

around Twelfth Street and Clairmount. He saw small groups throwing objects and running around. At this point (approximately 5:00 a.m.), Brown went to a private home, called the Tenth Precinct and took a taxi to the station. On the way, he observed young men running around, throwing "unknown objects" and breaking windows. He did not observe any looting.¹²

THE CIVIL DISORDER: AN ANALYSIS OF EARLY POST-RAID ACTS

The first riot-related police dispatch message after the two hour moratorium (8:01 a.m.) dealt with looting at Twelfth Street and Pingree. A concentrated listing of early post-raid police dispatch messages is included to set the street scene (see Exhibit 17). A presentation of the chronological dispersion of early riot-related events gives further insight into the nature of this tragic civil disturbance (see Exhibits 18 and 19). A total dispersion presentation of riot-related incidents is provided in the report of Mr. Cyrus R. Vance, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, concerning "The Detroit Riots". However, there remained a great need for material on the nature of the buildup of these incidents, especially regarding the first day. Exhibits 17 and 18 serve as such indicators. Reports of lootings, attempted lootings and looters carried the heaviest incidence, even during the early morning hours. This was the category to which the Detroit Police Department had to respond most often. The second highest category of requested response concerned assisting fellow police officers.

¹²Special Investigation Bureau Report, July 31, 1967.

Exhibit 17

TIMETABLE OF SELECTED POLICE DISPATCHES - TENTH PRECINCT

JULY 23, 1967, FROM 8:01 TO 10:53 A.M.

| TIME OF DISPATCH | DISPATCH MESSAGE |
|--------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 8:01 AM | 12th and Pingree, looting stores |
| 8:13 | 8605 12th, ADT alarm |
| 8:14 | 12th, between Blaine and Gladstone, B&E (Breaking and Entering) |
| 8:15 | 8925 12th, alarm, man from the alarm company on the way |
| 8:15 | 8730 12th, Guardian alarm |
| 8:17 | 2476 Pingree, four colored men carried ten shotguns or rifles into building |
| 8:17 | 8953 12th, alarm, owner notified |
| 8:18 | 9019 12th, Guardian alarm |
| 8:19 | 8621 12th, pawn shop, looting |
| 9:01 | Alley west of 12th, between Seward and Delaware, four men carrying shotguns |
| 9:01 | 8624 12th, House of Hats, B&E in process |
| 9:04 | 12th and Hazelwood, large gang |
| 9:07 | Linwood and Clements, at the Sinclair station, men with guns |
| 9:08 | 12th and Clairmount, shoe store fire |
| 9:10 | 12th and Hazelwood, pawn shop just looted |
| 9:11 | 1927 Pingree, loading loot in rear |
| 10:05 | Prisoners |
| 10:09 | 8202 12th, Brown's Drug Store, Michigan Alarm |
| 10:10 | Woodrow Wilson and Delaware, carrying loot from drug store |
| 10:39 | Seward and Woodrow Wilson, grocery store, B&E |
| 10:51 | 12th and Clairmount, trouble with crowd |
| 10:53 ¹ | 2476 Pingree, shooting |

Source: Detroit Police Department, Tenth Precinct dispatch tickets.

¹At 10:45 a.m., the Detroit Police Department began to record all riot-oriented mobile and PREP radio runs in a "Disorder Log".

CATEGORICAL/CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY OF RECORDED RIOT-RELATED POLICE RADIO DISPATCHES

JULY 23, 1967, FROM 2:00 A.M. to 11 A.M.¹

| NATURE OF DISPATCH | A. M. HOURLY DISPERSION | | | | | | | | TOTAL ² |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------|--------|--------|---------------------|---------------------|--------|--------|-------|--------------------|
| | 2-3:59 | 4-4:59 | 5-5:59 | 6-6:59 ² | 7-7:59 ² | 8-8:59 | 9-9:59 | 10-11 | |
| 1. Assist in raid with 10-80 (Tenth Precinct's Clean Up Crew) at 9123-25 12th St. | 9 | 4 | | | | | | | 13 |
| 2. Responses to the unruly behavior of the initial crowd | | | 9 | | | | | | 9 |
| 3. Lootings, attempted lootings and looters reports | | | | | | 3 | 10 | 8 | 21 |
| 4. Burglar alarm dispatches | | | | | | 6 | | 1 | 7 |
| 5. Gun carrying reports | | | | | | 1 | 3 | 1 | 5 |
| 6. Reported gatherings of people | | | | | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 |
| 7. Fire reports | | | | | | | 1 | | 1 |
| 8. Calls to assist police officers | | | | | | | | 2 | 2 |
| 9. Arrests and prisoner transporting reports | | | | | | | | 2 | 2 |
| 10. Sniper and shooting reports | | | | | | | | 1 | 1 |
| TOTAL | 9 | 4 | 9 | 0 ² | 0 ² | 11 | 15 | 16 | 64 ² |

Source: Detroit Police Department, Tenth Precinct dispatch tickets.

