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To: Mr. Marks, Director
Mrs. Brown, Research Director

Date: March 10, 1967

From: James Boudouris

Subject: The Kercheval - Pennsylvania Incident, August 1966

The attached report represents information obtained from police records, interviews with citizens, and interviews with members of the top command of the Detroit Police Department, and a review of the relevant literature regarding collective behavior and riots.

This report was made possible through the cooperation of many individuals and agencies.

All Detroit Police Department information relating to the Kercheval - Pennsylvania incident was made available to me through the approval of Police Commissioner Ray Girardin. My contacts with the police department were coordinated and police records were made available to me through the assistance of Mr. Hubert Locke, administrative assistant to the Commissioner. Valuable insights and information relating to the incident were provided through conversations with Deputy Superintendent Nichols, former Chief of Detectives Piersante, TMU District Inspector Bertoni, Eastern District Inspector Sage, Motor Traffic Bureau District Inspector Donlgy, and Inspector Rozman of Precinct #5. The officers of the Central Youth Bureau, and the Youth Bureau officers of Precincts 5, 7, and 15; Detective Tines, formerly of the Youth Bureau of Precinct #5; and Officer Marushia of the DPD Record Bureau were all helpful. An attempt to gain some understanding into police - community interaction was made possible through the cooperation of the police cruiser crews of Precincts 1, 2, 5, 7, and 10, and the Tactical Mobile Unit and the inspectors in charge who permitted me to ride with the officers.

The director of the Southeast Community Action Center (Mayor's Committee for Total Action Against Poverty), Mr. Al Frierson, volunteered his assistance and the employment of three TAAP employees for the initial stages of interviewing: Mrs. DeEssie Liggins and Mrs. Alberta Whitlow carried out 26 of the 73 interviews with residents of the Kercheval - Pennsylvania area. The Detroit Commission on Community Relations staff assisted in supplying me with relevant data. I also benefitted from the many years of experience of Principal Charles Doan of the A.L. Holmes School.

And equally important, were the residents of the Kercheval - Pennsylvania area who readily permitted us to enter their homes and patiently and candidly cooperated with us on the interviews.

DETROIT COMMISSION ON COMMUNITY RELATIONS

The Kercheval - Pennsylvania Incident
August, 1966

By James Boudouris
March, 1967

This report is an attempt to analyse the events of the week of August 9, 1966 in the area of the Kercheval - Pennsylvania intersection on Detroit's East side (see Enclosure 1). It is an attempt to analyse as objectively as possible these events, rather than fix blame, and to understand what contributed to this incident, as well as what kept it from mushrooming into a major riot such as Chicago, the Watts area in Los Angeles, and the Hough area in Cleveland have experienced in recent years.

This report relies on the theoretical framework of Neil J. Smelser's Theory of Collective Behavior (New York: The Free Press, 1962) without attempting a critique of that work. Smelser stresses, at one point, the "scapegoating" that frequently follows various kinds of collective behavior and this was noted following the Kercheval - Pennsylvania incident. The tendency was for some leaders to point at the Department of Parks and Recreation for a lack of recreation facilities in the area; others blamed the lack of jobs or adequate housing; members of the Afro-American Unity Movement blamed the American system and the Detroit Police Department; the people in the area accused instigators in the neighborhood; while the following appeared on the editorial page of the Negro weekly, "The Michigan Chronicle" (August 20, 1966):

"This is an Indictment of the Mayor, Police, CCR, TAAP, and Society".

Although this report touches on a wide range of subjects, the intention, at least, is to avoid indictments, while the facts are unavoidable collected from a frame of reference that I have tried to vary by talking to various segments of the community.

In this report I will avoid the term "riot" because of the legal implications and because the events are not considered of such severity to warrant the term, although this is an arbitrary, literary choice. The "incident" has been referred to as a melee, rampage, riot, disturbance, episode, and in this theoretical framework, an outburst of hostility.

In a legal sense, the State of Michigan Penal Code (Chapter 286a) defines a riot as 30 or more persons, whether armed or not, who are "unlawfully, riotously or tumultuously" assembled (28.789, Michigan Statutes, 1954).

According to Webster's 3rd International Dictionary, a riot is "an assemblage of three or more persons in a public place for the purpose of accomplishing by concerted action and in a turbulent and disorderly manner a common purpose irrespective of the lawfulness of the purpose".

The definition is relevant legally because 8 of the participants are awaiting trial for their part in this disturbance and were charged with "inciting to riot" but the question was raised that if a riot did not take place, could the defendants be so charged? Wayne Circuit Judge George Bowles ruled that they could be so charged

on February 1, 1967.

