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A POLITICIAN CREATES A NEW SERVICE

(DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, POLICE, SOCIAL WORK AND POLITICS:

A MODEL FOR INCREMENTAL CHANGE)

"Police. Send the police. He's got a gun."

According to the F.B.I. Uniform Crime Report of 1975, police across the country received more calls for family conflict than for murder, aggravated assault and all other serious crimes. Wife beating outnumbered rape by 3 to 1. Wife abuse calls accounted for 13% of all homicides of police and 40% of all injuries to police.<sup>1</sup> How do social workers with training in crisis intervention, family counseling and social planning develop programs to change service delivery systems to help lower these figures?

The problem-solving process needs to be used at the community level to achieve the goal of more services to families in crisis. The expression of that need is the recurring violence by family members who then turn to the police as authority figures to "solve the problem." Police officers across the nation know families that are repeaters; they are familiar to the local precinct, officers on the beat, and to the neighborhood. These families are not familiar with counseling services, and far too often the death or handicapping of a family member is the "solution" to the conflict.

A variety of responses to the problem of domestic violence have developed. Social workers in the army in Europe worked with commanding officers and the military police to defuse such situations and begin a counseling process.<sup>2</sup> In the United States, social workers in some communities have been assigned full time to police stations.<sup>3</sup> In other communities, psychologists have trained police officers in defusion techniques.<sup>4</sup> Other psychologists have offered police training that includes referral to social agencies.

In many communities, social agencies have insisted that the family in trouble come during regular office hours and questioned social workers going with police

officers on "Family Trouble Runs."

In Detroit, I believed the problems and needs of families trapped in domestic violence demanded a solution that could be designed and implemented only if social workers and the police developed strategies together and avoided confrontation tactics with one another. As social workers, we have stated that our knowledge, ethics and skills are needed wherever individuals and society interface and problems are created. Many social workers are acutely aware that public policy affects both the generation and resolution of such problems. As a result, more social workers have become involved in politics, ranging from being campaign workers to serving in appointed and elected positions.

My strategy as a social worker elected to a city council was to pair social workers and police, namely, Family Services of Detroit and Wayne County and the Detroit Police Department, to defuse domestic violence incidents and provide social services to the disputants. The overall objectives of the project were: (1) To train the police in crisis intervention techniques to defuse domestic violence; (2) To involve social workers in the training of the police; (3) To have social workers in the precinct stations on call; and (4) For the police to make referrals to social workers. The success of the project depended upon its acceptance by the decision makers in city government with responsibility for training the police and managing the Police Department as well as the leadership in the Family Services Agency and the private social service funding system.

Inevitably, the change process involves the problem-solving process: Defining the problem, assessing the elements and forces involved, setting goals and objectives, determining strategy, and analyzing and evaluating the process. The change process also involves identifying and mobilizing support, both inside and outside the systems targeted for change. In order to influence government and governmental departments, there are certain aspects of the problem-solving process that require special attention. For example, it's necessary to review the political aspects, the balancing of the needs and interests of policy makers (elected officials), constituencies, functionaries and

clientele. Integral to change is leadership that understands power, when and how to use and respond to expert power, referent power, charismatic power and the power of numbers.

In our American concept of government, power is not absolute. Power is shared through a system of checks and balances. The legislative body and the mayor of a city have their own level of politics and struggle for power including the power of constituency support. This usually leads to fierce competition in convincing their constituency that one is giving leadership and, therefore, is worthy of their vote.

Depending on time, place and situation, strategies and tactics may need revisions; always, there must be a range of goals and objectives.

In 1973, I believed there was some public recognition of the problem of family violence, the demands on the Police Department for a solution, and potential community support for a rational effort to deal with the domestic violence aspect of public safety. By proposing a solution to the issue in the 1973 campaign and receiving a large vote as a City Council candidate, I could display that this solution to the issue would have broad public support (the power of numbers). Thus, the problem could begin to be solved at a community level by providing more services to families in need. (This problem was one of several human service problems which were a campaign issue for me.)

We were at the time caught in a political crossfire. The black mayoral candidate had fought for changes in the City Charter to include a civilian commission charged with making policy for the Police Department and controlling it. The other candidate was the white police chief. Hysteria in the community was rising as the media featured crime, muggings and property damage. One headline screamed, "Detroit is Murder City." The message was clear. Strangers killing strangers were creating fear among city residents and hostility in the suburbs towards the city as its black population crept towards a 51% majority. Some people were calling for

more and more police and "untying their hands;" still others were campaigning against the police and for black control of the city.