¹There were 85 recorded dispatches of separate events in the Tenth Precinct in the early afternoon where a run was not made because of the level of activity. Most were riot-oriented.

²There were no recorded dispatches between 6:12 and 8:01, the reason given was that the activity became too heavy for any recording. Moreover, there were also dispatches during the other hours of peak activity that were not recorded.

Exhibit 19
CATEGORICAL/CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY OF RIOT INCIDENTS¹
 JULY 23, 1967, FROM 10:45 A.M. TO 12 MIDNIGHT

| NATURE OF INCIDENT ¹ | HOURLY DISPERSION | | | | | | | | | | | | | TOTAL |
|-----------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------|----------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|----------|-------|-------|
| | 10:45 ² -11:59 | 12-12:59 | 1-1:59 | 2-2:59 | 3-3:59 | 4-4:59 | 5-5:59 | 6-6:59 | 7-7:59 | 8-8:59 | 9-9:59 | 10-10:59 | 11-12 | |
| 1. Calls to assist police officers | 5 ⁴ | 6 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 9 | 5 | 8 | 9 | 7 | 9 | 11 | 13 | 90 |
| 2. Calls to assist citizens | 1 | | | 1 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 3 | | 3 | 4 | 2 | 3 | 21 |
| 3. Lootings, attempted lootings and looters reports | 3 | 12 | 5 | 9 | 13 | 14 | 44 | 42 | 33 | 69 | 53 | 89 | 109 | 495 |
| 4. Calls to assist the Fire Dept. | | | 5 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 28 |
| 5. Fire reports | | | 1 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 1 | | 5 | 1 | 7 | 6 | 10 | 38 |
| 6. Arrest and prisoner transporting reports | 2 | 2 | | 1 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 9 | 7 | 5 | 11 | 10 | 62 |
| 7. Gun carrying reports | | | 1 | 1 | 1 | | 2 | 2 | 1 | 6 | 1 | 5 | 2 | 22 |
| 8. Sniper and shooting reports | | | 1 | 2 | | 2 | 2 | 2 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 7 | 17 | 75 |
| 9. Bottle and debris throwing and window-breaking reports | 2 | 1 | | 1 | 2 | 5 | 11 | 1 | | 1 | 2 | 2 | | 28 |
| 10. Equipment runs | | | | 2 | 1 | | 2 | | | | | | 2 | 7 |
| 11. Reported gatherings of people | 1 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 9 | 4 | | 2 | 2 | 10 | 1 | 1 | 36 |
| 12. Reported fights and beatings | | | | | | 1 | 1 | | 1 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 11 |
| 13. Other riot-related messages | 1 | 4 | 5 | 7 | 8 | 5 | 6 | 2 | 9 | 10 | 5 | 8 | 11 | 81 |
| TOTAL ³ | 15 | 28 | 22 | 34 | 37 | 56 | 86 | 65 | 77 | 116 | 104 | 144 | 182 | 966 |

Source: Detroit Police Department Disorder Log (a compilation of riot-related police radio messages from 10:45 a.m., July 23 to 2:00 a.m., July 27).

¹An "incident" is defined as a distinct riot-related occurrence mentioned in a police radio message. The messages were broken down into such occurrences. Thirteen categories were established. Hence, one message often contains several "incidents".

²The Disorder Log was started at 10:45 as the severity of the situation was realized.

³Due to the volume of messages received and sent during the peak hours of activity, approximately 2,000 messages were not recorded during the disturbance.

EARLY DISORDER EVENTS AS DESCRIBED BY A SUPERVISOR
OF THE DETROIT COMMISSION ON COMMUNITY RELATIONS

As directed, the observations of a civil rights worker were solicited.