If by "riot" we consider the social (or extensional) definition by comparing the Kercheval - Pennsylvania episode with the "Watts", "Hough", or 1943 Detroit riot, this cannot be called a riot. No shots were fired by police officers, no one was killed, there was no widespread looting, no teargas was used.

The Events:

My description of what took place begins with an account made to me by a resident of the neighborhood that seems to me reliable enough to be included here, but since it has not been verified, must be considered a "rumor". The informant said that in the barbershop on Monday, August 8, 1966 a discussion took place regarding police officers telling a group of loiterers standing on the corner of Kercheval and Parkside to disperse that evening. It was decided that on the following evening, Tuesday, August 9th, the loiterers would not move when ordered to do so by the police, and that would signal the start of the riot. The barber is said to have cautioned the men that a riot was serious business and that there might be a better way to deal with this conflict. But it was felt that the police didn't have the right to chase guys off their neighborhood street corners when they weren't doing anything, except "hanging around".

According to the City of Detroit ordinance (section 58-1-10; p. 1052):

"It shall be unlawful for any person to loiter on any street, sidewalk, overpass or public place. For the purpose of this article, loitering is defined as the act of standing or idling in or about any street, sidewalk, overpass or public place so as to hinder or impede or tend to hinder or impede the passage of pedestrians or vehicles."

The following evening, Tuesday, August 9th, seven men were standing on the corner of Kercheval and Pennsylvania at a time somewhere around 8:00 p.m. The official police reports say 8:25 p.m., but the time is placed earlier than that by the injury of a man at about 8:10 p.m.

The initial contact was between the police cruiser of precinct #5 and the loiterers. Cruisers are known throughout the city as the "Big Four" and are manned by 3 plainclothes officers and a driver in uniform. One cruiser is assigned to each precinct in high crime rate areas, and their function is to investigate the more serious offenses and to patrol the entire precinct. This particular cruiser had been awarded a commendation by the 5th Precinct Citizens-Police Committee earlier in the year for their good police work.

The cruiser told the seven loiterers to "move on"; four of the men moved half a block down the street. The men who remained were Wilbert McClendon, 26, Clarence Reed, 32, and James Roberts, 24, (alias James Robert, James Robertson, Edward ("ED") James Caver). The three men are reported to be members of the Afro-American Unity Movement with headquarters a couple blocks west of the intersection at 9211 Kercheval. McClendon said to the cruiser, "What for?" The cruiser, on the other side of the street, turned around and asked the men for their identification. The police report says the men refused to show their ID, while McClendon stated at fund-raising meeting at the Central Methodist Church on August 19th that all he had done was not move fast enough, while admitting, on the same occasion, that he had received 7 previous loitering violations. The men are reported to have yelled "Whitey is going to kill us", and "This is the start of the riot" as the officers attempted to arrest them. The cruiser radioed for assistance, and a scout car, a sergeants' car, and two Tactical Mobile Unit cars responded to the scene. In the ensuing scuffle, Reed, in possession of a

knife, suffered a laceration to the head and a bloody nose, and two of the TMU officers received minor cuts.

A crowd of approximately 100 people had by this time gathered at the intersection. Knowing that on a hot summer night police cars alone attract onlookers, the police left the area. At about this time, Arthur Waszewski, 44, an employee of the Whittier Hotel, 5-10 minutes after leaving his job at 8:00 p.m., was forced to stop his car at Kercheval and Pennsylvania because of the traffic and pedestrian congestion. As he sat in his car a bottle was hurled through the open window of his car, severely cutting his ear. The victim reports seeing no police cars in the area at this time and so turned his car around and returned to the hotel and from there was taken to Doctors Hospital. This incident was not reported to the police department until the following day.

At about 9:00 p.m. at the same intersection another caucasian male, Albert Gibbs, 41, got out of his car as it was being stoned, and received a 4" laceration and had several teeth knocked out.

The subsequent events are graphically summarized on the chronology (Chart I). The events following the loitering arrests, according to reports made to the police department that evening or the following day, included 37 incidents of rocks damaging automobiles being driven through the area on Tuesday night. Following this, the targets of bricks and concrete were shop windows in the area, primarily along Kercheval Avenue, and police cars. Certain events are not recorded in police records or shown on the chart. These are the heckling and name-calling by the crowd as the police were called back into the area when the disorder became more pronounced, and bottles that were being broken on the pavement. Thirteen persons were injured, none seriously, including 4 police officers. The period of the Kercheval - Pennsylvania disturbance can be said to have started with the initial loitering arrests on Tuesday, August 9, 1966 and extend to Monday morning, August 15, when the police department returned to normal duty.

