSON	11	5	3	14	4	5	7	5	5	5	2	1	1	67	67	67	67
TOTAL	1182	920	572	1068	883	963	1003	688	968	1060	1432	1293	953	25	25	25	13010
GRAND TOTAL ALL LARCENY	2263	1439	835	1585	1237	1403	1477	962	1530	1852	2005	1817	1305	28	28	28	19738
TOTAL AUTO THEFT	453	573	338	530	489	619	976	348	497	629	417	574	298	5	5	5	6746
TOTAL ABOVE OFFENSES	4465	4699	2447	4801	3515	4508	7286	2499	3965	5218	4152	3973	2687	67	67	67	54282
OFFENSES NOT LISTED ABOVE	1247	1537	1027	1434	1133	1705	1599	1052	1316	1259	1565	1191	1236	53	53	53	17354
GRAND TOTAL ALL OFFENSES	5712	6236	3474	6235	4648	6213	8885	3551	5281	6477	5717	5164	3923	120	120	120	71636

Source: Detroit Police Department, June, 1967 Monthly Report

MAJOR OFFENSES INCIDENT HAPPENED - YEAR 1966
Also Three Year Comparison of Group Totals

Uniform Classification of Offenses (Part I Classes)	P E R C E N T															Harbor Master	TOTAL
	1	2	4	5	6	7	10	11	12	13	14	15	16				
HOMICIDE AND NON-NEGLIGENT MANSLAUGHTER:																	
Homicide and Non-neg. Manslaughter-Criminal	18	19	8	17	6	23	25	11	5	31	2	4	4	1	1	175	
Homicide and Non-neg. Manslaughter-Excusable	7	5	..	3	1	9	6	2	..	6	39	
Total Year 1966	25	24	9	20	7	32	31	13	5	37	2	4	4	1	1	214	
Total Year 1965	21	21	6	15	10	28	43	7	4	28	3	1	..	1	1	188	
Total Year 1964	13	19	7	18	3	12	24	5	2	14	4	1	2	1	1	125	
MANSLAUGHTER BY NEGLIGENCE:																	
Year 1966	1	2	6	1	4	9	2	2	..	5	3	6	4	45	
Year 1965	5	5	..	2	1	3	3	..	5	2	4	..	3	33	
Year 1964	3	4	6	1	4	1	2	2	2	..	2	5	1	33	
RAPE-FORCIBLE:																	
Rape	23	27	11	38	29	38	62	8	18	53	13	11	6	8	8	365	
Statutory Rape	5	13	6	9	10	27	23	1	4	10	3	4	5	4	4	124	
Attempt Rape	15	24	14	28	31	21	55	10	20	35	5	10	5	2	2	275	
Total Year 1966	43	64	31	75	70	86	140	19	42	98	21	25	16	14	14	744	
Total Year 1965	40	68	17	64	42	73	125	21	24	76	27	13	27	11	11	648	
Total Year 1964	31	60	27	47	30	46	82	20	23	52	26	16	8	5	5	475	
ROBBERY:																	
Robbery - Armed	497	437	134	328	285	418	790	184	203	572	237	181	104	7	7	4377	
Robbery - Not Armed	489	438	114	362	189	354	511	68	186	535	121	116	46	17	17	3526	
Attempt Robbery	133	138	47	135	94	110	196	40	45	133	70	44	14	1199	
Total Year 1966	1099	1013	295	825	568	882	1497	292	434	1240	428	341	164	24	24	9102	
Total Year 1965	561	633	212	436	292	526	921	209	309	902	239	139	100	19	19	5498	
Total Year 1964	502	663	207	413	283	341	803	158	218	572	173	103	91	12	12	4739	
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT:																	
Felonious Assault	359	446	246	379	227	365	556	89	130	418	82	100	62	3	3	3462	
Attempt Homicide	7	4	7	12	6	28	15	10	7	4	4	1	1	108	
Mayhem	2	..	1	..	2	5	
Other Assaults	413	472	273	346	296	390	414	160	194	346	180	244	167	13	13	3918	
Total Year 1966	779	922	526	739	531	784	985	261	331	768	276	345	230	16	16	7493	
Total Year 1965	670	771	448	745	339	808	851	273	214	795	214	133	128	21	21	6410	
Total Year 1964	963	861	492	856	428	1057	886	418	310	832	249	204	180	28	28	7804	

* 1966 FIGURES NOT COMPARABLE TO PREVIOUS YEARS DUE TO THE UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING COMMITTEE'S CHANGE IN METHOD OF REPORTING.

Source: Detroit Police Department, 1966 Annual Report, P. 25.

	DIAL	RADIO CODE	
EUGENE A. REUTER	270	2102	Superintendent
JOHN F. NICHOLS	279	2103	Deputy Superintendent
THOMAS TURKALY	305	2104	Chief Inspector
EDWARD R. RASH	377	2105	Chief of Detectives
GEORGE BLONDFIELD	770	2106	Deputy Chief of Detectives
ROBERT S. QUAD	781	2107	Director of Personnel
WILLIAM H. FOLKINGHORN	471	2108	Director of Traffic
ANTHONY BERTONI	780	2109	Central District Inspector
ARTHUR C. SAGE	377	2110	Eastern District Inspector
CHARLES H. GENTRY	404	2111	Western District Inspector
GEORGE J. ZEILMAN	405	2112	District Inspector, Special Services Division
ARLEN DeLUCA	786	2113	District Inspector, Inspectional Service
	389	2114	Central District Detective Inspector
HENRY N. NEDWAK	390	2115	Eastern District Detective Inspector
JOHN J. O'NEILL	302	2116	Western District Detective Inspector
	485	2117	Director of Technical Services
ROSEMARY H. KLUG	711	2118	Chief of Women's Division
ROBERT A. LOTHIAN	280	2119	2nd Deputy Commissioner
HUBERT G. LOCKE	788	2120	Police Administration Assistant
WILLIAM P. DORAN	248	2121	Police Attorney; Assistant Corporation Counsel

P R E C I N C T S

				DIAL	CID	RADIO CODE					DIAL	CID	RADIO CODE		
GORDON R. SMITH	Inmpt	1	244	231	150	EDWARD G. WISCHNICK	Inmpt	10	551	429	1050
FRANCIS V. ARDANAS	Inmpt	2	311	743	250	STANLEY L. JEDENSKI	Inmpt	11	856	731	1150
RICHARD J. LOFTUS	Inmpt	4	321	744	450	ROBERT W. MOORE	Inmpt	12	561	752	1250
ANTHONY E. ROZMAN	Inmpt	5	426	742	550	RUSSELL P. GALLAWAY	Inmpt	13	566	460	1350
EUGENE L. ZIOLKOWSKI	..	Inmpt	6	331	741	650	NORMAN J. WERNER	Inmpt	14	571	472	1450
BRUCE J. GRUND	Inmpt	7	436	750	750	CHARLES W. BEER	Inmpt	15	876	438	1550
								ARNOLD A. KLEINER	Inmpt	16	581	748	1650

S P E C I A L I Z E D B U R E A U S

	DIAL	RADIO CODE		DIAL	RADIO CODE
CARL F. JEFFERMAN	379	2765	William T. MORRIS	420	2170
WATSON W. DAY	757	2130	FRED D. HOTCHKISS	350	2175
JAMES D. BANNON	410-730	2810	EMERIK R. GEINIG	787	2200
JAMES A. COLE	872	2135	CHESTER R. SYLVESTER	330	850
HENRY C. MAJESKI	400	2140	WILLIAM G. HUNN	374	2225
WILFORD C. WOOD, MD	382	2145	LEONARD J. SZNEWASZ	480	2250
MARVIN W. FRANK	783	2160	CHARLES J. KANTZLER	788	2113
BERNARD G. WINCKOSKI	315	2860	GEORGE W. HARGE		
NORMAN J. NICKERSON	434	2165	FRANCIS E. CONWELL	717	2830
			HARRY C. ANDERSON	861	

T R A F F I C B U R E A U S

	DIAL	RADIO CODE		DIAL	RADIO CODE
ARTHUR SONKENBERG	283	2280	HENRY W. MORGAN	355	2215
PAUL L. DOWLEY	881	2300	CARL H. SMITH	467	2605
JOHN J. BOWYER	327	2280	WILLIAM P. ELLENBURG	208	2510

D E T E C T I V E D I V I S I O N

	DIAL	RADIO CODE		DIAL	RADIO CODE
JOSEPH P. WUFER	726	2710	EDWARD V. DOGGS	273	2760
JAMES BALAZE	844	2720	DONALD L. CUNEO	347	2795
ALBERT P. SCHWALLER	352	2730	ROBERT KERR	347	2797
THEODORE S. SIENSKI	392	2770	RAYMOND J. GLINSKI	347	2798
JOHN S. WARE	426	2800	ROY E. CHLOPAN	347	2796
JOSEPH EPKYN	358	2750	THOMAS R. MOLAN	347	2799
EDWARD A. MONK	6343				

T E C H N I C A L S E R V I C E S D I V I S I O N

	DIAL	RADIO CODE		DIAL	RADIO CODE
JACK SHOEMAKER	260	2180	ELMER W. SOLDAN	6232	2270
GERALD L. PERMAN	219	2740	JOHN STRUBANK	8932	2271
ANTHONY LESHAU	414	2743	EDWARD T. WALSH	324	2220
FREDERICK J. SCHMIDT	479	2790	WILBERT F. KENNY	823	2150

Form C of D-44-28 (Rev. 4-60)

0.99. 43.4

POLICE DEPARTMENT -- RECORD BUREAU
MONTHLY PERSONNEL ASSIGNMENT REPORT

DATE, June, 1987

June, 1987

PRECINCTS	UNIFORM DIVISION				DETECTIVE DIVISION				Total Force Actually Working	Police Cadet	Civilian	Total Actually Working in Precinct	ALL RANKS		STREET DUTY										PATROLMEN								
	Inspector	Lieutenant	Sergeant	Patrolman	Total Uniform Div.	Detective Lieutenant	Detective Sergeant	Detective					Total Detective Div.	MOTORIZED								FOOTMAN		STREET DUTY					OTHER THAN STREET DUTY				
														Assigned OUT	Assigned IN	Patrol Wagon	Scout Car	Cruiser	Clean-up	*Other Motorized	Total Motorized	Precinct Safety	Beat Man Available	Total Footmen	Total Street Duty	Clark	Station Attendant	**Other Duty	Total Other Than Street Duty				
1st Precinct	1	5	18	177	201	1	2	16	19	220		17	237	8	1	2	91	10	8	14	125		19	19	144	6	3		24	33	177		
2nd Precinct	1	5	14	164	184	1	2	17	20	204		6	210	11	1		102	10	6	6	124		30	30	154	5	3		2	10	164		
4th Precinct	1	5	13	120	139	1	1	14	16	155		3	158	8			71	8	5	14	98		13	13	111	4	3		2	9	120		
5th Precinct	1	4	13	169	187	1	3	18	22	209		6	215	9			107	10	6	7	130		26	26	156	7	3	1	2	13	169		
6th Precinct	1	5	12	109	127	1	1	13	15	142		3	146	5	2		78		4	17	99		1	1	100	4	3		2	9	109		
7th Precinct	1	5	12	162	180	1	2	18	21	201		5	206	10	1		116	8	6	4	134		16	16	150	8	3		1	12	162		
10th Precinct	1	5	14	176	196	1	2	22	25	221		8	229	12		3	108	13	11	14	149		14	14	163	6	3	2	2	13	176		
11th Precinct	1	5	12	107	125	1	1	10	12	137		4	141	4	3		75		3	4	82		18	18	100	4	3			7	107		
12th Precinct	1	5	13	128	147	1	1	11	13	160		4	164	6	4		78	7	6	11	102		10	10	112	6	3		7	16	128		
13th Precinct	1	5	14	155	175	1	2	20	23	198		6	204	7			100	10	6	7	123		18	18	141	8	3		3	14	155		
14th Precinct	1	5	11	136	153	1	1	12	14	167		3	170	9			81		3	19	103		22	22	125	4	3	2	2	11	136		
15th Precinct	1	5	13	151	170	1	2	13	16	186		4	190	10	1		110		3	12	125		15	15	140	4	3	2	2	11	151		
16th Precinct	1	5	13	137	156	1	1	12	14	170		4	174	3	1		114		3	4	121		9	9	130	4	3			7	137		
Total Precincts	13	64	172	1891	2140	13	21	196	230	2370		73	2444	102	14	5	1231	76	70	133	1515		211	211	1726	70	39	7	49	165	1891		

PRECINCTS BY PLATOONS

[illegible]

Source: Detroit Police Department, June, 1967 Monthly Report.