Mr. James Bush, a caucasian and a Supervising Community Services Assistant of the Detroit Commission on Community Relations, was selected for an interview because he was at the scene before 8:00 a.m., July 23, 1967, and because he is the top field man of the department. Bush was called at 7:00 a.m. by Richard Marks, Secretary-Director of the Commission. Marks had been called by Councilman Hood, who apparently had been at the scene. Hood reported looting on Twelfth Street. He told Marks that the police weren't stopping it. Marks also was out before 8:00 a.m. Bush picked up Van Stoner, one of his employees and a negro, on the way to the Tenth Precinct. All was quiet on Dexter. When they got to the station, they observed that patrolmen were frantically calling in men. Western District Inspector Gentry and District Inspector De Luca were there. Gentry gave Bush an assessment. He said he didn't have enough men to cordon off the area. Bush and Stoner drove to LaSalle and Clairmount, and then walked to Twelfth Street. There was a big crowd at 12th and Clairmount, and for as far as you could see south (about 1½ blocks). About a half dozen police cars were in the middle of 12th. The crowds were milling, no looting was observed. However, several stores had been looted. There had been a fire, and the word was that the Fire Department had put it out without any trouble. Bush saw Abe Ulmer and Vivian Pope of the State Civil Rights Commission. One negro told Stoner, "Your friend won't be too safe." Bush and Stoner stood around talking to people. A jovial mood prevailed. People were greeting friends. Many had come out to see what was happening. Bush feels that police action at that time would have made the crowd hostile. Bush only witnessed one racial reference. Two or three young negro fellows who passed him were saying, "We're gonna get Whitey tonight."

Six or seven stores had already been about a third looted. People communicated to Bush grievances against the merchants as though to justify such acts.

Bush and Stoner separated. Stoner went further down 12th. They both had the distinct impression at this point that this was a "big thing". Bush also got the impression that there was a considerable crowd all the way south down 12th ("at least five or six blocks"). He saw no cars on the street. There was a police barricade at 14th and Clairmount, and Bush got the impression that there was one somewhere else down 12th.

Bush and Stoner stayed at 12th and Clairmount for 45 minutes to one hour. Bush decided they should leave when people started to call him Hardy (he was standing in front of Hardy's Drug Store). As he and Stoner were walking towards La Salle (circa 9:15 - 9:30), they saw the police scout cars pull out one by one. At this point, a couple of men started to finish ripping the grating off the Cancellation Shoe Store. Then four or five scout cars, four men to a car with helmets and "rifles", came screaming in Clairmount. At 14th, they saw another flotilla.

At Seward and 12th around 10:00 a.m., they saw a store looted. There were big crowds, and they were spreading out very quickly. Bush talked to Jim Boyce, the Virginia Park Advocate Planner, who was with Austin Chavis of the UAW.

Bush heard about a meeting of community and negro leaders at Virginia Park and 12th (Grace Episcopal Church). When Bush and Stoner got there, the meeting had just broken up. Bush listed these notables: Rev. Potts, Congressman Conyers, Art Johnson of the Board of Education, Congressman Diggs, Hubert Locke of the Police Department and Joe Coles of the Detroit Community Relations Commission.

This group decided to use bull horns (an electric megaphone) to tell the crowds to go home. The whole tone of the meeting was not to use violence, to save lives, not property. The time was around 10:22 a.m., because at this time two bull horns were dispatched to Hubert Locke at 12th and Virginia Park (Appendix A). At this point, the police were lined up in formation down the middle of the street so as to sweep the area.

Stoner got into a car with Potts and a fellow named Jackson from the steelworkers union. Bush then spent some time on the street trying to get some meetings set up. He knows and talked to many block club leaders. Bush saw Clyde Cleveland, the President of Detroit's Chapter of CORE. He took Cleveland back to 12th and Clairmount. Here also the police were lined up in formation. They were "barely holding their own". There were huge numbers of people, "a couple of thousand". Bricks and bottles were being thrown at the police. There was a fire on 12th. The police were pushing people aside. The time was pushing noon. Bush feels the police could not have contained this crowd, although he said that the other streets were still quiet, referring to Linwood, Dexter and Oakland (per Appendix A, rioting and looting began on Linwood at 3:23 p.m.)

Before and after Virginia Park, Bush went to the Kiefer Command Post. He had heard of this activity at the Tenth Precinct Station. The second time (circa 2-2:30 p.m.), he stayed for a couple of hours, then he walked back into the disorder area. He saw Dewey Shanks (MCHRD) at the scene, who said that he got the distinct impression that people were trying to organize. Shanks had a Rap Brown style haircut, and one fellow urging organization said to him, "I haven't seen you since Newark". Bush said there were many guys with Rap Brown haircuts, opening stores and urging the crowds on. Stoner went over to Linwood, and home at the curfew. Shanks, Stoner and Bush saw no beatings on Sunday.