As a candidate for City Council, I defined as public safety campaign issues the need for the City Council to: (1) Free police officers for crime fighting by filling more jobs with civilians; and (2) Assure the training of police to deal with domestic violence and social conflict so that we could reduce the injuries and death to officers, as well as to the citizens at large.

My position was strengthened by my high vote in November, 1973, when I was elected fifth to a nine member City Council from a field of eighteen. Soon after being sworn in, the City Council marched at the head of a state funeral for a police officer killed in the line of duty in a social conflict situation. (The emotional impact was incredible--the dirge, the lines of silent officers, the crowds along the parade route, the rifle salute--the tightness of officers and their families as they rallied to the widow, who was herself, in police training.) On June 12, 1974, the City Council adopted my resolution establishing a task force to investigate the issues of social conflict and how to help reduce police injuries. The resolution pointed out that in Detroit in 1972, 50.3%, or 388 homicides, were social conflict crimes arising from an argument or a conflict between people who knew each other. In 1974, 50.6% of the homicides were between people who knew each other--spouses, friends and neighbors.<sup>6</sup>

The police are involved in these situations because they are the most easily available through a phone call, and come quickly if ordered to do so. The officer handles the violence because she/he has the authority--the uniform and the badge. The police have become the twenty-four hour service agency--the last resort. Patrick Murphy, Director of the Police Foundation, has publicly stated that such problems occupy a major proportion of police officers' time--they are not so trained, and should be.<sup>7</sup>

The resolution instructed the task force to report to the Council and the

Mayor within three months with recommendations: (1) How to deal with the crisis situations; and (2) Curriculum and implementation proposals to institute such training for Detroit Police Officers. The task force, by resolution, was to be composed of representatives from a number of organizations and agencies, including Family Service, N.A.S.W., A.B.S.W., community counseling and mental health coordinating agencies, the Detroit Police Department and their chaplain's corps. The task force would also include three people named by the Mayor and the Police Commission.<sup>8</sup>

By asking the Mayor and the Police Commission to name three people, I hoped to avoid turf problems; also, we could lend credibility to the Committee, for the new Mayor would, hopefully, feel involved and the community at large would not think that the Council and the Mayor were at odds.

A diverse group of professionals who relate to family conflict problems had to be involved to avoid leaving the project to the Police Department traditionalists or those advocating one particular method or another; for example, the disciples of the peer group counseling model. In Detroit, as well as elsewhere, that model is based on the idea that one does not need professional training to deal with human relationship problems; one needs to be a "peer" with a loving, caring heart; hence, untrained women were running rape crisis counseling lines without professional consultation. (By 1975, such crisis lines were applying for money to hire professionals because the problems called for more skills and training than the volunteer had.)

The lack of mutual understanding of roles between the social work professional and the police also had to be addressed. I was convinced that if we had social work professionals involved from the beginning, the services developed would be better. We could also cut down on some of the artificial barriers between the two professions.

However, some social workers had serious doubts about the project: Would a change from traditional social agency practices improve the situation? Would social workers lose their identity and begin to emulate police officers? What would be the physical dangers?

Traditional police work has been viewed as the pursuit of criminals and performance of patrol duties. Intervening in social conflict disputes is often seen as social work and as a less desirable assignment for the police officer. However, many police officers, as well as the public, are intrigued with T.V. "Baretta," "Starsky and Hutch" activity, while they admit that "Barney Miller" of T.V. fame is closer to reality. At the same time, many social workers see their role as one of offering therapy in traditional office settings. Psychiatrists or social workers have not traditionally worked with the police, so several psychologists began to develop crisis intervention programs designed for police work. In the meantime, officers on Detroit's streets wanted to get the family-trouble runs off their backs. Hence, the programs were often ignored and victims told that the problem was civil matter. "Sorry, lady, there's nothing we can do."

The idea of a task force was new for the Detroit City Council. Although it met every day of the year in Committee of the Whole, sub-committees were prohibited by the charter from 1918 to 1974. Some members of the Council were reluctant to establish committees or task forces, for they felt it would then be impossible for members to know everything going on. Some thought it would reduce the power of the President (many wanted the position). It seemed wise to make this a task force with a time limit and since it was a first, have someone, other than a Council Member, chair it. A priest, who was a trained community social worker was asked to serve as chairperson in hopes that this would reduce turf problems. He would

also do better, I believed, with the "macho" Police Department since his gender and priestly identification would help with the police chief.