DISTRIBUTION OF CERTAIN OFFENSES: BY DAY OF WEEK

Uniform Classification of Offenses	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Saturday	Sunday	Unknown	TOTAL
HOMICIDE AND NON-NEGLIGENT MANSLAUGHTER:									
Homicide and Non-neg. Manslaughter-Criminal	24	24	31	23	31	34	27	1	175
Homicide and Non-neg. Manslaughter-Excusable	3	3	1	3	5	14	10	..	39
Total	27	27	32	26	36	48	37	1	214
MANSLAUGHTER BY NEGLIGENCE	5	8	2	9	4	11	8	..	43
RAPE-FORCIBLE:									
Rape	49	40	38	33	47	77	81	..	345
Statutory Rape	22	12	16	19	18	22	15	..	124
Attempt Rape	33	28	31	34	37	58	53	1	275
Total	104	80	85	86	102	157	129	1	744
ROBBERY:									
Robbery-Armed	487	483	544	514	840	1013	513	1	4377
Robbery-Not Armed	404	419	382	418	709	777	436	1	3526
Attempt Robbery	158	144	159	151	223	239	122	1	1199
Total	1029	1048	1065	1081	1774	2029	1073	3	9102
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT:									
Felocious Assault	417	313	320	388	350	834	831	1	3462
Attempt Homicide	12	8	8	12	18	26	24	..	104
Mayhem	1	..	1	1	..	1	1	..	3
Other Assaults	537	329	444	470	645	738	549	6	3918
Total	967	650	783	869	1213	1399	1205	7	7493
BURGLARY-BREAKING OR ENTERING:									
Breaking or Entering Business	1149	1178	1154	1208	1224	1253	1189	873	9231
Breaking or Entering Dwelling	2099	1918	2019	2061	2413	2202	1554	847	15023
Breaking or Entering Others	331	323	334	358	358	332	380	740	3156
Attempt Breaking or Entering Business	149	158	188	164	193	180	163	78	1251
Attempt Breaking or Entering Dwelling	178	182	193	176	213	177	149	52	1320
Attempt Breaking or Entering Others	14	7	8	12	13	21	10	13	96
Total	3850	3766	3893	3978	4413	4148	3425	2603	30077
LARCENY-THEFT:									
a. \$30.00 and Over in Value:									
Larceny	606	628	635	669	714	705	415	695	3053
Larceny from Motor Vehicle	732	745	791	836	828	775	576	439	5722
Larceny from Person	83	88	86	78	151	136	88	..	720
Total	1421	1459	1512	1583	1693	1616	1079	1134	11497
b. Under \$30.00 in Value:									
Larceny	2748	2699	2748	2724	3054	2913	1956	1299	20140
Larceny from Motor Vehicle	792	861	840	979	923	848	746	507	8598
Larceny from Person	309	174	231	243	329	403	240	3	1832
Attempt Larceny	34	88	88	50	48	33	43	11	393
Attempt Larceny from Motor Vehicle	21	34	30	25	33	39	22	4	198
Attempt Larceny from Person	28	21	25	36	26	28	18	..	180
Total	3850	3855	4042	4057	4415	4273	3025	1824	29341
Total Larceny-Theft	5271	5314	5554	5640	6108	5889	4104	2958	40838
AUTO THEFT	1690	1711	1698	1641	2094	2038	1683	698	13260
TOTAL PART I CLASSES	12952	12802	13102	13331	13734	13919	11664	6269	101773
TOTAL PART II CLASSES	3830	3581	3543	3676	4389	4571	3356	2818	30004
GRAND TOTAL	16782	16383	16645	17007	20123	20490	15220	9087	131777

Source: Detroit Police Department, 1966 Annual Report, P. 22.

DISTRIBUTION OF CERTAIN OFFENSES: BY HOUR OF DAY

Uniform Classification of Offenses	12 A.M. to 1:59 A.M.	2 A.M. to 3:59 A.M.	4 A.M. to 5:59 A.M.	6 A.M. to 7:59 A.M.	8 A.M. to 9:59 A.M.	10 A.M. to 11:59 A.M.	12 Noon to 1:59 P.M.	2 P.M. to 3:59 P.M.	4 P.M. to 5:59 P.M.	6 P.M. to 7:59 P.M.	8 P.M. to 9:59 P.M.	10 P.M. to 11:59 P.M.	Day Time-4our Unknown	Night Time-4our Unknown	Time Unknown	TOTAL
HOMICIDE AND NON-NEGLIGENT MANSLAUGHTER:																
Homicide and Non-neg. Manslaughter-Criminal ..	13	18	8	8	4	4	8	7	8	23	23	33	3	4	20	173
Homicide and Non-neg. Manslaughter-Excusable ..	5	6	2	1	1	1	1	3	4	4	6	8	39
Total	18	24	10	9	5	5	9	10	12	27	29	41	3	4	20	214
MANSLAUGHTER BY NEGLIGENCE																
.....	4	5	1	2	1	..	8	4	1	7	9	7	48
RAPE-FORCIBLE:																
Rape	39	64	42	18	14	16	10	8	9	12	33	80	..	7	4	343
Statutory Rape	9	5	4	2	11	4	6	11	16	18	15	17	..	2	6	124
Attempt Rape	26	40	23	14	12	10	9	9	11	26	38	42	1	1	1	273
Total	104	109	71	34	37	30	25	28	36	54	86	109	1	10	11	744
ROBBERY:																
Robbery-Armed	813	826	284	147	137	261	284	307	304	407	626	554	1	4	12	4377
Robbery-Not Armed	413	313	141	97	82	142	234	242	295	477	380	470	2	1	16	3526
Attempt Robbery	112	78	81	39	66	80	76	106	85	144	201	167	1	..	3	1189
Total	1028	917	486	283	266	463	594	655	694	1026	1417	1191	4	5	21	9102
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT:																
Felony Assault	470	324	130	85	82	130	181	262	293	381	324	864	2	2	20	2462
Attempt Homicide	13	12	6	4	..	6	8	5	4	8	20	18	1	106
Mayhem	1	2	1	1	8
Other Assaults	425	241	166	80	183	180	234	452	448	462	578	327	8	12	24	3918
Total	909	580	343	170	235	296	401	740	747	862	1121	1110	8	14	45	7493
BURGLARY-BREAKING OR ENTERING:																
Breaking or Entering Business	321	875	460	113	41	44	81	43	79	147	330	462	40	1034	5281	9231
Breaking or Entering Dwelling	247	228	149	79	204	234	692	801	648	884	880	422	2623	1017	5728	13022
Breaking or Entering Others	66	62	42	29	20	44	49	70	84	82	140	67	46	157	2155	3136
Attempt Breaking or Entering Business	122	122	73	25	9	7	5	10	11	32	74	112	1	80	555	1251
Attempt Breaking or Entering Dwelling	82	60	31	8	26	67	74	98	82	92	131	120	97	46	326	1220
Attempt Breaking or Entering Others	4	4	1	1	..	2	1	6	6	8	9	9	1	2	42	96
Total	1032	1648	756	255	320	686	842	1028	891	1225	1564	1222	2711	2336	14065	30077
LARCENY-THEFT:																
a. \$50.00 and Over in Value:																
Larceny	126	96	64	49	114	282	363	452	416	281	287	188	227	172	1910	5053
Larceny from Motor Vehicle	205	114	44	39	98	177	237	315	302	366	442	309	369	410	2274	5722
Larceny from Person	78	102	78	23	14	43	50	59	56	81	64	59	6	10	15	720
Total	409	312	186	111	226	512	670	826	777	716	802	554	602	592	4199	11497
b. Under \$50.00 in Value:																
Larceny	406	217	128	135	461	1078	1086	2278	2326	1772	1545	719	734	740	5915	20140
Larceny from Motor Vehicle	313	119	89	33	91	197	242	312	287	354	588	316	428	514	2825	8588
Larceny from Person	121	102	59	64	82	88	167	182	221	242	303	205	1	10	14	1822
Attempt Larceny	22	21	14	11	8	17	22	27	32	39	42	46	2	5	83	383
Attempt Larceny from Motor Vehicle	19	16	7	1	10	8	8	11	12	14	19	15	9	9	42	196
Attempt Larceny from Person	5	8	3	2	4	11	12	18	21	40	40	10	1	180
Total	789	484	278	237	626	1407	2148	2928	2902	2432	2837	1211	1184	1276	6480	29241
Total Larceny-Theft	1198	796	464	348	852	1919	2818	3854	3679	3170	3240	1865	1786	1870	13079	40638
AUTO THEFT																
.....	322	266	92	197	255	340	425	520	526	862	1184	886	912	1293	2014	12260
TOTAL PART I CLASSES	4833	3743	2126	1217	2001	3751	5189	6649	6305	7236	8751	6435	5425	5523	32245	101773
TOTAL PART II CLASSES	1897	1244	546	382	609	969	1137	1649	1787	2409	3261	2878	412	812	9926	30004
GRAND TOTAL	6730	4987	2672	1599	2610	4720	6326	8298	8092	9645	12112	9313	5837	6335	42211	131777

Source: Detroit Police Department, 1966 Annual Report, p. 23.

The police mobile radio system is the in-car radio system. These radios operate off the battery power of the automobile. They are powerful enough to transmit and send a signal directly to the Police Headquarters Communications Center. It is a totally independent system.

The PREP system involves the new portable radio concept. PREP radios by themselves are not as powerful as the mobile radios. However, through the use of a relay tower system, the PREP system becomes the equal of the mobile system. There are several relay towers throughout the city. Transmission from a PREP set is picked up by the nearest tower, amplified and then relayed through a wire system to the Police Headquarters Communications Center.

One exception to this pattern is the Motor Traffic Bureau, which has a mobile frequency of its own. The control center for this system is also located in Police Headquarters.

Another exception concerns the Tactical Mobile Unit (TMU) and certain other specialized bureaus equipped with PREP radios which they operate on separate car-to-car or car-to-portable frequencies. There is no control center, nor are relay towers utilized. Hence, the range is limited.

In addition, an adjunct to ordinary Bell Telephone equipment is the separate Detroit Police Department telephone system. All police units, as well as many schools, hospitals and city offices, are equipped with police telephones. The police call boxes on the streets and freeways are also part of this system.

A teletype system is also employed by the Department for disseminating information. All precincts and key bureaus are equipped with teletype receiving sets. Both the teletype system and the police phone system are maintained and serviced by the Public Lighting Commission Communications Section.

Police Equipment

Exhibit 11 is the pre-disorder riot control armament inventory of the Detroit Police Department as of January 1, 1967. Exhibit 12 is the breakdown by precincts and bureaus of this equipment. Quantities that are listed in the G-2 Room will vary from day to day as ammunition is used by precincts and bureaus and in police training programs. Tear gas and extra ammunition is carried by all cruiser crews and precinct patrol sergeants.

Exhibit 13 gives the police mobile equipment picture as of December 31, 1966. The Detroit Police Department has approximately 400 PREP sets. The Motor Traffic Bureau has jurisdiction over the Department's special mechanized equipment, some of which is riot related:

- 1 Dukw (an amphibious vehicle)
- 2 Tanks
- 1 Communications Trailer
- 1 Truck and power unit for the Communication's Trailer
- 1 Bomb truck and trailer
- 1 Prison bus
- 2 Riot rigs

Arrest Procedure

Under normal circumstances, the arresting officer accompanies his prisoner to the precinct station, where he tags all evidence property and personal property of the defendant. A detailed report describing the arrest situation is prepared by the arresting officer (PCR - preliminary complaint record). The prisoner is fingerprinted by precinct personnel. Under normal conditions, it is not uncommon to have a back-up of prisoners in the station awaiting fingerprinting and registering (completion of detailed arrest card, inventory of personal property, logging in books, etc.).

DETROIT POLICE DEPARTMENT
PRE-DISORDER RIOT CONTROL ARMAMENT INVENTORY

ITEM	AMOUNT
Shotguns	479
Rifles	137
Sub-machine guns and M-1's	27
Grenades:	
Blast type for indoor use	857
Burning type	1625
Sick gas	100
Long range projectiles - shells	768
Short range projectiles - shells	524
Tear gas guns	44
Ammunition:	
38 cal.	192,000 rounds
45 cal.	71,000 rounds
30 cal. M-1 carbine	1,100 rounds
30-6 cal.	9,000 rounds
30-30 cal.	20,000 rounds
12 gauge -.00 buckshot	55,000 rounds
12 gauge - #4 buckshot	6,000 rounds
12 gauge - slug	8,600 rounds
Misc. Equipment:	
Bayonets	89
Body armour	3 sets
Flak vests	7
Bullet proof vests	3
Helmets (variety)	2000
Plastic face shields	1200

Source: Lt. A. McGhee of the Detroit Police Academy

DETROIT POLICE DEPARTMENT
ASSIGNMENT OF RIOT CONTROL EQUIPMENT
BY PRECINCTS AND BUREAUS
JANUARY 1, 1967

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GUNS:

SHOTGUNS
RIFLES
SUB MACHINE GUNS
TEAR GAS GUNS

TEAR GAS EQUIPMENT:

BLAST TYPE TEAR GAS
GRENADE
BURNING TYPE TEAR
GAS GRENADE
LONG RANGE TEAR GAS
PROJECTILE
SHORT RANGE TEAR GAS
SHELLS
NAUSEATING GAS GRENADE

AMMUNITION:

38 CAL. SERVICE CART.
45 CAL. SERVICE CART.
30 CAL. M-1 CARBINE CART.
30-06 CAL. RIFLE CART.
30-30 CAL. RIFLE CART.
12 GAUGE OO BUCKSHOT SHELLS
12 GAUGE #4 SHOT
12 GAUGE SLUGS

MISCELLANEOUS:

BAYONETS
BODY ARMOR
FLAK VESTS
BULLET PROOF VEST
HELMETS, ALL TYPES
PLASTIC FACE SHIELDS

	1st PRECINCT	2nd PRECINCT	4th PRECINCT	5th PRECINCT	6th PRECINCT	7th PRECINCT	10th PRECINCT	11th PRECINCT	12th PRECINCT	13th PRECINCT	14th PRECINCT	15th PRECINCT	18th PRECINCT
SHOTGUNS	19	19	19	19	19	20	20	19	19	19	19	19	19
RIFLES	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	4	3	3	3	3
SUB MACHINE GUNS	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1
TEAR GAS GUNS	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
BLAST TYPE TEAR GAS	22	85	23	81	20	16	85	81	20	75	20	20	85
GRENADE	28	135	35	135	25	27	140	135	30	134	35	30	135
BURNING TYPE TEAR GAS	10	65	10	65	10	10	73	65	10	58	10	10	65
PROJECTILE	10	50	10	50	10	10	55	50	10	50	10	10	50
SHORT RANGE TEAR GAS	10	50	10	50	10	10	55	50	10	50	10	10	50
SHELLS	-	5	-	5	-	-	5	5	-	5	-	-	5
NAUSEATING GAS GRENADE	-	5	-	5	-	-	5	5	-	5	-	-	5
38 CAL. SERVICE CART.	2M 400	12M 1400	2M 500	12M 1450	2M 250	2M 400	12M 1700	12M 1250	2M 500	12M 1500	2M 250	2M 300	12M 1450
45 CAL. SERVICE CART.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
30 CAL. M-1 CARBINE CART.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
30-06 CAL. RIFLE CART.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	40	-	-	-	-
30-30 CAL. RIFLE CART.	100	1100	100	1080	100	100	1100	1100	100	1100	100	100	1100
12 GAUGE OO BUCKSHOT SHELLS	300	1300	400	1250	300	300	1350	1300	300	1300	300	275	1300
12 GAUGE #4 SHOT	-	500	-	500	-	-	500	500	-	500	-	-	500
12 GAUGE SLUGS	30	505	30	525	30	30	515	530	30	515	30	25	527
BAYONETS	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
BODY ARMOR	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-
FLAK VESTS	1	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	1	1	-	-	-
BULLET PROOF VEST	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
HELMETS, ALL TYPES	141	141	141	141	141	141	141	141	141	141	141	141	129
PLASTIC FACE SHIELDS	55	55	55	55	55	55	55	55	55	55	55	55	55

	A.P.B.	CONTROL CENTER	C.I.B.	COMMISSIONER'S SQUAD	H.M.B.	MOUNTED BUREAU	MOTOR TRAFFIC BUREAU	RADIO	SCIENTIFIC	T.M.U.	YOUTH BUREAU	GUN REPAIR SHOP	G-2 ROOM	TOTAL
GUNS:														
SHOT GUNS	4	10	9	2	19	-	95	4	-	44	2	41	-	479
RIFLES	-	-	-	-	4	-	26	-	1	2	-	64	-	137
SUB MACHINE GUNS	-	1	-	-	-	-	6	-	-	-	-	6	-	27
TEAR GAS GUNS	-	1	-	-	3	-	6	-	-	2	-	6	-	44
TEAR GAS EQUIPMENT:														
BLAST TYPE TEAR GAS	14	10	-	-	20	-	72	-	-	70	-	-	38	857
GRENADE														
BURNING TYPE TEAR GAS GRENADE	10	-	-	-	50	-	157	-	-	110	-	-	274	1625
LONG RANGE TEAR GAS PROJECTILE	-	10	-	-	10	-	79	-	-	8	-	-	200	768
SHORT RANGE TEAR GAS	-	3	-	-	10	-	35	-	-	8	-	-	93	524
SMILES														
NAUSEATING GAS GRENADE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	70	100
AMMUNITION:														
38 CAL. SERVICE CART.	2M	250	300	-	2M	-	4500	-	-	2M	1000	150	93M	192M
45 CAL. SERVICE CART.	-	250	-	-	-	-	3450	-	-	200	-	750	55M	71M
30 CAL. M-1 CARBINE CART.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	30	-	-	-	1.1M	1.1M
30-06 CAL. RIFLE CART.	-	-	-	-	40	-	40	-	-	-	-	880	8M	9M
30-30 CAL. RIFLE CART.	-	-	-	-	100	-	240	-	-	260	-	120	12M	20M
12 GAUGE OO BUCKSHOT SH. 100	225	325	30	300	-	1000	400	-	-	2300	100	245	40M	55M
12 GAUGE #4 SHOT	-	-	-	-	-	-	2M	-	-	1000	-	-	-	6M
12 GAUGE SLUGS	-	-	35	-	25	-	25	-	-	-	-	193	5M	8.6M
MISCELLANEOUS:														
BARONETS	-	-	-	-	-	-	89	-	-	-	-	-	-	89
BODY ARMOR	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	3
BLANK VESTS	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7
BULLET PROOF VESTS	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3
FIELD TESTS, ALL TYPES	-	-	-	-	80	49	-	-	-	141	-	-	332	2000
PLASTIC FACE SHIELDS	-	-	-	-	32	55	225	-	-	150	-	-	3	1200

DISTRIBUTION OF POLICE MOBILE EQUIPMENT
as of December 31, 1966

ASSIGNMENT OF VEHICLES	First Precinct	Second Precinct	Fourth Precinct	Fifth Precinct	Sixth Precinct	Seventh Precinct	Tenth Precinct	Eleventh Precinct	Twelfth Precinct	Thirteenth Precinct	Fourteenth Precinct	Fifteenth Precinct	Sixteenth Precinct	Headquarters Administration	C.I.D. Headquarters *	Women's Division
Officials	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	24	15	1
Sergeants	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Detectives	7	8	5	6	4	7	8	4	4	8	5	5	4	1
Scout Cars	13	17	12	17	11	17	20	11	14	16	16	17	16
Cruisers	1	1	1	1	..	1	2	..	1	1
Accident Bureau Cars
Auto Patrols	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Street Patrols	1	2	78	13
Youth Bureau	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1
Traffic Safety Bureau ...	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Motorcycles
Servi-Cars	1	1	1	..	1	1	1	..	1	1	1
Trucks	2	..
Trailers
Clean-up	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Miscellaneous	3
TOTAL	32	33	25	31	21	32	40	22	25	32	28	28	26	26	95	14

* Included in C.I.D. Headquarters: Commissioner's Squad, Special Investigation, Citizens Complaint, Scientific, Auto Recovery, Record, Homicide, General Service, Criminal Intelligence, Robbery, B & E, Narcotic, Identification.

Source: Detroit Police Department, 1966 Annual Report, p. 15.

THE CATALYTIC EVENT AND THE DETROIT POLICE DEPARTMENT:
A DESCRIPTION AND AN ANALYSIS¹

A routine raid by the Detroit Police Department on an illegal drinking place² in the early hours of a mid-summer Sunday set off widespread rioting, looting, arson and sniping in the city. It is paramount to this report to set down at this point a more exhaustive narrative of events relating to this raid, emphasizing the reactions of the Detroit Police Department to the ensuing series of happenings.

The United Community League for Civic Action, 9125 Twelfth Street.

According to a departmental report, this address had been known as the site of a "blind pig" operation for over a year (see Exhibit 14). The officer in charge of the night "clean up" crew on Saturday, July 22, 1967, was Sergeant Arthur Howison. Assigned to his crew were Patrolmen Anthony Fiermonti, Charles Henry and Joseph Brown. Howison and Fierimonti were working out of a department car, Henry and Brown were working out of Henry's private automobile. Howison had personal knowledge of this particular "blind pig" as he was in charge of a clean up crew that raided it over a year ago (see Exhibit 14). Furthermore, Fiermonti stated that he regularly works clean up and that he had known of this "blind pig" for three or four years.³

This particular raid was the result of a "bitter complaint".⁴ Henry and Brown had attempted admittance at approximately 10:00 p.m., Saturday, July 22. They tried to pass Brown off to the doorman as an out-of-town basketball player.

¹See Appendix A.

²There were 76 "blind pig" raids by the Detroit Police Department in 1966, from which 1,088 arrests were made (Detroit Police Department, 1966 Annual Report, p. 51).

³Detroit Police Department, Special Investigation Bureau Report on the July 23, 1967 Raid at 9125 12th Street, July 31, 1967.

⁴Detroit Police Department, Report on Case Investigated, Complaint Number A 139526 (July 23rd Raid at 9125 12th Street).

Exhibit 14

ACTION BY THE TENTH PRECINCT CLEAN UP CREW AT 9125 TWELFTH ST. - TO JULY 23, 1967

<u>DATE</u>	<u>ACTION AND RESULTS</u>
2/11/66	Raid by Sergeant Howison and crew, ten persons arrested.
10/21/66	.Attempted raid by Patrolman Hooper, no response
10/22/66	Attempted raid by Patrolman Lovelace, refused admittance
10/28/66	Raid by Sergeant Harris and Patrolman Urquhart, found children's halloween party in progress
11/05/66	Observed by Sergeant Guffery and crew, no evident action
11/11/66	Attempted raid by Patrolman Henry, no response
11/12/66	Observed by Sergeant Guffery and crew, no evident action
12/02/66	Observed by Sergeant Gordon and crew, no evident action
6/03/67	Raid by the Vice Squad, 28 persons arrested.

Source: October 17, 1967 - Inter-Office Memorandum from Sergeant Howison, Supervisor of the 10th Precinct Clean Up Crew, to the Lieutenant-in-charge of the Tenth Precinct.

The doorman told them they could not enter as it was a private party.⁵ At approximately 3:00 a.m., Henry gained admittance by mingling with three women while approaching the door. It was after 3:10 and closer to 3:40 when the Tenth Precinct Clean-up Crew entered the "blind pig". Up to this report, 3:45 a.m. had been accepted as the entry time for the clean-up crew. This was the result of two factors. First, a complete and thorough chronology of this period was not available. Secondly, Patrolmen Henry and Brown, when interviewed, gave different estimates of the time Henry gained admittance. Henry stated 3:45, while Brown mentioned "approximately 3:00"⁶ However, the facts we have gathered support the earlier time:

1. Sergeant John Smith, the Twelfth St. beat sergeant that evening, mentioned that at approximately 3:10 a.m., he heard a call by 10-80, the Tenth Precinct Clean Up Crew, for the Tenth Precinct cruiser to meet them at Delaware and Twelfth Street. Sergeant Smith and his men also responded. Sergeant Howison asked for their assistance. At this point, the cruiser arrived, and it was dispatched to a fire house to get a sledge hammer for entry, another factor of delay.⁷
2. The first scout car dispatched to assist the clean-up crew was at 3:38.⁸
3. The Tenth Precinct cruiser was summoned at 3:05.⁹
4. Sergeant Howison stated that they would ordinarily survey a suspected "blind pig" "soon after" 3:00 a.m. to see if it was operating. Given a positive observation, an officer would attempt to gain entry and make a buy.¹⁰

⁵Special Investigation Bureau Report

⁶Ibid.

⁷Detroit Police Department, August 2, 1967, Special Investigation Bureau Report No. 2 (July 23rd Activities of Sergeant John Smith, Supervisor of the 12th Street Detail)

⁸Detroit Police Department, Tenth Precinct dispatch tickets

⁹Detroit Police Department, Tenth Precinct Activity Log

¹⁰Special Investigation Report, July 31, 1967

The loading of the prisoners, although orderly, attracted spectators.

The crowd contained friends of the prisoners, and they kidded the prisoners to such effect as, "I told you you'd get caught one day up there." By the time that the last prisoners were being loaded into the wagon, eight to ten scout cars had responded to the scene. At this point, bottles were being thrown at the police and police cars from the rear of the crowd. One of the bottles struck and broke the rear window of the cruiser. When the last prisoners were loaded into a paddy wagon, all the police cars were ordered out of the area. The time previously accepted here has been 5:00 a.m. Our analysis of police records disclosed that it was very close to 4:40 a.m. (see Exhibits 15 and 16). Exhibit 15 lists 4:27 as the last dispatch to the raid. All of the scout cars dispatched to the scene departed by 4:40.¹¹ The ordering of the cars out of an inflamed neighborhood (de-escalation) had been employed successfully by the Detroit Police Department and others in the past as a tactic of crowd dispersion. Apparently, the presence of police is a knitting factor to a crowd. Exhibit 16 shows that the cars dispatched to the raid were engaged in non-riot related activity around 4:40, tendering two observations:

1. There was routine patrol work after the raid, while waiting for the Twelfth and Clairmount situation to return to normal.
2. Since scout cars were free for disposition, had there been a more serious appraisal of the situation, an area containment attempt certainly could have been initiated.

Patrolman Brown was left behind at the scene. He was sitting in Henry's car waiting for Henry to return, not knowing that Henry had gone with a scout car to the Tenth Precinct. Brown heard what he thought was glass breaking coming from

¹¹ Tenth Precinct Activity Log

Exhibit 15

TIMETABLE OF RECORDED POLICE DISPATCHES - TENTH PRECINCT

JULY 23, 1967, FROM 3:38 A.M. TO 6:12 A.M.