Inspection of the upper part of Chart I, "offenses", indicates the most common offenses related to this incident were rocks thrown at automobiles (n=73), including police cars, at businesses (n=48), and other types of "malicious destruction of property" (MDP=36). The figures refer to occurrences, rather than individuals. For example, the chart shows 13 occurrences of "inciting to riot" (ITR), although 60 individuals were so charged on their initial contact with police officers. Warrants were obtained for 19 of these persons on this charge and others, and 8 of these are still pending trial or court decisions.

Thirty-seven cases of arson or "preparing to burn" were also reported, but most of these involved the possession of preparation of molotov cocktails without extensive fires. According to on-the-scene reports, if the "molotov cocktails" (bottles filled with gasoline and a paper wick), had been more effectively made, the damage from fires would have been more extensive. Fires were avoided (including to a TMU police car) because the firebombs didn't ignite as expected.

The Kercheval - Pennsylvania incident was not in the strict sense a "race riot" such as Detroit experienced in 1943 when the conflict was between people of different races. Instead the conflict seemed to be between a small segment of the Negro population and the white society in general, and specifically, its official representatives, the police force.

The incident was racial in that as far as I can determine all automobiles damaged during the incident were driven or owned by white citizens. Cries of "Here comes Whitey"

were the reported prelude to the stoning of a car.

It was not racial in that windows broken out of businesses were those of white and Negro proprietors, including two Negro storefront churches. As a crowd moved down Kercheval, projectiles were thrown without particular attention to what business was the target. The targets were the property (the automobiles) of white owners rather than their occupants, with a few exceptions. It was also noted that at the time of the disturbance, Negro and caucasian citizens were seen standing together and talking on street corners. The FBI report on 9 riots in 1964 also indicates that those riots were not "race riots" in the old sense.

A useful analytical framework for the presentation of this data is Smelser's Theory of Collective Behavior. Since the emphasis of this is a presentation of information rather than a theoretical critique, I have attempted to utilize Smelser's basic categories instead of dwelling on the numerous subtle complexities of the book. "Collective behavior" is seen as "a 'compressed' way of attacking problems created by strain". As examples of collective behavior, the book discusses "the panic", "the craze", "the hostile outburst", "the norm-oriented movement", and "the value-oriented movement". The Kercheval - Pennsylvania incident will be treated in context of "the hostile outburst" and within the stages of the "value-added" process that is the basis of Smelser's theoretical framework. The "value-added" process differs from the natural sequence approach in that all the determinants necessary for collective behavior may be present prior to the occurrence of the particular event, but for it to occur the determinants must be activated in a certain order. Each of the determinants are "necessary" conditions for the occurrence of collective behavior, but all of them must be activated in this sequence for a hostile outburst to occur.

I. "Structural conduciveness" includes channels provided by the social system for the airing of grievances.

II. "Structural strain" refers to conflicts or deprivations that lead to cleavages within the community.

III. "Generalized beliefs" are the ideas required to prepare or activate the participants to action.

IV. "Precipitating factors" are usually involved in triggering a particular collective behavior, in this case, the hostile outburst.

V. "Mobilization of participants for action" refers to the importance of the behavior of leaders at the time of the incident.

VI. "Social control" includes elements that are important at earlier stages of the development of the hostile outburst as well as at this particular stage.

I. Structural Conduciveness.

This determinant is the first stage in the value-added approach to the analysis of the hostile outburst.

Every effort is made in Detroit to keep the channels for the airing of grievances clear. These channels include the Detroit Commission on Community Relations, the Michigan Civil Rights Commission, and the Detroit Police Department's Citizens Complaint Bureau. The explicit position of Police Commissioner Ray Girardin is, "My door has always been open and it will remain open".

Interviews with residents: For these channels to be effective the public must be aware of them, and to partially evaluate this (as well as to determine the social characteristics and attitudes of the citizens), a random sample of 73 residents of the neighborhood (including only one non-random partial interview with an organizer of the Afro-American Unity Movement, Mr. Alvin Harrison) were interviewed in their homes with a 39-item questionnaire. The interviews were conducted from September 30, 1966 to January 26, 1967. The interviews could be completed in a minimum of about 15 minutes, but the interviews were continued as long as the respondent desired to discuss the relevant issues and in some cases lasted for two hours. It was felt that interviewers of a different race from the respondent might influence the questionnaire replies and at first, the author interviewed white respondents and 3 Negro employees from the Southeast Community Action Center (Mayor's Committee for Total Action Against Poverty) were made available by Director Al Frierson, to interview Negro respondents. Two days were spent in orienting the TAAP interviewers and two of the three interviewers accounted for 26 of the first 28 interviews with Negro respondents. For several reasons, the use of these 3 interviewers was then discontinued so that 12 interviews of the caucasian respondents and 33 interviews of Negro residents were conducted by myself. "Interviewer effect" is examined only briefly in this report, and although a conclusive decision is not possible, my impression is that all citizens answered with candor and welcomed the opportunity to be interviewed.