Approximately four months before the Social Conflict Task Force was appointed, I put together a special task force jointly with the Mayor and women's groups to develop a special service for rape victims. This culminated in an agency in the Police Department financed by City government employing trained social workers located at city hospital to work with victims and their significant others. The first stage for both task forces was one of defining the problem, accumulating knowledge, and involving community agencies, police, government, and significant sectors of the public, especially women, in working together to seek a solution. In addition, my aim throughout was to prevent the issues from becoming the property of any one element of what I believed to be a shared organizational responsibility.

The Police Department in the meantime was in the midst of a massive reorganization. Its chief, a former F.B.I. agent and mayoral appointee, was not accepted by old line officers; many were unhappy and on edge with the new mayor, who had stated publicly that affirmative action in the Department (50/50 black and white) was his first priority. He meant to break the power of the police union--pushing black officers to the top while increasing the number of black officers. The police force in 1974 was one-fifth black, while the city itself was 50% black. As the first black mayor in Detroit, he apparently felt it was imperative that he be in command and that he take every opportunity to make it known that he was the boss and would brook no interference. He regarded the two task forces as relatively unimportant and non-threatening, as indicated by his appointments. However, they could become one at any time.

In assessing the forces to be dealt with in order to set objectives, it became known that one command officer in the Police Department had researched

domestic violence, culminating in a doctoral dissertation on the emergency police phone system. His findings highlighted the lack of crisis intervention training for the operators and the low priority given to domestic violence.<sup>8</sup> He was, and is, regarded by police officers, black and white, as fair, tough and a true police professional. The Chief refused to appoint him to the Social Conflict Task Force; instead, intimating that he was being investigated by the F.B.I. because of criminal contacts. Therefore, the police officers appointed to the Committee included one assigned to the Criminal Justice Institute (the local police academy) and another officer in the headquarters command who was held in low esteem by the Chief.

The Criminal Justice Institute was trying to carve its own niche in police work in Detroit. The officers in charge were from outside the city and the local system and, therefore, had little credibility in some levels of the Police Department.

The Department, as mentioned earlier, was reeling from a variety of attacks. The appointments to the Task Force reflected the Mayoral priority on this activity. The only hope we had was to use the Task Force to develop some base and understanding in the Police Department, in social agencies and in the community and to develop a model for successful coping as preparation for later program development.

The Task Force examined crisis intervention programs conducted by Police Departments and other law enforcement agencies for their training techniques, their effectiveness and referral mechanisms, plus the availability of social services.

In 1974, most of the published work in this field had been done by psychologists. However, I believed that social work was better prepared to deal with the problems because social work is a practice profession with skills in assessing needs, including community needs, social relationships, and making essential referrals, as well as counseling. The two major training packages had been developed by Morton Bard from the Psychology Department of City College of New York and Schwartz and Leibman, psychologists from San Francisco. The Bard model placed emphasis on teaching officers techniques for defusing conflict and for referring people to



agencies.<sup>9</sup> Initially, this package was designed for special units in Police Departments. The only problem was that such police units tended to become "elitists;" the other officers often arrived at the scene before the special unit did and performed the difficult and sensitive parts of the assignment. When there were problems with funding, special units were the most likely to be eliminated. The Schwartz-Leibman approach used in the California Bay area also placed the emphasis on defusing conflict. This approach trained all police officers. However, the relationship with social service agencies was limited to making referrals and the development of pocket size referral books for officers. The police tested out whether or not the agency was receptive to police referrals and if people were taken care of.<sup>10</sup> Such referral mechanisms seemed to be afterthoughts. Both of the models had sexist overtones in how they viewed women victims of violence and were built on the knowledge of the "macho" emphasis in police training.

A Task Force team, including representatives from the Detroit Police Department and Criminal Justice Institute and I, conducted on-site research in California with police departments using the Schwartz model. The visit served to convert some of the police officers and gave me additional facts regarding links needed to community agencies and information on the experience of community agencies in such situations. For example, experience in Oakland, California, indicated that once a situation was defused, 75% of the people could wait until Monday morning. The peak for conflict is weekends and paydays. Most families successfully referred needed from one to three interviews and only 5% became long-term clients.<sup>11</sup> Extensive consultation was held with the Police Foundation in Washington, D.C. One member of the Task Force attended an F.B.I. seminar on social conflict in Virginia. Others attended a regional L.E.A.A. (Law Enforcement Assistance Agency) conference in Chicago.