<u>TIME OF DISPATCH</u>	<u>SCOUT CAR ORIGIN</u>		<u>DISPATCH MESSAGE</u>
	<u>PRECINCT</u>	<u>TERRITORY</u>	
3:38 A. M. ¹	10	5	To 9123 12th, raid with 10-80 (Tenth Precinct Clean-up Crew)
3:40	10	2	To 9123 12th, raid with 10-80
3:41	10	16	To Precinct 12, get wagon, to 9123 12th
3:47	10	1	To 12th and Clairmount, raid
3:50	10	4	To 12th and Clairmount
3:50	10	7	To 12th and Clairmount
3:51	10	3	To 12th and Clairmount
3:59	13	Auto ²	To 12th and Clairmount
4:00	10	2	To station guard prisoners
4:22	10	14	12th and Clairmount, raid
4:27	6	Auto	12th and Clairmount, raid
4:27	13	Auto	12th and Clairmount, raid
5:00	10	4	12th and Clairmount, man down on sidewalk in front of shoe store, bad cut
5:03	10	5	14th and Clairmount
5:03	2	14	12th and Clairmount
5:03	2	15	12th and Clairmount
5:07	10	4	9035 12th, ADT alarm
5:10	10	7	To Lodge and Clairmount, meet 10-70 (Sergeant Mulvihill and Lieutenant Good)
5:35	10	1	9101 12th (shoe store) - Guardian Alarm
5:37	10	1	Busy at Clairmount and Lodge
5:37	10	5	Busy at Clairmount and Lodge
6:12 ³	10	6	Busy at Byron and Taylor with the Lieutenants (10-60)

Source: Detroit Police Department, Tenth Precinct dispatch tickets

¹First dispatch reference to the raid

²Paddy wagon (auto patrol)

³Last recorded dispatch until 8:01, the reason given was that the activity became too heavy for any recording.

Exhibit 16

SCOUT CAR ACTIVITY LOG - TENTH PRECINCT

JULY 23, 1967

SCOUT CAR	TIMETABLE ¹		ACTIVITY AND DISPOSITION
	FROM	TO	
10-1	3:50 AM ² ? ³		Assist 10-80 (Tenth Precinct Clean up Crew), 12th and Clairmount, raid
	4:35	5:00	*Euclid and W. Warren, abduction attempt reported
	5:00	5:35	Assist 10-4, 12th and Clairmount, officer in trouble, met precinct cars at Lodge and Clairmount
	5:35	2:00 PM	Riot and traffic detail
10-2	3:40 AM	4:35	9125 12th, assisted 10-80 on a raid with 10-5, assisted on 65 arrests
	4:35	?	*2242 Blaine, B&E (breaking and entering)
	?	5:20 AM ⁴	*2068 Seward, noise complaint
10-3	3:50 AM	4:40	12th and Clairmount, officer in trouble, 10-80 raided a blind pig, large crowd.
	4:40	5:10	*12th and Chicago, accident
	5:10	6:10	*Chicago and Wildemere, cab holdup
	6:30	?	Riot control
10-4	4:00 AM	4:40	Assisted with traffic 12th and Clairmount, during pig raid . . .
	4:50	5:40	Clairmount and 12th St., "man's been shot", conveyed Harry Chappetual, 1961 Glendale, to Ford Hospital...
	6:00	6:20	4 man car now with 10-14, detail to deliver crash helmets to Byron and Taylor
	6:20	7:20	* 4502 Joy Road, holdup
	7:20	12:00 AM	Riot detail, 12th St.
10-5	3:15AM	5:30	9123 12th, assist 10-80 with blind pig
	5:30	12:00 AM	Clairmount and J.C. Lodge, 4 men to a car, 10-5 with 10-7
10-6	3:50 AM	4:30	12th and Clairmount, assisted 10-71 (12th St. beat detail), stood by for crowd control
	4:30	5:15	*12846 Woodrow Wilson, sick woman conveyed to hospital
	5:15	5:50	*Conveyed Lucille Johnson to hospital
	5:50	2:00 PM	Byron-Taylor, guarding cars per 10-60 (a Tenth Precinct Sergeant)
10-7	4:00 AM	4:35	Assist 12th and Clairmount, officer in trouble
	4:35	5:00	* 2536 Highland, prowler reported.
	5:00	12:00 AM	J. C. Lodge and Clairmount, busy with 10-60 on detail

* Non-riot related activity

¹ Timetable starts with first mention of the raid.

² The recorded times were termed "approximate".

³ No time recorded.

⁴ Last recorded time

Exhibit 16 (contd.)

<u>SCOUT CAR</u>	<u>TIMETABLE¹</u>		<u>ACTIVITY AND DISPOSITION</u>
	<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>	
10-8	4:00 AM	4:45	Busy in station assisting with raid at 9123 12th
	4:45	5:00	*3285 Davison, B&E
	5:00	12:00 AM	On standby with 10-60, disturbance on 12th and Clairmount
10-14	3:15 AM	3:50	Assisted 10-71, 12th and Clairmount, "calling for help"
	3:50	4:10	*11701 Livernois, B&E
	4:10	?	Scouts 10-4 and 10-14 now one unit (note the time discrepancy with 10-4; given the general pattern, 10-4 seems to be a more accurate description)
10-16	3:30 AM	5:00	Pick up #12 auto (Precinct Twelve's paddy wagon), go to 12th and Clairmount
	5:00	12:00 AM	Assist 10-80
10 Cruiser	3:05 AM	5:30 AM	12th and Delaware, meet 10-80, to 9125 12th, 72 misdemeanor arrests reported.

Source: Detroit Police Department, Tenth Precinct Activity Log

around Twelfth Street and Clairmount. He saw small groups throwing objects and running around. At this point (approximately 5:00 a.m.), Brown went to a private home, called the Tenth Precinct and took a taxi to the station. On the way, he observed young men running around, throwing "unknown objects" and breaking windows. He did not observe any looting.¹²

THE CIVIL DISORDER: AN ANALYSIS OF EARLY POST-RAID ACTS

The first riot-related police dispatch message after the two hour moratorium (8:01 a.m.) dealt with looting at Twelfth Street and Pingree. A concentrated listing of early post-raid police dispatch messages is included to set the street scene (see Exhibit 17). A presentation of the chronological dispersion of early riot-related events gives further insight into the nature of this tragic civil disturbance (see Exhibits 18 and 19). A total dispersion presentation of riot-related incidents is provided in the report of Mr. Cyrus R. Vance, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, concerning "The Detroit Riots". However, there remained a great need for material on the nature of the buildup of these incidents, especially regarding the first day. Exhibits 17 and 18 serve as such indicators. Reports of lootings, attempted lootings and looters carried the heaviest incidence, even during the early morning hours. This was the category to which the Detroit Police Department had to respond most often. The second highest category of requested response concerned assisting fellow police officers.

¹²Special Investigation Bureau Report, July 31, 1967.

Exhibit 17

TIMETABLE OF SELECTED POLICE DISPATCHES - TENTH PRECINCT

JULY 23, 1967, FROM 8:01 TO 10:53 A.M.

TIME OF DISPATCH	DISPATCH MESSAGE
8:01 AM	12th and Pingree, looting stores
8:13	8605 12th, ADT alarm
8:14	12th, between Blaine and Gladstone, B&E (Breaking and Entering)
8:15	8925 12th, alarm, man from the alarm company on the way
8:15	8730 12th, Guardian alarm
8:17	2476 Pingree, four colored men carried ten shotguns or rifles into building
8:17	8953 12th, alarm, owner notified
8:18	9019 12th, Guardian alarm
8:19	8621 12th, pawn shop, looting
9:01	Alley west of 12th, between Seward and Delaware, four men carrying shotguns
9:01	8624 12th, House of Hats, B&E in process
9:04	12th and Hazelwood, large gang
9:07	Linwood and Clements, at the Sinclair station, men with guns
9:08	12th and Clairmount, shoe store fire
9:10	12th and Hazelwood, pawn shop just looted
9:11	1927 Pingree, loading loot in rear
10:05	Prisoners
10:09	8202 12th, Brown's Drug Store, Michigan Alarm
10:10	Woodrow Wilson and Delaware, carrying loot from drug store
10:39	Seward and Woodrow Wilson, grocery store, B&E
10:51	12th and Clairmount, trouble with crowd
10:53 ¹	2476 Pingree, shooting

Source: Detroit Police Department, Tenth Precinct dispatch tickets.

¹At 10:45 a.m., the Detroit Police Department began to record all riot-oriented mobile and PREP radio runs in a "Disorder Log".

CATEGORICAL/CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY OF RECORDED RIOT-RELATED POLICE RADIO DISPATCHES

JULY 23, 1967, FROM 2:00 A.M. to 11 A.M.¹

NATURE OF DISPATCH	A. M. HOURLY DISPERSION										TOTAL ²
	2-3:59	4-4:59	5-5:59	6-6:59 ²	7-7:59 ²	8-8:59	9-9:59	10-11			
1. Assist in raid with 10-80 (Tenth Precinct's Clean Up Crew) at 9123-25 12th St.	9	4									13
2. Responses to the unruly behavior of the initial crowd			9								9
3. Lootings, attempted lootings and looters reports						3	10	8			21
4. Burglar alarm dispatches						6		1			7
5. Gun carrying reports						1	3	1			5
6. Reported gatherings of people						1	1	1			3
7. Fire reports							1				1
8. Calls to assist police officers								2			2
9. Arrests and prisoner transporting reports								2			2
10. Sniper and shooting reports								1			1
TOTAL	9	4	9	0 ²	0 ²	11	15	16			64 ²

Source: Detroit Police Department, Tenth Precinct dispatch tickets.

¹There were 85 recorded dispatches of separate events in the Tenth Precinct in the early afternoon where a run was not made because of the level of activity. Most were riot-oriented.

²There were no recorded dispatches between 6:12 and 8:01, the reason given was that the activity became too heavy for any recording. Moreover, there were also dispatches during the other hours of peak activity that were not recorded.

Exhibit 19

CATEGORICAL/CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY OF RIOT INCIDENTS¹

JULY 23, 1967, FROM 10:45 A.M. TO 12 MIDNIGHT

NATURE OF INCIDENT ¹	HOURLY DISPERSION												
	10:45 ² -11:59	12-12:59	1-1:59	2-2:59	3-3:59	4-4:59	5-5:59	6-6:59	7-7:59	8-8:59	9-9:59	10-10:59	11-12 TOT
1. Calls to assist police officers	5	6	3	4	1	9	5	8	9	7	9	11	13
2. Calls to assist citizens	1			1	1	2	3	3		3	4	2	3
3. Lootings, attempted lootings and looters reports	3	12	5	9	13	14	44	42	33	69	53	89	109
4. Calls to assist the Fire Dept.			5	3	2	3	1	2	4	2	3	1	2
5. Fire reports			1	2	3	2	1		5	1	7	6	10
6. Arrest and prisoner transporting reports	2	2		1	4	4	4	3	9	7	5	11	10
7. Gun carrying reports			1	1	1		2	2	1	6	1	5	2
8. Sniper and shooting reports			1	2		2	2	2	4	4	4	7	17
9. Bottle and debris throwing and window-breaking reports	2	1		1	2	5	11	1	1	1	2	2	28
10. Equipment runs				2	1		2						2
11. Reported gatherings of people	1	3	1	1	1	9	4		2	2	10	1	1
12. Reported fights and beatings						1	1		1	4	1	1	2
13. Other riot-related messages	1	4	5	7	8	5	6	2	9	10	5	8	11
TOTAL ³	15	28	22	34	37	56	86	65	77	116	104	144	182
													966

Source: Detroit Police Department Disorder Log (a compilation of riot-related police radio messages from 10:45 a.m., July 23 to 2:00 a.m., July 27).

¹An "incident" is defined as a distinct riot-related occurrence mentioned in a police radio message. The messages were broken down into such occurrences. Thirteen categories were established. Hence, one message often contains several "incidents".

²The Disorder Log was started at 10:45 as the severity of the situation was realized.

³Due to the volume of messages received and sent during the peak hours of activity, approximately 2,000 messages were not recorded during the disturbance.

EARLY DISORDER EVENTS AS DESCRIBED BY A SUPERVISOR
OF THE DETROIT COMMISSION ON COMMUNITY RELATIONS

As directed, the observations of a civil rights worker were solicited.

Mr. James Bush, a caucasian and a Supervising Community Services Assistant of the Detroit Commission on Community Relations, was selected for an interview because he was at the scene before 8:00 a.m., July 23, 1967, and because he is the top field man of the department. Bush was called at 7:00 a.m. by Richard Marks, Secretary-Director of the Commission. Marks had been called by Councilman Hood, who apparently had been at the scene. Hood reported looting on Twelfth Street. He told Marks that the police weren't stopping it. Marks also was out before 8:00 a.m. Bush picked up Van Stoner, one of his employees and a negro, on the way to the Tenth Precinct. All was quiet on Dexter. When they got to the station, they observed that patrolmen were frantically calling in men. Western District Inspector Gentry and District Inspector De Luca were there. Gentry gave Bush an assessment. He said he didn't have enough men to cordon off the area. Bush and Stoner drove to LaSalle and Clairmount, and then walked to Twelfth Street. There was a big crowd at 12th and Clairmount, and for as far as you could see south (about 1½ blocks). About a half dozen police cars were in the middle of 12th. The crowds were milling, no looting was observed. However, several stores had been looted. There had been a fire, and the word was that the Fire Department had put it out without any trouble. Bush saw Abe Ulmer and Vivian Pope of the State Civil Rights Commission. One negro told Stoner, "Your friend won't be too safe." Bush and Stoner stood around talking to people. A jovial mood prevailed. People were greeting friends. Many had come out to see what was happening. Bush feels that police action at that time would have made the crowd hostile. Bush only witnessed one racial reference. Two or three young negro fellows who passed him were saying, "We're gonna get Whitey tonight."