There was a meeting of Civil Rights leaders and the police at the Tenth Precinct at 5:30 p.m. Marks and Stoner attended. At this meeting, Charles Coulding was the only one opposed to violence.

Around 6 to 6:30 p.m., Bush went out in a state police car for 1 to 1½ hours with an officer, a reporter and Austin Chavis. There were four cars in total, with four officers to a car. Jim Boyce was also in one of the cars. Then Bush went back to the Kiefer Command Post until one or two a.m. He called Marks when he returned home.

THE DETROIT POLICE DEPARTMENT: DISORDER OPERATIONS AND STRATEGIES

Appendix A clearly illustrates that the basic operational pattern of the Detroit Police Department during the civil disorder became one of reaction to the riotous events as they were reported. A chronological police manpower tally is included. Once a workable determination of the magnitude, nature and potentiality of the disturbance had been achieved, a battle strategy framework was formed. The general basis of Detroit Police Department strategies during the Civil Disorder was the Department's Riot and Mob Control Manual. Regarding the estimate of the situation, material is presented on crowd and mob behavior, including:

1. types of crowds
2. basic patterns in mob action
3. anatomy of a riot
4. psychological influences causing mobs
5. tactics of rioters
6. techniques of rioters

Regarding suppression tactics, the manual covers:

1. Headquarters Command Post operations
 - a. personnel
 - b. intelligence
 - c. transportation
 - d. armaments
 - e. communications
 - f. news release center

Suppression tactics (contd)

2. Field Operations

- a. riot control formations, tactics and techniques
- b. command relationships
- c. employment of forces
- d. field command post operations
- e. security of headquarters complex
- f. precinct emergency plan
- g. special weapons and equipment
- h. intelligence
- i. communications
- j. medical support
- k. barriers and road blocks
- l. check point operations
- m. withdrawal of units
- n. relief of personnel
- o. handling of prisoners
- p. displaced persons

The top Detroit Police Command had personal knowledge of the techniques used by other municipal police departments when they were confronted with riot conditions. The crux of the Detroit Police strategy was the command post concept. Ordinarily, the Department reacts in scout car units. Separate command posts were established in the riot areas as the need dictated. Deputy Superintendent Nichols insured a continuity of top command at these posts. Deployment from these command posts was in strict reference to riot-related events. This was the first line of our attack. The precincts operated as complementary units to these command posts. Four command posts were set up during the disorder. Following is a listing of the command posts and their principal officers:

HERMAN KIEFER HOSPITAL COMMAND POST - District Inspector Arden De Luca, Inspectional Service; Inspector Edward Mischnick of the Tenth Precinct; Inspector Stanley Jedlenski of the Eleventh Precinct; Inspector Leonard Sznewajs of the Youth Bureau; Inspector Paul Donley of the Motor Traffic Bureau (MTB); Inspector John Bowyer of the Mounted Bureau

DETROIT POLICE HEADQUARTERS COMMAND POST - Superintendent Eugene Reuter; Deputy Superintendent John Nichols; Chief Inspector Thomas Turkaly; Central District Inspector Anthony Bertoni

*Why precinct
Command*

CENTRAL HIGH SCHOOL COMMAND POST - Western District Inspector Charles Gentry;
Eastern District Inspector Arthur Sage

SOUTHEASTERN HIGH SCHOOL COMMAND POST - District Inspector George Zellman,
Special Services Division; Inspector Charles Beer of the Fifteenth
Precinct; Inspector James Cole of the License Bureau; Inspector Thomas
Nolan of the Control Center; Inspector William Ellenburg of the Traffic
Safety Bureau

*Why
precinct
commander*

As would be expected, the Headquarters Command Post was the central command post, the chief information and order disseminating unit and the primary intelligence gathering unit. Deputy Superintendent Nichols received his telephone call about 5:20 a.m., July 23, 1967. The information he received was threefold:

1. A Lieutenant (Good) had been injured.
2. There were crowds reaching a number sufficient enough for the Weekly Duty Officer (Bertoni) to notify the Western District Inspector (Gentry).
3. There was enough evidence to indicate that this might not be a single, isolated event.