During this period in Detroit, very low priority was given to "domestic calls" on "911," the emergency line. People soon caught on that calls describing family

problems engendered slow response and callers began claiming there was "a man with a gun," making the call a number 1 or 2 priority, therefore getting a quick police response.

The Detroit Police Department General Orders in 1974 described social conflict situations as civil matters and not as a police responsibility. Several reasons were given for this point of view: (1) The volume of service demands for emergencies involving immediate physical danger and crimes in progress appeared to overload the Police Department; (2) The lack of specific training for police for mediating social conflicts; and (3) The current service award system which emphasize arrests and convictions. In the meantime, an estimated 25% to 30% of the calls per week to the 911 number in Detroit were in the social conflict category.

The Detroit Police recruit received a total of seven hours of lecture-type training in topics related to social conflict situations, a three hour lecture in domestic complaint and four hours of lecture in handling abnormal persons, a tiny portion of the six month training.

In October of 1974, the Social Conflict Task Force reported to the Detroit City Council and the Mayor problems in many areas: (1) The law, i.e., there was no way legally to force separation or to evict the violent person from the situation; (2) The police did not treat domestic conflict or social conflict situations involving people who knew each other as being a crime with the same seriousness as if between strangers. This was particularly noteworthy in instances of violence between husband and wife; (3) The lack of contact between social agencies and the Police Department and misunderstanding of each other's role. Social agencies offered some evening hours and some limited shelters for people who needed a place to spend the night. There was not enough, and what was available was often not made sufficiently known to the individual police officers. In some communities, including Detroit, there were twenty-four hour mental health clinics, but these are for psychiatric emergencies, not relationship problems, such as family conflict.

There was the additional problem of the social agencies who have not had blocks of time available for walk-in clients caught in a conflict situation. With few exceptions, agencies have had waiting lists for services. Two friends threatening to shoot each other don't need to be told to get at the end of the waiting list.

The Task Force recommended that the police make a direct referral to an agency after defusing the conflict. (4) The "911" priority list, which placed property crimes and crimes involving a weapon higher than family calls, was criticized and the Department urged to raise such calls to the top of the list. An example of the calls that came to 911 to which the operator could not send a car in 1974 was as follows: A 15-year old girl called, screaming that her mother was hitting her and beating her up. She cried that she was frightened that her mother would kill her. The operator said that this was not a police matter and hung up. In turn, the police complained that when the calls came in at midnight Friday or 2:00 a.m. Sunday from a family involved in physical violence, the social worker and the social work agency services were not available.

After study and discussion, the Task Force made five major training recommendations: (1) The need for a 40-hour crisis intervention training program for all officers rather than for special units; (2) A community resource referral system; (3) Social agencies to set aside blocks of time and have extended hours, in order to reach those calling the Police Department; (4) Changes in the police priority system and allocation of personnel, giving a higher priority to family calls, re-evaluating the training offered to 911 operators to include basic interviewing skills and crisis intervention skills; and (5) A service award system for officers that recognizes their abilities to defuse volatile situations without injury to themselves and others instead of placing a priority on arrests and convictions.<sup>12</sup>

During this period, I had co-chaired with an aide of the Mayor, the committee that researched the needs of victims of rape. My staff and I sketched the purpose, function and structure of the service and wrote the proposal with the

Police Department--obtaining an L.E.A.A. grant for the city to establish a rape counseling center which was eventually financed from regular city funds. Victims of rape also had problems because of the police priority system, which gave "rape just committed" priority below a bunco game in the alley. Our success with the Rape Counseling Center and pressure on the 911 system through public hearings, etc., resulted in priority system changes and also obtained wider community support for solutions to family violence/police problems. It also built credibility for my activities, which could lead to increased influence with the police in improving the handling of social conflict.

When the Social Conflict Task Force Report was completed in November 1974, I used my elected position and consequent proximity to the press to obtain media coverage. I also presented the report to the Police Commission at a public meeting. Several Commissioners believed in what we were trying to do. Others thought it a minor matter. The Chief said nothing could happen until social work agencies were available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. He was unwilling to consider employing social workers in the Police Department unless they were uniformed officers and, if they were uniformed officers, he was not willing to give them the assignment of working with domestic violence.