Six or seven stores had already been about a third looted. People communicated to Bush grievances against the merchants as though to justify such acts.

Bush and Stoner separated. Stoner went further down 12th. They both had the distinct impression at this point that this was a "big thing". Bush also got the impression that there was a considerable crowd all the way south down 12th ("at least five or six blocks"). He saw no cars on the street. There was a police barricade at 14th and Clairmount, and Bush got the impression that there was one somewhere else down 12th.

Bush and Stoner stayed at 12th and Clairmount for 45 minutes to one hour. Bush decided they should leave when people started to call him Hardy (he was standing in front of Hardy's Drug Store). As he and Stoner were walking towards La Salle (circa 9:15 - 9:30), they saw the police scout cars pull out one by one. At this point, a couple of men started to finish ripping the grating off the Cancellation Shoe Store. Then four or five scout cars, four men to a car with helmets and "rifles", came screaming in Clairmount. At 14th, they saw another flotilla.

At Seward and 12th around 10:00 a.m., they saw a store looted. There were big crowds, and they were spreading out very quickly. Bush talked to Jim Boyce, the Virginia Park Advocate Planner, who was with Austin Chavis of the UAW.

Bush heard about a meeting of community and negro leaders at Virginia Park and 12th (Grace Episcopal Church). When Bush and Stoner got there, the meeting had just broken up. Bush listed these notables: Rev. Potts, Congressman Conyers, Art Johnson of the Board of Education, Congressman Diggs, Hubert Locke of the Police Department and Joe Coles of the Detroit Community Relations Commission.

This group decided to use bull horns (an electric megaphone) to tell the crowds to go home. The whole tone of the meeting was not to use violence, to save lives, not property. The time was around 10:22 a.m., because at this time two bull horns were dispatched to Hubert Locke at 12th and Virginia Park (Appendix A). At this point, the police were lined up in formation down the middle of the street so as to sweep the area.

Stoner got into a car with Potts and a fellow named Jackson from the steelworkers union. Bush then spent some time on the street trying to get some meetings set up. He knows and talked to many block club leaders. Bush saw Clyde Cleveland, the President of Detroit's Chapter of CORE. He took Cleveland back to 12th and Clairmount. Here also the police were lined up in formation. They were "barely holding their own". There were huge numbers of people, "a couple of thousand". Bricks and bottles were being thrown at the police. There was a fire on 12th. The police were pushing people aside. The time was pushing noon. Bush feels the police could not have contained this crowd, although he said that the other streets were still quiet, referring to Linwood, Dexter and Oakland (per Appendix A, rioting and looting began on Linwood at 3:23 p.m.)

Before and after Virginia Park, Bush went to the Kiefer Command Post. He had heard of this activity at the Tenth Precinct Station. The second time (circa 2-2:30 p.m.), he stayed for a couple of hours, then he walked back into the disorder area. He saw Dewey Shanks (MCHRD) at the scene, who said that he got the distinct impression that people were trying to organize. Shanks had a Rap Brown style haircut, and one fellow urging organization said to him, "I haven't seen you since Newark". Bush said there were many guys with Rap Brown haircuts, opening stores and urging the crowds on. Stoner went over to Linwood, and home at the curfew. Shanks, Stoner and Bush saw no beatings on Sunday.

There was a meeting of Civil Rights leaders and the police at the Tenth Precinct at 5:30 p.m. Marks and Stoner attended. At this meeting, Charles Coulding was the only one opposed to violence.

Around 6 to 6:30 p.m., Bush went out in a state police car for 1 to 1½ hours with an officer, a reporter and Austin Chavis. There were four cars in total, with four officers to a car. Jim Boyce was also in one of the cars. Then Bush went back to the Kiefer Command Post until one or two a.m. He called Marks when he returned home.

THE DETROIT POLICE DEPARTMENT: DISORDER OPERATIONS AND STRATEGIES

Appendix A clearly illustrates that the basic operational pattern of the Detroit Police Department during the civil disorder became one of reaction to the riotous events as they were reported. A chronological police manpower tally is included. Once a workable determination of the magnitude, nature and potentiality of the disturbance had been achieved, a battle strategy framework was formed. The general basis of Detroit Police Department strategies during the Civil Disorder was the Department's Riot and Mob Control Manual. Regarding the estimate of the situation, material is presented on crowd and mob behavior, including:

1. types of crowds
2. basic patterns in mob action
3. anatomy of a riot
4. psychological influences causing mobs
5. tactics of rioters
6. techniques of rioters

Regarding suppression tactics, the manual covers:

1. Headquarters Command Post operations
 - a. personnel
 - b. intelligence
 - c. transportation
 - d. armaments
 - e. communications
 - f. news release center

Suppression tactics (contd)

2. Field Operations

- a. riot control formations, tactics and techniques
- b. command relationships
- c. employment of forces
- d. field command post operations
- e. security of headquarters complex
- f. precinct emergency plan
- g. special weapons and equipment
- h. intelligence
- i. communications
- j. medical support
- k. barriers and road blocks
- l. check point operations
- m. withdrawal of units
- n. relief of personnel
- o. handling of prisoners
- p. displaced persons

The top Detroit Police Command had personal knowledge of the techniques used by other municipal police departments when they were confronted with riot conditions. The crux of the Detroit Police strategy was the command post concept. Ordinarily, the Department reacts in scout car units. Separate command posts were established in the riot areas as the need dictated. Deputy Superintendent Nichols insured a continuity of top command at these posts. Deployment from these command posts was in strict reference to riot-related events. This was the first line of our attack. The precincts operated as complementary units to these command posts. Four command posts were set up during the disorder. Following is a listing of the command posts and their principal officers:

HERMAN KIEFER HOSPITAL COMMAND POST - District Inspector Arden De Luca, Inspectional Service; Inspector Edward Mischnick of the Tenth Precinct; Inspector Stanley Jedlenski of the Eleventh Precinct; Inspector Leonard Sznewajs of the Youth Bureau; Inspector Paul Donley of the Motor Traffic Bureau (MTB); Inspector John Bowyer of the Mounted Bureau

DETROIT POLICE HEADQUARTERS COMMAND POST - Superintendent Eugene Reuter; Deputy Superintendent John Nichols; Chief Inspector Thomas Turkaly; Central District Inspector Anthony Bertoni

*Why precinct
Command*

CENTRAL HIGH SCHOOL COMMAND POST - Western District Inspector Charles Gentry;
Eastern District Inspector Arthur Sage

SOUTHEASTERN HIGH SCHOOL COMMAND POST - District Inspector George Zellman,
Special Services Division; Inspector Charles Beer of the Fifteenth
Precinct; Inspector James Cole of the License Bureau; Inspector Thomas
Nolan of the Control Center; Inspector William Ellenburg of the Traffic
Safety Bureau

*Why
precinct
commander*

As would be expected, the Headquarters Command Post was the central command post, the chief information and order disseminating unit and the primary intelligence gathering unit. Deputy Superintendent Nichols received his telephone call about 5:20 a.m., July 23, 1967. The information he received was threefold:

1. A Lieutenant (Good) had been injured.
2. There were crowds reaching a number sufficient enough for the Weekly Duty Officer (Bertoni) to notify the Western District Inspector (Gentry).
3. There was enough evidence to indicate that this might not be a single, isolated event.

Nichols called Superintendent Reuter, who, in turn, called Police Commissioner Girardin, who, it was discovered, had already been informed. Girardin, Reuter and Nichols arrived at Police Headquarters very close together. About the next 30 minutes was used to accumulate and evaluate information from police field men as to the extent and the nature of the situation. During this period, Nichols charged a patrolman from Precinct 1, which is in the same building, to start notifying the staff sections. There was a brief conference then between Girardin, Reuter and Nichols. The mobilization order for the next platoon (M02) was then issued (6:42 a.m.). This means that the next platoon (Platoon 2 - days) was ordered in immediately. The Western District Inspector, Charles Gentry, had already mobilized the 2nd Platoon of all of the West Side precincts (6:15 a.m.). Girardin told Reuter to alert the Michigan National Guard and the Michigan State Police. Nichols gave the order to set up a special communications installation at Headquarters, much of which was placed in his office.

*?
time*

time

Nichols also designated Inspectors Morris and Winckoski as adjutants, with the primary responsibility of putting a Headquarters log into effect. This procedure was set up and followed first during the Kercheval incident. The communications section on the 3rd floor (Nichol's office) went operational at 8:00 a.m. In effect, the Headquarters Command Post also became operational at this point, about half an hour before the Herman Kiefer Command Post.

Further strategies evolved at the Headquarters Command Post. The Department first tried to employ the three basic riot principles:

1. contain the riot to an area
2. isolate the riot participants
3. destroy the groupings of rioters

This system is predicated on the fact that one can respond with sufficient numbers. If there is any key to riot control, it is the rapid, heavy appearance of men. Had the riot catalyzed three hours earlier, it might well have been thwarted as the TMU and the Motor Traffic Bureau went off duty that Sunday morning at 3:00 a.m. At the time required, we simply did not have enough men, especially with reference to blockades, as we were unable to seal off the area. Our intelligence sources told us that the rioters bypassed our blockades by going past and entering Twelfth St. by some of the smaller avenues. There are numerous streets perpendicular to Twelfth St. from Clairmount to West Grand Boulevard. The character of the immediate area is also one of high density. In effect, the rioters mobilized faster than we did. Once it was determined that the area could not be completely sealed off, the next strategy decided on was to leave only key street blockades lineally and laterally off of 12th, and have the surplus men join the others in reacting to the sequence of events. The pattern of the intelligence that we gathered showed that someone would break a store window, but that someone else did the looting. This is why so many were charged with "entering without breaking."

Much of the looting was done by women and children. For one who breaks a window, there is the charge of "malicious destruction". However, once the person puts his hand through the opening, a "breaking and entering (B&E)" has taken place, which is a felony.

The looters displayed a priority preference by product categories:

1. liquor
2. furniture and appliances
3. groceries
4. guns

Given these patterns, the Detroit Police Department could project as well as react.

Regarding the use of firearms, there is a governing state law according to the nature of the situation. The Detroit Civil Disorder was characterized by a series of small unit actions. The circumstances of each were different. One allowable situation for the use of firearms invoked by the Department involved flight from a felony, e.g. a B&E, where identity was not known. The Department probably under-reacted regarding the use of riot weapons as the situations were not controllable for such use, coupled with the fact that many women and children were partakers. }

There had to be some balanced geographic reasonability of deployment as the Department certainly couldn't be sure that the near West Side would be the only area affected. Indeed, the East Side did become involved. Moreover, the Department was never sure that this conflagration wouldn't take on a racial aspect. Of course, the first bit of strategy was the de-escalation of policemen from the area immediately after the raid. Another strategic move was forced on us as we had to take all policemen off the guarding of vital installations and commit them to riot action, because General Throckmorton of the U. S. Army would not come in with his troops until he was assured that all policemen were committed. H. H. ?

National Guardsmen were initially given this function. On the third day (July 25th), the Air Guard was de-federalized and placed under our direction. Deployment was to vital installations.

The brunt of the civil disorder was borne by the West Side of Detroit. At 5:10 a.m., July 23rd, the Western District Inspector, Charles Gentry, was called by the Weekly Duty Officer, ^{the} Anthony Bertoni. At that point, Gentry only knew that there were many people milling around on Twelfth Street. He arrived at Precinct 10 at 5:43 a.m. Here he talked twice to Lt. Good, who was at the scene. He learned that many people were throwing objects, that Lt. Good had been hurt and that the crowd was increasing. Lt. Good estimated the crowd to be "several hundred". Good's group of 14 men (later 28) was reconnoitering from the John C. Lodge service drive and Clairmount. Gentry ordered them to a lot by Herman Kiefer Hospital (Byron and Taylor), so that there would be room for help to get in. He told Good to "stand fast", that he would get him help. He then called the Motor Traffic Bureau's Commando Squad, the Department's first line of defense. There were five MTB men on street duty. The next platoon was not due in until 10:00 a.m. At this point, all duty people in at Precinct 10 were on the scene. Gentry called the other West Side Precincts for men. He then ordered the mobilization of ^{time} the Motor Traffic Bureau (MTB).

He had no authority to do so, only the Director of Traffic (Polkinghorn) can do such. At 6:15 a.m., Gentry re-called the Bureau and ordered the first squad formed to go to the Ford Hospital garage. A MTB squad is composed of 15 men and a Sergeant. A precinct squad has 12 men and a Sergeant. At 7:25 a.m., the first MTB squad was complete. It went out under Sergeant John May. It is departmental thinking that a squad must be intact in order to be effective. At 6:15 a.m., ^{Where} Gentry ordered the next platoon in (MC2) of all the West Side precincts.

Shortly after 6:00 a.m. also, Gentry formed his own intelligence unit, comprised of two young negro officers in plain clothes. They were out in the field all day, feeding information to the 3rd floor of Police Headquarters. Of course, the Central Intelligence Bureau (CIB) also had crews out. Gentry then had a conversation with Reuter. Gentry and Inspector Mischnick of Precinct 10 were trying to decide on a field command post. Mischnick went out with Lt. Mazzie and a Clerk at 7:40 a.m. to survey the area for a field command post. Mischnick made arrangements to get the first floor of Pavilion #6 of the Herman Kiefer Hospital. About this time, policemen began to arrive at Precinct 10. Some were in squads, and some were not. A sergeant was detailed to meet them at the door. He took their names and an inventory of the equipment they had. From there, Gentry took the men to the squad room where he held roll calls. The men were briefed on the problem, and formed into squads. Gentry was frequently interrupted by phone calls. He had to leave and go upstairs to his office, since the squad room is in the basement. These squads were sent to Mischnick at the Kiefer Command Post in auto patrols. The strategy here was quick disbursement after arrival. Before Mischnick left Precinct 10, he outlined his street strategy to Good, who was at the scene. He told him to form into units of three cars, with four men to a car. He ordered that these units patrol Twelfth, with the cars close together. It wasn't effective because so much was going on that the cars had to stop and respond, and thereby got tied up.