Nichols called Superintendent Reuter, who, in turn, called Police Commissioner Girardin, who, it was discovered, had already been informed. Girardin, Reuter and Nichols arrived at Police Headquarters very close together. About the next 30 minutes was used to accumulate and evaluate information from police field men as to the extent and the nature of the situation. During this period, Nichols charged a patrolman from Precinct 1, which is in the same building, to start notifying the staff sections. There was a brief conference then between Girardin, Reuter and Nichols. The mobilization order for the next platoon (MO2) was then issued (6:42 a.m.). This means that the next platoon (Platoon 2 - days) was ordered in immediately. The Western District Inspector, Charles Gentry, had already mobilized the 2nd Platoon of all of the West Side precincts (6:15 a.m.). Girardin told Reuter to alert the Michigan National Guard and the Michigan State Police. Nichols gave the order to set up a special communications installation at Headquarters, much of which was placed in his office.

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time*

time

Nichols also designated Inspectors Morris and Winckoski as adjutants, with the primary responsibility of putting a Headquarters log into effect. This procedure was set up and followed first during the Kercheval incident. The communications section on the 3rd floor (Nichol's office) went operational at 8:00 a.m. In effect, the Headquarters Command Post also became operational at this point, about half an hour before the Herman Kiefer Command Post.

Further strategies evolved at the Headquarters Command Post. The Department first tried to employ the three basic riot principles:

1. contain the riot to an area
2. isolate the riot participants
3. destroy the groupings of rioters

This system is predicated on the fact that one can respond with sufficient numbers. If there is any key to riot control, it is the rapid, heavy appearance of men. Had the riot catalyzed three hours earlier, it might well have been thwarted as the TMU and the Motor Traffic Bureau went off duty that Sunday morning at 3:00 a.m. At the time required, we simply did not have enough men, especially with reference to blockades, as we were unable to seal off the area. Our intelligence sources told us that the rioters bypassed our blockades by going past and entering Twelfth St. by some of the smaller avenues. There are numerous streets perpendicular to Twelfth St. from Clairmount to West Grand Boulevard. The character of the immediate area is also one of high density. In effect, the rioters mobilized faster than we did. Once it was determined that the area could not be completely sealed off, the next strategy decided on was to leave only key street blockades lineally and laterally off of 12th, and have the surplus men join the others in reacting to the sequence of events. The pattern of the intelligence that we gathered showed that someone would break a store window, but that someone else did the looting. This is why so many were charged with "entering without breaking."

Much of the looting was done by women and children. For one who breaks a window, there is the charge of "malicious destruction". However, once the person puts his hand through the opening, a "breaking and entering (B&E)" has taken place, which is a felony.

The looters displayed a priority preference by product categories:

1. liquor
2. furniture and appliances
3. groceries
4. guns

Given these patterns, the Detroit Police Department could project as well as react.

Regarding the use of firearms, there is a governing state law according to the nature of the situation. The Detroit Civil Disorder was characterized by a series of small unit actions. The circumstances of each were different. One allowable situation for the use of firearms invoked by the Department involved flight from a felony, e.g. a B&E, where identity was not known. The Department probably under-reacted regarding the use of riot weapons as the situations were not controllable for such use, coupled with the fact that many women and children were partakers.

There had to be some balanced geographic reasonability of deployment as the Department certainly couldn't be sure that the near West Side would be the only area affected. Indeed, the East Side did become involved. Moreover, the Department was never sure that this conflagration wouldn't take on a racial aspect. Of course, the first bit of strategy was the de-escalation of policemen from the area immediately after the raid. Another strategic move was forced on us as we had to take all policemen off the guarding of vital installations and commit them to riot action, because General Throckmorton of the U. S. Army would not come in with his troops until he was assured that all policemen were committed.

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them
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National Guardsmen were initially given this function. On the third day (July 25th), the Air Guard was de-federalized and placed under our direction. Deployment was to vital installations.