Other obstacles included the Mayor's continuing low priority for this project. It seemed obvious that we weren't going to get very far without better cooperation from the top of the Police Department. Therefore, the strategy became one of keeping the issue alive through contacts with the Chief, and the Mayor and involving other community groups, including women's groups. For example, when we went to the Police Commission, we rounded up committee members as well as others who would be present as a show of support. The chairperson of the Task Force organized an N.A.S.W. Committee on social conflict. Both of us continued to talk to the police, the police unions, and he to the police chaplain corps.

In order to deal with the obstacles, we continued to work actively on the

issue of 911 priorities, talking with professionals, and agencies, about the necessity of closer work between social agencies and the Police Department.

We continued to work with the National Organization of Women, and other community groups to keep the pressure on.

In this case, outside issues were useful in achieving our objectives. The Chief over-reached himself in an internal dispute within the Department and was fired. A new Police Chief was appointed. The Deputy Executive Chief position was filled temporarily by the man who had become the expert within the Department on the issue of social conflict calls. However, his position was interim for several months; we could talk, but I didn't feel it was wise to try to put him on the spot by pushing this or any other program until his position became a permanent one.

Until the shift in command in the Police Department, the Criminal Justice Institute had the officers most interested in this project. They'd invited Schwartz and Liebman to do a demonstration course one week in length. It was obvious that Bard, Schwartz and Liebman were wedded to defusion but not to the close working relationship with the community and the social service agencies that I believed essential for truly resolving the problem and reducing recidivism.

In the meantime, the Criminal Justice Institute was closed as a part of the internal police and criminal justice politics and the Detroit depression of 75-76 when every department, including the police, took a 20% budget cut. There would be no police to train for at least six months. It appeared the project was dead.

Working on the philosophy of bringing people into the same room, using the power of my position to get a meeting of the minds, and to break through the stalemate in the process, I held a meeting in my office on November 15, 1976, - regarding social conflict calls. I invited the Deputy Executive Chief of the Police Department, the United Community Services representative, the priest who

had been chair of the Task Force, the two area directors of Family Service Society of Detroit and Wayne County and a representative of N.A.S.W. Discussion at this meeting identified the two major areas of unmet needs: (1) Emergency shelters to house and protect adults and children in danger as a result of family trouble, and (2) Professional counseling. Family Service responded with a specific proposal--A proposal designated later as the "Police Referral Project of Family Services of Detroit and Wayne County;" it eventually became the Family Trouble Clinic.

Family Services' willingness to engage in this project was partly as a response to community pressure and N.A.S.W. involvement; the Police Commander's speech at an N.A.S.W. meeting on the issue of "Family Violence and the Police" interested many social workers in the problem.

The project was conceived as a three-month pilot effort, with Family Service providing and financing a social worker located in the precinct station on Friday and/or Saturday evenings from 8:00 p.m. until 12:00 midnight to provide immediate service to clients during what was understood to be the peak of domestic violence incidents. In addition, one or two visits to the precinct during the week were planned to facilitate, coordinate and direct referrals to Family Services. Moreover, with the goal of serving families in need, several results were anticipated which became objectives: (1) To demonstrate that referrals are expedited by precinct-based activities; (2) To make social services better known to more police officers; (3) To give professional staff better insight into the problems police officers have in domestic relations calls and to give police officers a better understanding of the services offered so that a mutual appreciation of the complexities of both assignments would be developed; (4) To serve as a pilot project for one part of the recommendation of night service for family counseling.

The proposal remained on paper for several months. Finally, I discovered that the Executive Deputy Chief had not seen the proposal, so I forwarded another copy to him. I then called him several times and he finally agreed it was worth

pursuing. At a brief meeting March 16, 1977, project acceptance and location was confirmed and final arrangements made. The police precinct was chosen because the commander volunteered. In addition, it was close to an existing Family Service Agency office. The precinct is the largest in the city with a racial and economic cross-section of citizens. At each step in the process, as the responsibility for the development and implementation of the project shifted between various forces, I used my position to focus attention on the next step and keep the project moving toward the goal. Obstacles were confronted, emotions defused and problems solved as the project moved forward.