How many?
where

Gentry forwarded all the gas masks from the Tenth Precinct to the Kiefer Command Post. Around this time, Gentry started running out of equipment, specifically riot guns and helmets. He began borrowing from other precincts. Squads were not sent out unless they were properly equipped.

?

Gentry told Mischnick to hit Twelfth Street in squad (straight line) formations, and/or use two squads in V formations. The policemen were never able to form a V. At 9:16 a.m., Nichols mobilized the 3rd Platoon (MO3). These men were expected in by noon. The dispatcher called to inform Gentry that routine runs were not being covered. Gentry decided that those responding to Precinct 10 from MO3 would be made available for runs other than those to the affected area. In between the action, Gentry had a few moments for members of the State's Civil Rights Department and the Detroit Community Relations Commission.

Around 2:00 p.m., General Noble Moore arrived with other members of the Michigan National Guard. Gentry briefed him on the conditions, and agreed he had better talk to the Top Command. He provided Moore with a scout car for the run downtown. A little later, Gentry received a call from Nichols to go to Central High School and open a command post. He left with an advance party at 4:20 p.m. He crossed 12th above Clairmount, and saw nothing but people in all directions. Many were running. It was a loud, disorderly crowd. Although a Board of Education employee was to open the school, no one showed. Gentry forced entrance. At 5:25 p.m., the first contingent of Michigan National Guardsmen arrived at Central, 200 men of the 156th Signal Battalion in 2½ ton trucks. They stayed there for the next 15 days. Gentry and Moore deployed the men during this period. Later, Moore received his orders from General Throckmorton of the U. S. Army (the Guard was federalized). *where to when*

When Gentry arrived at Central, he called the Kiefer Command Post for policemen. They got there about the same time that the Guard arrived. Gentry decided on a strategy of "integrated" patrols, i.e., Detroit Police and National Guardsmen. The first units sent out were composed of one Detroit Police Lieutenant, five Detroit Patrolmen and 15 guardsmen. They were sent to the *when*

troubled areas, including Linwood, which at this time was having as much trouble as Twelfth Street. In fact, the first three units formed were sent to Linwood. Since looting had greatly increased, guardsmen were also dispatched to other precincts (1, 2, 5, 12, 13 and 14). The guardsmen were put on the street as they arrived. Then, 150 men of the 182nd Artillery Battalion began to pull in. They came in jeeps, divided into small groups. They were dispatched in units of three jeeps, containing policemen and guardsmen. All integrated units were furnished with PREP radios. It was discovered that a PREP doesn't work in an armored track vehicle, once the hatch is buckled. The Police Communications Division made special antennas to alleviate the situation.

The precincts began to call for more help. The D.P.D. pattern at this point was one of reaction. Integrated units were also sent at first to guard vital installations.

The Central Command Post underwent light sniper fire Monday, July 24th. The lights were turned off for only about half an hour.

At 8:00 a.m., August 6, 1967, Gentry and his men moved back to the Tenth Precinct. The National Guard pulled out some units on the 3rd. All were out by the 6th. The Central Command Post was completely closed the morning of the 7th.

Gentry is now working on a plan for one command post per area. He never got to Kiefer, he doesn't know what happened there. 11?

Inspector Mischnick also had a key role in the disorder. He was notified a little after Gentry (5:15 a.m.). He arrived at his station at 5:40 a.m. He was informed that about 20 windows in the raid area had been broken, and that crowds were forming. He immediately mobilized the 2nd Platoon of the Tenth Precinct.

Gentry arrived at 5:43 a.m. Gentry sent Mischnick out at 7:40 a.m. to set up a command post. As related earlier, Herman Kiefer Hospital was selected. At 8:30 a.m., the Police Communications Trailer arrived at Herman Kiefer. It was ready for action in about one hour. Because of differing frequencies, this trailer provided the only radio contact the DPD had with Michigan State Police cars.

Mischnick operated the Kiefer Command Post as part of a shift from July 23rd to July 28th. He spent most of his time making up three car units as men and cars arrived at the Command Post. There were no guardsmen or Army soldiers deployed from this Command Post. After a couple of days, Mischnick obtained some guardsmen for perimeter security.

As the disorder spread to the East Side, a search was undertaken for possible staging areas (1:35 a.m., July 24, 1967). Southeastern High School was selected, and became operational with 17 policemen and 20 guardsmen (1:55 a.m.). Inspector Cole was a top commander at this post. He arrived around noon Monday. The order was given him to stop the disorder, to use whatever force was necessary to enforce the law and to provide protection for the officers. He wasn't briefed on any specific strategy. Upon arrival, he discovered a dire need for supplies, telephones, riot guns, ammunition, scout cars and helmets. He immediately put men to work on this problem. He deployed men four to a car, four cars to a unit. These units were headed by a Sergeant or a Lieutenant, most often a Sergeant. Four units were put onto the streets. By Monday afternoon, the complexion of the disorder on the East Side had changed. The greater part of the looting was over, and there were only a few sporadic fires burning. Strategic points were covered by guardsmen only, who were under the direction of Col. Ritzenheim.

Policemen were used on patrols only. On Monday night at shift break (12:00 midnight), Precincts 5 and 7 and the Southeastern Command Post were under heavy fire. All are on the near East Side. As all were being attacked, they couldn't get out to help each other.

The East Side quieted right down when the 82nd and the 101st Airborne came in Tuesday, July 25th, at 3:00 a.m. The Army contingent at the Southeastern Command Post was under the immediate direction of Col. Bolling. At 6:00 a.m., Sunday, July 30th, the Federal Troops moved to Chandler Park. At this point, the National Guard came back to Southeastern. Later this day, this Command Post was moved to the Fifth Precinct Station.

Cole was distressed that Lieutenants and Sergeants were changed between precincts and command posts every day. His desire was continuity of command.

SUPPORTING EVENTS AND DETAILS RELATING TO THE CIVIL DISORDER AND THE DETROIT POLICE DEPARTMENT

24 Hour Police Communications Taping

The Detroit Police Department tapes on a 24-hour basis all of its radio communications (mobile, base station, PREP), as well as incoming Bell Telephone calls. This is accomplished by five banks of double Dictatape multi-channel recorders located in Police Headquarters (see Exhibit 20). One recorder on a bank runs continuously, while the other is available for instant playback. One of the channels on each tape records the Bell time. Two of these banks were moved to a new location the week before the disorder. These two banks covered the dispatch messages. They were not adjusted until Monday, which was done by a police radio technician. The messages before Monday, i.e. at the beginning of the disorder, are garbled and undistinguishable. Hence, the time gap between 6:12 am. and 8:01 a.m. Sunday, July 23, 1967, remains, as the activity became too heavy for hand-recorded dispatch messages (See Exhibit 15).

Exhibit 20

DETROIT POLICE DEPARTMENT COMMUNICATIONS CENTER

FIVE BANKS OF DOUBLE DICKTATAPE MULTI-CHANNEL RECORDERS

City-Wide PREP Frequency

At 5:00 a.m. on July 23, 1967, the Detroit Police Department switched to one radio frequency for the PREP system. This city-wide frequency is used daily by certain units. However, during an emergency, all units switch to this frequency. The July disturbance marked the first time that this procedure was put into operation. Since in general all police vehicles were manned by four men, with the vehicles deployed in task forces (groups of three or more), one PREP set could service an entire task force, and often did. When Detroit Police Officers were combined with the other enforcement agencies (Michigan State Police, U. S. Army, Michigan National Guard), one set also could serve the entire group, and again often did.

During the disorder, the PREP system was completely without power for a time span of about 10 minutes. This failure was the result of a loose wire in some newly installed equipment.

Prisoner Processing

Under normal conditions, a prisoner is taken to the station in the precinct in which he was arrested. A printcard, arrest ticket and PCR (preliminary complaint record) are prepared. There are then three major possibilities of prisoner disposition: transference to court, transference to a Bureau for further investigation, or release. In immediate court cases, the prisoner, in most instances, would be transferred to court the following morning, depending on the type of case (traffic, criminal, etc.).

During the disorder, prisoners were brought into the precinct stations, where normal processing was begun. The major problem of limited space was immediately encountered. Prisoners were at first transferred to the Police Headquarters cell block. However, it quickly was filled. At that point, prisoners were kept in the precinct stations until detectives could process them for court. Many prisoners refused to identify themselves. The only recourse the policemen had was to wait for fingerprint identification. This required a great deal of time because of the number of print cards that were being forwarded to the Identification Bureau.

Detectives began processing prisoners immediately. They had to prepare various standard reports, such as interrogation sheets, appraisal of rights forms, warrant requests, etc. There were few available stenographers. A saving factor was the loan by IBM of several dictating and recording machines. *When?*

Once a prisoner had been processed for court, the detectives had to request a warrant from the prosecutor's office, another factor of delay. Further delay was encountered at Recorder's Court. Judges had to be secured from other courts. Here also there was a shortage of clerical help.

Once a defendant had been arraigned, he was remanded to the Wayne County Jail, which is the normal procedure. The prisoner was then the responsibility of the County. The Wayne County Jail quickly filled, and County officials refused to accept more prisoners. The Detroit Police Department was thus faced to assume responsibility for prisoners. Arrangements were made to house prisoners at other detention facilities. The county jails of Washtenaw, Ingham, Macomb, Ionia and Monroe took on riot prisoners. The State Prison at Jackson and the Federal Prison at Milan were also used. However, before such a facility could be used, approval by the State Corrections Officer was first required. The proposed facility had to be surveyed for floor space, latrine space, etc. While this was going on, many prisoners had to wait in busses.

Several other cities in lower Michigan were experiencing riotous situations at this time, and were also making mass arrests. The county jails were soon filled. At this point, serious consideration was given to the possibility of using a compound of Ft. Wayne, but upon inspection, the area was found to be deficient regarding sanitary and plumbing conditions. The Belle Isle bath house was then proposed, investigated and accepted. DSR employees quickly prepared the facility. Wayne County then moved in more than 500 prisoners, which were guarded by a few County officers and some guardsmen. Detroit Policemen were not used to guard these prisoners.

The prisoners transferred to other jails were transported by DSR busses. They were guarded by County, Army and a few Detroit Police personnel.

Each precinct normally has only one officer detailed as custodian of prisoners. During the disorder, this detail was naturally increased, with precinct variances. Regular detail duty sheets were not maintained for this function.

Belle Isle

Belle Isle was closed at 7:45 a.m., Sunday, July 23, 1967 for several reasons:

1. It was a beautiful Sunday morning and large crowds were anticipated.
2. Belle Isle is a sensitive site as the 1943 Detroit Race Riot started here.
3. There is vital police communications equipment and other property on this island.

Belle Isle had 60 policemen (30/shift) throughout the disorder. Lt. Crampton, the officer in charge on the island, had men stationed on the mainland side of the bridge to stop traffic. The Police boats were manned. Two men were detailed for security to the MO Garage, Chene and Jefferson, and two to the Belle Isle radio station.

The U. S. Coast Guard, U. S. Army and city personnel normally assigned there were permitted to enter. Members of the Detroit Yacht Club were not allowed to cross the bridge, however, the Club provided ferry service, which was sanctioned.

Cadillac Gage Co.

Cadillac Gage Company on Groesbeck Highway in Warren manufactures an armored personnel carrier (APC - see Exhibit 21). Cadillac Gage loaned us five APC's during the disorder. Three arrived Sunday night, July 23rd, and the other two on Monday.

Follow Up of Looting Tips re License Numbers

Exhibit 22 is enclosed as evidence of follow-up.

Charges against Riot Perpetrators

Exhibit 23 shows that suspected snipers were charged with assault with the intent to commit murder. Exhibit 24 shows that those suspected of making fire bombs were charged with violation of the Governor's Proclamation regarding the possession of volatile liquids. Suspected looters were charged with entering without breaking.

Interaction with other Police Agencies relating to the Disorder

Exhibits 25 and 26 are examples of typical interactions between the Detroit Police Department and other police agencies relating directly to the disorder.

Disorder Tours

Exhibit 27 shows a typical itinerary of a disorder tour by the Detroit Police Department.




Figure 3. Identification of Major Components

DETROIT POLICE DEPARTMENT
Detective Division

July 23, 1967

TO : Chief of Detectives

SUBJECT: INFORMATION RE LOOTING - complainant, JOHN BRYANT, SGT., BOWMAN
PRIVATE POLICE.