The brunt of the civil disorder was borne by the West Side of Detroit. At 5:10 a.m., July 23rd, the Western District Inspector, Charles Gentry, was called by the Weekly Duty Officer, ^{Time} Anthony Bertoni. At that point, Gentry only knew that there were many people milling around on Twelfth Street. He arrived at Precinct 10 at 5:43 a.m. Here he talked twice to Lt. Good, who was at the scene. He learned that many people were throwing objects, that Lt. Good had been hurt and that the crowd was increasing. Lt. Good estimated the crowd to be "several hundred". Good's group of 14 men (later 28) was reconnoitering from the John C. Lodge service drive and Clairmount. Gentry ordered them to a lot by Herman Kiefer Hospital (Byron and Taylor), so that there would be room for help to get in. He told Good to "stand fast", that he would get him help. He then called the Motor Traffic Bureau's Commando Squad, the Department's first line of defense. There were five MTB men on street duty. The next platoon was not due in until 10:00 a.m. At this point, all duty people in at Precinct 10 were on the scene. Gentry called the other West Side Precincts for men. He then ordered the mobilization of the Motor Traffic Bureau (MTB). ^{Time}

He had no authority to do so, only the Director of Traffic (Polkinghorn) can do such. At 6:15 a.m., Gentry re-called the Bureau and ordered the first squad formed to go to the Ford Hospital garage. A MTB squad is composed of 15 men and a Sergeant. A precinct squad has 12 men and a Sergeant. At 7:25 a.m., the first MTB squad was complete. It went out under Sergeant John May. It is departmental thinking that a squad must be intact in order to be effective. At 6:15 a.m., ^{Where} Gentry ordered the next platoon in (MC2) of all the West Side precincts.

Shortly after 6:00 a.m. also, Gentry formed his own intelligence unit, comprised of two young negro officers in plain clothes. They were out in the field all day, feeding information to the 3rd floor of Police Headquarters. Of course, the Central Intelligence Bureau (CIB) also had crews out. Gentry then had a conversation with Reuter. Gentry and Inspector Mischnick of Precinct 10 were trying to decide on a field command post. Mischnick went out with Lt. Mazzie and a Clerk at 7:40 a.m. to survey the area for a field command post. Mischnick made arrangements to get the first floor of Pavilion #6 of the Herman Kiefer Hospital. About this time, policemen began to arrive at Precinct 10. Some were in squads, and some were not. A sergeant was detailed to meet them at the door. He took their names and an inventory of the equipment they had. From there, Gentry took the men to the squad room where he held roll calls. The men were briefed on the problem, and formed into squads. Gentry was frequently interrupted by phone calls. He had to leave and go upstairs to his office, since the squad room is in the basement. These squads were sent to Mischnick at the Kiefer Command Post in auto patrols. The strategy here was quick disbursement after arrival. Before Mischnick left Precinct 10, he outlined his street strategy to Good, who was at the scene. He told him to form into units of three cars, with four men to a car. He ordered that these units patrol Twelfth, with the cars close together. It wasn't effective because so much was going on that the cars had to stop and respond, and thereby got tied up.

How many?

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Gentry forwarded all the gas masks from the Tenth Precinct to the Kiefer Command Post. Around this time, Gentry started running out of equipment, specifically riot guns and helmets. He began borrowing from other precincts. Squads were not sent out unless they were properly equipped.

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Gentry told Mischnick to hit Twelfth Street in squad (straight line) formations, and/or use two squads in V formations. The policemen were never able to form a V. At 9:16 a.m., Nichols mobilized the 3rd Platoon (MO3). These men were expected in by noon. The dispatcher called to inform Gentry that routine runs were not being covered. Gentry decided that those responding to Precinct 10 from MO3 would be made available for runs other than those to the affected area. In between the action, Gentry had a few moments for members of the State's Civil Rights Department and the Detroit Community Relations Commission.

Around 2:00 p.m., General Noble Moore arrived with other members of the Michigan National Guard. Gentry briefed him on the conditions, and agreed he had better talk to the Top Command. He provided Moore with a scout car for the run downtown. A little later, Gentry received a call from Nichols to go to Central High School and open a command post. He left with an advance party at 4:20 p.m. He crossed 12th above Clairmount, and saw nothing but people in all directions. Many were running. It was a loud, disorderly crowd. Although a Board of Education employee was to open the school, no one showed. Gentry forced entrance. At 5:25 p.m., the first contingent of Michigan National Guardsmen arrived at Central, 200 men of the 156th Signal Battalion in 2½ ton trucks. They stayed there for the next 15 days. Gentry and Moore deployed the men during *when to* *when* this period. Later, Moore received his orders from General Throckmorton of the U. S. Army (the Guard was federalized).

When Gentry arrived at Central, he called the Kiefer Command Post for policemen. They got there about the same time that the Guard arrived. Gentry decided on a strategy of "integrated" patrols, i.e., Detroit Police and National Guardsmen. The first units sent out were composed of one Detroit Police Lieutenant, five Detroit Patrolmen and 15 guardsmen. They were sent to the

when