Family Service began its pilot project by assigning a mature social worker as well as a younger social worker. An early problem arose when the acting commander supported a mayoral candidate in opposition to the incumbent mayor. However, the officers working with the project were convinced of its importance and value, and the social workers were so pleased with their work, that all became supportive of the project. Both sides said they had begun to appreciate each other. Thus, in the end, the project survived the internal politics of the Police Department and electoral politics.

An Ad Hoc Committee of Family Service followed the project developments, as well as relating to the Police Department. The experience of the test program showed (1) social workers and the police were received differently by the families, (2) all direct referrals resulted in crisis counseling service to the client within three hours of the complaint, (3) some follow-up counseling occurred in 89% of all situations where families had such immediate and direct contact with the social worker, (4) in all situations there was some contact with social workers, (5) the new referrals generated would have doubled the agency's total annual intake if the rate of referral was projected to other police precincts, (6) 99% of the persons had not gone to an agency before, (7) police officers were very concerned about the problem of domestic violence, but most felt helpless and powerless,

(8) the police are perceived as the authority in the community that can force cessation--but they cannot keep people apart. In some situations the wife would the next day, for a variety of reasons, say she wanted the abuser home. Social workers know and deal with the dynamics of relationships, the police officer with cessation of the trouble. Now the police officer had something to say--to recommend after stopping the hostile actions, (9) most disputants lacked communication skills, were not used to talking about feelings (there are also problems when only one of the two partners is verbal).

When the project was completed, we released the information that there would be a report to the commission. A newspaper reporter called me on a Sunday afternoon. As a result, we received a first-page headline Monday morning. The report was presented to the Police Commission with two resolutions: (1) That the commission approach the local community chest agency and the planning agency for the money to make the work in the one precinct permanent and expand it to another precinct; and (2) To instruct the police department to work with Family Service to prepare a proposal to get funding for Family Service in all the precincts.

We were fortunate that the writer of the newspaper article contacted a police sergeant who had worked with Family Services. That police sergeant was very pleased and praised the project, broadening the public support.

Time, place and situation influence process and strategy. As a result of the report of Family Service, plus a National Organization of Women National Conference in Detroit on domestic violence that received extensive media coverage, the Police Commission set up a task force on social conflict. A woman police commissioner is the chairperson; I am the vice chair. Part of my function is to keep the project focussed and coordinate community interest to keep the police from having to get into major battles with all kinds of groups in the community who want to latch on to a hot topic.



For example, after the Police Commission task force was formed, a local feminist wrote a proposal for crisis intervention training for the police, focusing on one person (with sociological research expertise) supervising a sergeant serving as a counselor-aide, to develop a program within two months to train police officers in defusion. The researcher planned to develop a referral manual. The focus was on the victim without real consideration of the problems of the police officer. No mention was made of the training the police were doing or of any contacts with other training programs. They did their political homework, manipulating, maneuvering and taking advantage of internecine rivalry in the department in order to obtain an L.E.A.A. grant over the objections of the Task Force. The grant was re-written.

The process continues as other groups have gone to the Police Commission to demand some changes in police procedures. Some representatives of these groups were made members of the commission's Social Conflict Task Force.

During the re-election campaign in '77, I built my campaign presentation on the theme "Promises Made and Promises Kept." One of the promises made in '73 had been to do something about domestic violence. The promise had been kept because of the special project which had demonstrated that help could be given to families and to police officers, and as a result, some lessening of domestic violence recidivism.

Now there was a need to spread this throughout the city. In November of '77, the local planning agency gave money to Family Service to continue in the 16th precinct and expand to the 10th. Family Service continued its work in the 16th in the interim. There is evidence that cases are diverted to Family Service and recidivism in calls to the police has been reduced. They also report that 18 to 23 year olds are abusing their parents as a result of violence against them in their early years, documenting the necessity for a protective service for older people. Experience also led to the Task Force agreeing on the need for

therapy as a condition of probation for some. Certainly we believe the project documents the overwhelming need for money for more social workers.

We could not have achieved what we did if there had not been support inside the Police Department, as well as considerable support on the outside. Confrontation was avoided, for police support was necessary; the changing climate in this nation in relation to women contributed immensely. Outside support, combined with the Mayor's own low priority for human services but recognition of my expertise in this area, kept us from being seen as too great a threat. In addition, the amount of money we talked about initially was small. We involved other sources of funding while we built up public police acceptance of the idea for a different kind of training for the Police Department. The Police Department benefited through positive publicity re their eagerness to find solutions to help people. In the meantime, the Criminal Justice Institute has resumed training and continues to use some of the material that was prepared as a result of the studies of the Social Conflict Task Force. Existing structures were used to accomplish a small project to insure success.