1. At 6:35 a.m. received a call from Patr. Albert Lesko, 13 Pct. clerk, who reported that at 6:00 a.m. he was on 12th Street, and observed the following cars looting business places:

65 Buick EC 6815
65 Olds conv. DK 8830

2. Also observed following license numbers:

CU 7888 MS 7201 AN 2288 EA 2886
BH 9257 ES 0919

3. Check with Lansing, SOS, reveals following registrations:

AN 2288 - JOHN JONESCU JR 10414 Cedarlawn, Detroit 61 Ford
T Bird, tudor

BH 9257, MANNING SMITH 5003 Kay, Detroit, 66 Ford, Mustang

CU 7888 HERBERT E THRASH 3700 Lincoln, Apt. #307, Det. 62
Olds 4 door sedan

DK 8830, ROGERS S HARGO, 15810 Baylis, Detroit, 64 Pont. conv.

EA 2886 ALBERT TIPTON, 357 Roosevelt Pl., Detroit, 65 Mercedes
Benz, 4 door

EC 6815 ROBERT E. FEDELEM, 8084 Evergreen, Detroit, 62 Chev.
2 door

ES 0919 BETTY SLATER ELMER SLATER 253 E. Buena Vista, Det.
64 Pont. conv.

MS 7201 L J Taylor, 1722 Blaine, Detroit, 57 Dodge sedan

4. Det. Martin Gillespie, 10 DB, and Sgt. Edward Ewald, R B & E Bureau, notified.

5. Assigned to 10th Pct., R B & E Bureau; copies ASB, Inte. Bur.

James Thomas
JAMES THOMAS
Lieutenant

Thomas:sk

Source: Detroit Police Departments, Detective Division Write-Up, July 23, 1967.

DETROIT POLICE DEPARTMENT
Detective Division

July 26, 1967

To: Chief of Detectives

Subject: SHOOTING & ARREST OF WILLIE JACKSON M/N/25 of 9353
Laura and EDDIE PAULING M/N/39 of 4909 Mc Clellan
Held for Assault With Intent to Commit Murder

1. At 9:45 P.M. Det. John Lock, Homicide Bureau, assigned to detail at Detroit General Hospital (Central Branch) called Patr. Charles Garden, Homicide Bureau, and reported the shooting of Willie Jackson and Eddie Pauling.

2. Jackson and Pauling were conveyed to Detroit General Hospital (Central Branch) by A.P.B. Auto #3 from Cortland and Dexter. Jackson was suffering gunshot wounds to the right cheek right chest and left eye. Condition critical. Pauling was suffering a gunshot wound to the back. Condition critical.

3. Later Patr. Walter Ryan, assigned to Keifer 24, called Patr. Charles Garden, Homicide Bureau, and stated they were informed by unknown citizen that the police and soldiers were being shot at by a sniper in the Cortland-Dexter area. The officer further stated upon arrival at the scene they were met by Mich. State Police officers and Mich. National Guard who turned the arrested men over to Patr. Ryan. Patr. Ryan further stated that Keifer unit 24 did no shooting.

4. Assigned to the 10th prec., Homicide Bur.; copies to Deputy Superintendent, Robbery & E.B. Bur., SIB, Intell. Command Post, Scientific Bur., Info. Desk, Director of Personnel, Gun Repair Shop, Firearms Instructor, Accounting Office, CFB, CCB.

Det. Sgt. Wagner:oh

Ray G. Dinski
RAY G. DINSKI
Inspector

Source: Detroit Police Department, Detective Division Write-Up, July 26, 1967.

DETROIT POLICE DEPARTMENT
DETECTIVE DIVISION

JULY 27, 1967

To: Chief of Detectives

Subject: DEATH OF CALEB MOORE, W/32, 13472 Lumphkin, 865-5393
Prisoner of the Wayne County Sheriff's Office, being
held at Washtenaw County Jail, Ann Arbor, Mich.

1. At 9 AM this date, Det. Insp. Albert Schwaller, Homicide Bureau, was notified by Lt. Lawrence Walters, Wayne County Jail, that Caleb Moore had expired after being transferred to the Washtenaw County Jail. He was DOA at 7 AM, at St. Joseph's Mercy Hospital, Ann Arbor.

2. Investigation has established the following:
Moore was arrested on 7-24-67 at 9:40 PM by Sc 11-8 in the alley north of Davison west of St. Aubin after the officers received a radio run reporting that fire bombs were being made at that location. The officers confiscated two completed fire bombs, gasoline and paper materials used in bomb preparation. MOORE was registered for Violation of Governor's Proclamation. Possession of Volatile Liquid and Curfew.

3. Subsequently, Warrant #272216 was issued for the above named offenses and MOORE was arraigned in Recorder's Court on 7-26-67, where a \$5,000 bond (two sureties) was set. Later MOORE was transferred to the Washtenaw County Jail to await trial.

4. At about 6:30 AM this date, MOORE was found unresponsive in a cell at the above jail and was immediately conveyed to St. Joseph's Mercy Hospital.

5. Washtenaw County Medical Examiner Dr. Engelkey was contacted and an autopsy was scheduled for 2:30 PM this date at the above hospital. Dets. Eugene Caviston and James Walker, Homicide Bureau, will attend the autopsy.

6. Notified:

Det. Lt. Victor De Wolf, #11 D.B.

7. Assigned to #11 Pct, Homicide Bureau; copies to Scientific Bureau, Accounting Office, S.I.B.

Robert Kerr
ROBERT KERR
INSPECTOR

DET. CAVISTON: EEL

Source: Detroit Police Department, Detective Division Write-Up, July 27, 1967.

DETROIT POLICE DEPARTMENT
Detective Division

July 24, 1967

WGT MSG 100080 MSP E LANSING 7-24-67 (12:15 PM)

TO: PD DETROIT
ATTN ROBERT A LOTHIAN, 2ND DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
DETROIT POLICE DEPARTMENT DETROIT, MICHIGAN

FROM: KANSAS CITY MISSOURI

CHIEF CLARENCE M KELLY REQUESTS PERMISSION FOR A RANKING OFFICER, THIS
DEPARTMENT AND ONE FROM MISSOURI STATE HIGHWAY PATROL, TO VISIT YOUR
DEPARTMENT AND ACCOMPANY YOUR OFFICERS TO OBSERVE CURRENT PROBLEM AND
HANDLING OF SAME.

UNABLE TO CONTACT YOU BY PHONE DUE TO LOADED CIRCUITS. REPLY BY PHONE
COLLECT, IF POSSIBLE, OTHERWISE BY TELETYPE.

REGARDS

LT. COL J. H. GAMESON, COMMANDING AUXILIARY SERVICES BUREAU
KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI POLICE DEPARTMENTANSWER TO ABOVE

WGT MSG 100084 JULY 24, 1967 12:25 PM per Chief Insp. Thos. Turkaly

TO: LT. COL. J. H. GAMESON
COMMANDING AUXILIARY SERVICES BUREAU
KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI POLICE DEPARTMENT

RE: WGT MSG 100080 12:15 PM 7-24-67

PERMISSION IS GRANTED FOR VISIT TO OBSERVE CURRENT PROBLEM PER
YOUR REQUEST BY CHIEF INSPECTOR THOMAS TURKALY, DETROIT POLICE DEPT.

INSP. CHLOPAN, DET. PD C C
/pj 12:25 PM

RECEIVED AT CONTROL CENTER

BY Roy Chlopan

AT 12:15 PM, 7-24-67

ANSWER SENT 12:25 PM 7-24-67

Source: Detroit Police Department, Detective Division Write Up, July 24, 1967.

DETROIT POLICE DEPARTMENT
Detective Division

July 27, 1967

TO : Chief of Detectives

SUBJECT : Long distance (Paid) call from PD HARVEY, ILLINOIS
re: WILLIE MINES, GLORIA MOORE, RONALD BRACKINS
and HAROLD WATSON JR.

1. At 3.15 this pm, Detective Stanley Rojowski, Special Investigation Bureau, received a call from Sergeant Hollingsworth, Police Department, Harvey, Illinois regarding our radiogram pertaining to the above subjects who were arrested during the riot.

2. Sergt. Hollingsworth stated they have the following records on the subjects mentioned:

WILLIE MINES: 1-6-66 1 yr court supervision for Unlawful Use
of Weapons and Poss. Narcotics

HAROLD WATSON JR: 2/2/65 Criminal damage to Property; \$150 fine
Mittimus to county jail.
1/11/65 Burglary; 1 yr supervision with restitution
7/27/65 A&B Fined \$10 and 5 days
7/20/65 Assault. Complaint withdrawn

RONALD BRACKINS: 4/18/63 Disorderly Conduct. \$20 fine
7/20/65 Burglary. Warrant quashed; recommitted
to probation
6/29/65 Theft. Restitution made. Complaint
withdrawn.

GLORIA MOORE: No record.

FISHER MINES: No record.

DAGNER MINES: DOB 12/25/42, address 14226 Hoyne, Dixmoore, Ill.
This is a brother of WILLIE MINES.

3. They have a record of a 67 Buick Skylark, ivory color, 4 d. Hardtop, Ser. 444397H150174, License D/L 4801CK (could be CR) reported stolen sometime after 6/19/67 from the lot of BAUER BUICK CO. 15400 Dixie Hwy., Harvey, Ill. This car was a loaner and was returned 6/19/67 and put on the lot, then discovered missing.

4. Willie Mines had been charged with arson of dwelling, but the case was dismissed. He is alleged to have ignited the home of a witness against his brother. None of the above are wanted by them.

5. Assigned to Special Investigation Bureau, copy to Chief of Detectives and Auto Recovery Bureau.

Roy Chlopak
ROY CHLOPAK
Detective Inspector

gs:Rojowski

Source: Detroit Police Department, Detective Division Write-Up, July 27, 1967.

July 24, 1967

PROPOSED ITINERARY FOR TOUR
OF DETROIT'S DISASTER
AREAS

Leave headquarters and proceed north on Woodward to Grand Blvd.
Go west on Grand Blvd. to 12th Street
Go north on 12th street to West Chicago
Go east on West Chicago to Oakland-Westminster Area
Return from that area to John Lodge Expressway
Take John Lodge Expressway northward and exit at Livernois
Proceed north on Livernois to view 6-Mile and 7-Mile Areas
Go west on 8 Mile Road to Wyoming
Return south on Wyoming to Grand River
Continue on Grand River to Grand Blvd.
Turn Right from Grand River to Grand Blvd. and proceed south to Warren
Go east on Warren to Chrysler Expressway
Stay on West Side Service Drive of Chrysler Expressway to Gratiot.
Go out Gratiot to Van Dyke Harper Area
From that Area go south to Jefferson-Kitchener Area
Return west on Jefferson to tour downtown

Source: Detroit Police Department, July 24, 1967.

POST-DISORDER DETROIT POLICE DEPARTMENT ACTIONS AND DECISIONS

Critique Session

On September 8, 1967, the Detroit Police Department held a critique session on the civil disturbance at the Detroit Police Academy. In attendance were:

Deputy Supt. John Nichols (Presider)
Chief of Detectives Edward Sash
Chief Inspector Thomas Turkaly
Director of Personnel Robert Quaid
Director of Technical Services Henry Sedmak
Director of Traffic William Polkinghorn
Dist. Inspector Arden DeLuca
Dist. Inspector Anthony Bertoni
Dist. Inspector Charles Gentry
Insp. Bernard Winckoski, Research & Development Bureau
Inspector William Morris, Academy
Inspector Chester Sylvester, T. M. U.
Inspector John Bowyer, Mounted Bureau
Inspector John Ware, Special Investigation Bureau
Lieutenant Francis McGee, Research & Development Bureau
Lieutenant Alfred McGhee, Academy
Lieutenant Raymond Borsak, Tenth Precinct
Lieutenant James Taylor, M. T. B. (Motor Traffic Bureau)
Lieutenant Alfred Saffold, M. T. B.
Lieutenant Clarence Cesare, S. T. B. (Stationary Traffic Bureau)
Lieutenant Teddy M. Sikora, S. T. B.
Lieutenant Robert Mazzie, Tenth Precinct
Lieutenant Fred Hotchkiss, Property Bureau
Sergeant Ray Piddington, Fourteenth Precinct (Air Operations)

The material that follows came from this meeting, and is considered confidential.

12 hour shifts -- The suggestion was made that following the initial phase of operations, shifts other than 12 to 12 could be used for street patrol (such as 8 to 8). Director of Personnel Quaid was to prepare a report on this matter.

Timekeeping -- An officer would be designated in each precinct to be responsible for timekeeping. In order to facilitate timekeeping and for other operational purposes, officers will report first to their precinct and then to the command post. Director of Technical Services Sedmak was charged with formalizing a system of timekeeping, utilizing key punch machines.

Supervisory Personnel -- It was decided that each unit in the field should have adequate supervision, i.e., each squad should have a sergeant, and a bunching of three or more squads should have a lieutenant. Director Quaid was to prepare plans for this.

Deployment of Personnel -- It was stressed that precincts should follow instructions on the deployment of personnel, otherwise men would be held at a precinct simply because of possible future need at the precinct.

Equipment Issuance and Security -- Need was expressed for a method to maintain control over and a record of weapons, etc., issued during emergencies. The possibility of using the factory "tool check" system was discussed. Inspector Gentry described the form on which squad or other commanders had recorded information. The form also served other purposes. Inspector Gentry was to prepare a report and recommendation.

Private Weapons -- There was discussion concerning use by officers of private weapons. No conclusions were reached. It was noted that special training would be required.

Air Operations -- Sergeant Piddington, Precinct 14 (Air Operations), was to submit recommendations on which would be preferable - a helicopter or a fixed wing aircraft.

Director Quaid and Sergeant Piddington were to screen personnel records to see if additional young pilots were available.

Consideration was to be given the problems created when manpower is drained from bureaus or precincts when pilots are used. The defining and formalizing of pilot assignments was also to be considered.

Prisoners --

Transportation -- Problems were experienced but it was agreed that the D.S.R. provided excellent service. Arrangements were made through a dispatcher for the D.S.R. Bus drivers were cooperative and helpful. Transportation must be arranged so as to avoid delays in moving prisoners from one place to another. Duplicate requests for transportation should be avoided, and a precinct should make certain that busses are not waiting to be used before making a request. Busses can be sent reasonably near trouble areas if security guards are provided.

Detention Facilities -- This was termed a problem. Busses were used for this purpose in several instances for as much as two days.

Registration -- The suggestion was made that a bus sent to pick up prisoners in trouble areas should be provided with personnel to register (at least on preliminary basis) prisoners. Detective personnel would be desirable, but shortage of men is an obstacle. Inspector Ware was to prepare a recommendation. It was further decided that each precinct should designate a man to be responsible for prisoner registration and reporting.

Identification -- The proper identification of prisoners was considered essential to the transfer, processing and court prosecution of prisoners. Reports must be accurate and must contain the correct name or names of arresting officers. The photographing of prisoners with the arresting officers is helpful. When busses are used for prisoner registration in the field, a man should be detailed to the bus to take photographs of prisoners, if possible. It was stated that additional cameras were needed.

Prisoner Information Center -- The person in each area designated to be responsible for prisoner registration and reporting should notify an Information Center promptly of any pertinent information relative to a prisoner. This will be included in the check-list for command post operations.

Property -- The use of correct tags was given importance. Much material tagged as evidence property could be tagged as found or possibly safekeeping property, thus making release easier, as it is necessary to clear through Detectives to release evidence property. 90% of the property that came into Department's possession during riot was tagged as evidence property, and only a small portion of it was actually used as evidence.

Security -- It was decided that provision had to be made for the security of property, as many small sized items of considerable value are involved during a disorder.

Storage -- Consideration was to be given to the use of tractor trailers from trucking companies as temporary property storage facilities at precincts and other locations. Each precinct was to designate a man to be responsible in this area. Lieutenant Hotchkiss of the Property Bureau is preparing written recommendations covering these matters.

Command Posts -- A need for more telephones was immediately expressed. It was stated that command post locations should be selected on a city-wide basis (perhaps 5 or 6 locations) and they should be pre-wired with police lines and bell lines (jack system). Three Uniform District Inspectors will get together and decide on locations. The security of a command post is an important consideration. A command post kit is being designed containing needed equipment, etc. Any suggestions as to what should be included in the kit were to be sent to Inspector Gentry. A PREP unit at command posts was considered essential.

Identification of the Dead and Injured -- Inspector Ware of the Special Investigation Bureau will make recommendations on the possible use of an OCD system of tagging the dead and injured.

Communications --

PREP Units -- The Detroit Police Department expects to receive approximately 100 new PREP units in the near future. It was agreed that they should be phased into the present city-wide system, and that a new city-wide channel should not be utilized.

Bullhorns -- These are received as valuable items, and more are felt to be needed. Those that the Department has will be strategically located at key precincts, so that they will be readily available in the event of need.

Automobile Public Address Units -- It was felt that these served a useful purpose during the disorder.

Dispatching -- Generally the dispatcher does not handle cars in the trouble areas, as this is the responsibility of the area commander. However, it was considered important that certain vehicles not report to the command post in order to remain under the control of the dispatcher to handle minor runs (where a three car unit is neither desired nor necessary).

Officer in Trouble Calls -- The point was made that an over-response to officer in trouble calls caused difficulty, because the cars responding often blocked the street, preventing the needed emergency equipment or personnel from entering.

Information to Department Personnel -- It was deemed important that all personnel and units be notified promptly of any changes in rules, regulations, directives, etc. (such as curfews, restriction on sale of alcohol, gasoline, etc.). In some instances, this type of information was released to the public through radio broadcasts, while the department personnel had no official notification. Information, it was recommended, should go to Precincts and to command posts first.

Intelligence --

Reports from the Field -- It was emphasized that reports to Headquarters from the field and precincts should realistically reflect the true situation, and that care should be exercised so as to avoid over-stating a problem.

Intelligence Patrol -- It was noted that Inspector Genry had a two man team patrolling the area during the riot, and that they were able to provide valuable and accurate intelligence data. A larger number of such men was the recommendation so that the entire trouble area can be covered. This concept is to be developed.

Intelligence Bureau Officer -- The Intelligence Bureau man (C.I.B.) at the command post, it was decided, should serve as the intelligence officer for the commander. He should screen reports phoned in by Intelligence Patrol officers; provide liaison between the command post and the Intelligence Bureau; and screen out-of-town prisoners, arranging for interviews with detectives if deemed appropriate. He is also to monitor radio calls at the command post.

Backlash -- There was discussion regarding the possibility of backlash in the event of another civil disturbance. This could involve groups of people invading trouble areas, which would make the police job doubly difficult. Any information on this topic was to be directed to Inspector Ware.

Homicides, -- It was suggested that a homicide bureau man or a man familiar with homicide procedures be detailed to each precinct. It was decided that the best method is to send the case (and those involved) to the homicide bureau for handling. This procedure entails having a car available to be used for transportation purposes.

Emergency Police Reserves -- The E.R.P. program has been tentatively revamped since the disorder by Lt. A. McGhee of the Detroit Police Academy. The major change is the proposal that certain employees of public utilities and similar agencies serve as E.R.P. only on the premises of their employer. Exhibit 28 describes this proposal and the general workings of the E. R. P.

Citizen Volunteers -- Many citizens volunteered to assist the department during the emergency. It was decided that Commanding Officers should be granted authority to accept the services of volunteers in appropriate work (such as clerical duties). Moreover, citizens will not be committed to danger areas under any circumstances.

Retired Officers -- There was discussion concerning the possible use of retired officers during emergencies. Advantages, disadvantages, and complications were reviewed. No conclusion was reached other than that it is a matter that can be given further consideration.

Liaison with Other Units --

Michigan State Police -- Liaison with the Michigan State Police was considered excellent. One recommendation was to clarify formally with the Director of the State Police the fact that the Detroit Police Department can use men in less than 16-man (squad) units.

National Guard -- There was a recommendation for a ranking National Guard officer to be present in future disturbances at Police Headquarters. During the recent difficulty, ranking officers were in the field and at command posts, and a Captain was the highest ranking officer at Headquarters.

Street Lights -- There was general agreement that street lights should be extinguished in trouble areas since lights generally work to the disadvantage of the police. The Public Lighting Commission has promised to cooperate if the Detroit Police Department makes its wishes known to them. It sometimes takes a few hours to make the necessary arrangements. Director Sedmak and Inspector Gentry are working on this.




EXHIBIT 20

-01-

City of Detroit

DEPARTMENT OF POLICE

DETROIT, MICHIGAN 48231

RAY GIRARDIN
Commissioner

PROPOSAL TO ENLIST EMPLOYES OF PUBLIC UTILITIES AND OTHER AGENCIES INTO EMERGENCY POLICE RESERVES OF DETROIT POLICE DEPARTMENT

To ensure that an armed guard force could quickly be posted at critical installations, it is proposed that certain employees of public utilities and other agencies be enlisted into the Emergency Police Reserve (EPR) of the Detroit Police Department. They would provide protection until police or military authorities could direct their attention to such matters. Employees enlisted under this program would be given the same basic police training as other volunteers in the EPR program, but they would be assigned only to provide security on the premises of their employer. They would not be subject to removal from that assignment for duty elsewhere.

The proposal does not suggest that these voluntary civilian guards be a substitute for police and military personnel when they are available, or when a combat situation is encountered. It does, however, offer protection at vital installations until police or military can supplant or augment the civilian force. Also, a guard force of this type would relieve demands on police personnel in areas where the threat of sabotage is not imminent, but where it would be prudent to have guards stationed in the event of unlikely developments.

Utilities and other agencies, in addition to the security guards, should give consideration to providing some physical

protection for their property, in the form of security fencing, floodlighting and the like. This would reduce the number of guards required for maximum security.

The Emergency Police Reserve (EPR)

The EPR is a force of volunteer citizens that offer their services to assist the police department in the event of major emergency. They receive basic police training, including instructions in the handling of firearms, and in the event of an emergency they may be called to duty by the police commissioner. They are not paid by the city during their period of training or duty, but as a provision of the Detroit ordinance under which they are organized, they are covered by the Workmen's Compensation Act. If called to duty during a civil disturbance and assigned to duty where it might be necessary for them to protect themselves, they would be armed.

Training

The training of EPR's is usually conducted in their off-work periods at pre-established precinct stations. Fourteen hours of classroom training, in two-hour sessions, is offered, plus two four-hour sessions at the firearms range.

Uniforms and Firearms

It is contemplated that a uniform or some distinctive identifying attire or equipment will be provided to members of the EPR and that those assigned by the police department to field

duty will be provided with firearms. It is expected, however, that EPR's assigned only to duty on their employers' premises should be provided with firearms by the employer, if possible.

Liability

An employe volunteering for membership in the EPR program would be serving as a member of that force from the moment that the emergency was declared until he was relieved of the duty. Accordingly, it is anticipated that his actions during that ~~period would be those of a police officer acting for a law en-~~forcement agency, rather than those of an employe acting for his employer.

Private Armed Guards -- It appears that business places using armed guards avoided to some extent looting and damage. There are, however, practical and legal considerations. For example, a Governor's proclamation setting up rigid emergency firearms control rules could have an effect upon this, particularly if transporting weapons is involved. Any suggestions should be directed to Inspector Ware.

Arrest Procedure Proposal

In any situation where mass arrests may be made, it is imperative that arresting officers return immediately to the scene. Given these circumstances, prisoners and evidence must be processed quickly and accurately. The procedures described below have been developed by the Detroit Police Department Research and Development Bureau to provide rapid processing with a minimum of paper work at the time of the arrest. These procedures are designed to be followed when prisoner processing is accomplished at temporary facilities including the prisoner processing vehicle, or precinct stations during emergency situations. These procedures have not been completely finalized or passed on.

A new form, D.P.D. 551, the preliminary arrest card, has been designed for the processing of mass arrests (see Exhibit 29). This form will serve as a temporary arrest ticket and a PCR (preliminary complaint record). The regular print card, arrest ticket and the complete PCR will have to be prepared later, when time permits, but not later than the end of the tour of duty of the arresting officer.

The form will be available in the stock room. Each precinct shall maintain a supply of 500 forms and the Commanding Officer of the Motorcycle Traffic Bureau shall be responsible for insuring that the prisoner processing vehicle is equipped

DETROIT POLICE DEPARTMENT
PROPOSED PRELIMINARY ARREST CARD

Last Name	FIRST	MIDDLE	AGE	SEX	RACE
Address			DATE OF BIRTH		
Where Arrested			DATE	TIME	
Arresting Officers			BADGE	UNIT	
			BADGE	UNIT	
Initial Charge.					
Details of Arrest			RIGHT THUMB PRINT		
DPD 551			PRELIMINARY ARREST CARD		

Source: Detroit Police Department, Research and Development Bureau.

with a minimum of 1000 copies of the form and a like number of evidence and property tags.

The procedures to be used are described in detail in the following proposed amendments to the Detroit Police Manual:

CHAPTER 20

Add the following new sections after Section 145:

Section 145A, PRISONER PROCESSING DURING MASS ARRESTS.

The arresting officer shall enter the processing area with his prisoner and obtain the preliminary arrest card, D.P.D. 551, and if necessary, evidence and property tags. Once the officer has obtained the necessary forms, he shall follow the procedures listed below.

A. The prisoner's right thumb print shall be placed on D.P.D. 551.

If the right thumb cannot be printed due to injury or amputation, another digit shall be used and so indicated on the form. No attempt should be made to complete the form at this time.

B. After the thumbprint has been taken, the officer, his prisoner and any related evidence shall be photographed by a polaroid process. The officer, and his prisoner shall stand behind a table and any related evidence shall be placed on the table before them. Such photographs shall be taken from a distance of approximately four feet for maximum clarity.

C. Upon completion of photographing, the arresting officer shall prepare D.P.D. 551, including as many details of the arrest as time and space will permit. These details are essential as the arresting officer later will have to prepare a complete PCR from this card.

D. Evidence tags will not be completed at this time. The arresting officer shall place only his name and unit on the tag. The property shall be placed in the containers provided and the evidence tag shall be attached so the number may be easily read. The evidence tag numbers shall be noted in the space provided on the arrest card and on the reverse side of every polaroid picture that was taken.

Other officers will be available at the processing area to take charge of the prisoner and all property.

Revision of the Detroit Police Department's Mobilization Plan for Emergencies

The current mobilization plan for emergencies excludes certain units and bureaus - the Women's Division, Civic Center, Communication Center, License, Liquor License, Medical, Motor Service, Property, Public Vehicle, Record, Recorder's Court, Research and Development, Traffic Court, the Traffic Safety Bureaus and the specialized detective bureaus.¹³ Mr. William Walter of the Detroit Police Department Research and Development Bureau is setting up a new mobilization system, the basic change proposed being the mobilization of the above units and bureaus in emergencies.

¹³Detroit Police Department, Detroit Police Manual, September 1, 1967, p. 174.