The Police Commission Social Conflict Task Force will continue to meet and struggle, for we do not yet have the project in every precinct nor every officer trained. The Police Chaplains Corps had an M.S.W. social worker within the Police Department who has now been employed as the coordinator for the Chief of the variety of service programs that the Police Department is involved in or connected with. She is not a uniformed officer so she is not totally accepted. Police Department general orders have been changed requiring domestic violence be treated as is violence between any persons.

In the meantime, the public mood has begun to change in Detroit toward crime. More people are employed, with a decrease in crime. The women's movement has highlighted the problem of domestic violence. More is written about it and the press is more favorable. Bills have been passed in the state legislature to

provide funding for shelters for battered wives.

Given the forces we had to work with, the strategy did not include picket lines and mass demonstrations. It did include a great deal of individual assessment, persuasion, expert information and documentation, lobbying, and the implied pressure of budget power (particularly the power to hold up contracts), as well as the ability to create publicity. Certainly there was the proven value of coordinating various forces.

The Police Department itself, recognizing the checks and balance system, and the sharing of power in government, has expert politicians within its ranks.

A word about conviction and assertiveness: In our City Council, where the members are elected simultaneously and at large, there is a natural competition for constituency and for votes. There is also a tacit agreement that if you successfully stake out an issue as of special concern to you, are firm and assertive, others will not seriously interfere with your leadership on that issue.

Social workers are trained to analyze complexity and see all sides, both our greatest gift and liability. If we're not careful in the face of the complexities, we can be unable to make a decision. The police personality is essentially a "masculine" one. They are trained to be decisive, to be in command, to give short, quick answers, i.e., to book the person or not. Social workers as a whole, and agencies, need to understand that if they have an idea for a solution to a problem and the professional expertise to do so, they must be prepared to fight to get the problem solved in a professional way. Social workers sometimes take the position that let the best program win, and so do not fight for their proposals, which would assure social work services. Others will become attracted by the idea and want a piece of the action or want to take over for personal gain as the idea becomes popular. They will try to take it and tailor it to their own purposes.

It is clear from my example that there has been some change in the police attitudes toward social workers, and social workers changed their attitudes toward the police. It is important that in the end social workers commit themselves to engage in action for the client's benefit, and for equitable treatment including availability of services.

The solution to a problem on a limited scale creates new demands. As the service worked, the police made more referrals, "satisfied customers" called the Family Trouble Clinic instead of the police; others called the Clinic directly as a result of the publicity. Those who returned seem to want longer-term counseling. Now the agency is in crisis. It needs more workers and money. They are so overloaded they have trouble following up on calls and most counseling is now via telephone. The solution to one problem created new ones. The agency is now reviewing cases with the involved officers in small groups and reports this as a most satisfactory training method. Through this method, teams of social workers and police can be established. Another unresolved problem is how to become a part of the police communications system so the social worker can be in on the case when the call is first made to the police. The agency also needs time to analyse the results of one year's work, in order to develop a planful approach for the future. It's the age-old problem of building in monitoring and evaluation mechanisms. The problem is that sometimes there is no time to plan for all eventualities if one is to seize the opportunity. Therefore, one must be prepared to take risks.

The commanders say their officers are more efficient and productive with the help of the service. A long range goal may well be for social workers to be employed by the Police Department, working with the officers in the local stations. In our situation, the police were not ready for that. We have had to prove ourselves.

It is clear that the application of the scientific method of problem solving provides a valid model for developing and delivering services to a needy

population--changing social policy and creating a needed service.

The steps in the process outlined in this paper can be translated for use by other social workers elected to office, the many social workers who work with elected officials and the groups in the community who are successful in selling an issue to an elected official. The problem of domestic violence and its impact on the police as well as the families was identified and then further defined through the use of a Task Force to gather information and bring various forces in the community together. At each step in the process, strategies were developed to continue the forward movement of the project. When some forces threatened to sidetrack the project, other routes were found, and counterforces developed. Most importantly, throughout this long process, the goal was kept in focus and the pressure was continued.

The old maxim that change is slow is reaffirmed by the process which we followed in Detroit. Perhaps then, the goal once reached is even sweeter-- services for families in need.