Prior to the interviews, letters were sent to the addresses explaining to the citizens that a forthcoming interviewer from the Detroit Commission on Community Relations would be asking for their opinions on various issues, and that this confidential information would be used "in the planning of the Commission's future work". Although the initial purpose of the interview was related to the Kercheval - Pennsylvania incident, questions directly related to the disturbance were asked in a context that did not overemphasize their importance on the questionnaire. The emphasis, if any, was placed on the hope that the interviews were a means for a city agency to determine the opinions of the ordinary citizen who frequently is not heard from. One conclusion from this study is that the survey can be a valuable means by which city government can maintain contact with the pulse of the community, but that this is desirable only insofar as city agencies will be responsive to the citizens' attitudes and feelings. The interview itself is a means of providing channels for the airing of grievances.

All members of a household were interviewed from the age of 17 years old and above. Only those questions on the interview are summarized in this report that are considered in any way relevant to this analytical framework. The intention at this time is to bring out the salient aspects of the information collected, without entering into detailed statistical analyses and cross-tabulation, although this would be useful at a future time. Comparisons have been attempted of subsamples of individuals and of sub-areas of the city, but a useful extension of this study would be the conducting of the same interview with a random sample of residents in an area such as Dexter-Twelfth

Street-Clairmont.

Of the 73 interviews, 52 households are represented. The addresses were chosen at random from the Polk City Directory from an area indicated on the enclosed map (Enclosure 1); the addresses extend in each direction from the location of the precipitating incident at the intersection of Kercheval and Pennsylvania Avenues. Of the 73 individuals, 12 are caucasian and 61 are Negro, indicating for the entire area a racial composition that is almost 84% Negro. Of the 52 households, 7 are white and 45 are Negro suggesting a racial composition by household for the area of almost 87% Negro. Some of this information is summarized on Chart V - "Interviews of Neighborhood Residents" and will be referred to in various parts of this report.

A. One of the primary functions of the Detroit Commission on Community Relations is the investigation of any sources of strain within the city in the areas of police-community relations, employment, education, neighborhood conditions, and housing.

To determine how informed the community is of the Commission, the interview began with this question:

QUESTION #1: "I'm from the Commission on Community Relations. Do you happen to know anything about the Commission?"

1. Yes 2. No

Of the people interviewed (see Chart V), 82% of the 73 respondents answered "No". Of the remaining 13 respondents, several replied that they had "heard of" the Commission but didn't know what they did. At the close of the interview, the interviewer told the citizens about the agency and left a brochure with them.

This points to the necessity of informing people of the existence of an agency, as well as its function, in order for the agency to be more effective.

B. An FBI report on riots in 9 cities in 1964, suggests that prior to the outbursts there was a decline in the number of complaints brought before the local police-citizen complaint bureaus. A comparison between total cases in 1965 and 1966 brought before the Detroit Citizens Complaint Bureau is given below:

	1965	1966
January.....	5	6
February.....	7	13
March.....	9	9
April.....	12	10
May.....	13	13
June.....	10	11
July.....	0	17
August.....	4	17
September...	21	10
October.....	8	7
November....	5	2
December....	13	3
Totals	107	118

The main differences in the comparable 3 month periods indicate that prior to the August, 1966 disturbance, the complaints were more than double the previous year's, and that following the incident the complaints were reduced to half of the comparable period in the previous year.

Although different explanations could be given for such marked differences, in

the context of the above FBI observation, it might be concluded that the increase in complaints prior to the disturbance may be one reason why the incident did not develop into a genuine riot. As citizens see the Citizens Complaint Bureau as a legitimate channel for airing grievances, they are less likely to feel that a hostile outburst is justified.

Although no detailed comparisons are available, of 91 investigations of complaints completed in 1965, 24% (n=22) were sustained or partially sustained. The figure for comparison given in the McCone Report on the Watts riot is of 412 complaints, 10% (n=42) were sustained.

C. In an attempt to compare the Kercheval - Pennsylvania area with other parts of the city, several variables were selected. The areas were delineated in the Commission on Community Relations report on Recreation Facilities, Research Report #2, September, 1966 (see Enclosure 2 for map), and in that report Kercheval - Pennsylvania area was found comparable to the Dexter - Twelfth Street area (Area E) in the number of children per recreation facility with leadership. The report recommends the employment of more recreation leaders to increase the utilization of available recreation facilities.

To determine if the Kercheval - Pennsylvania area is in an especially high crime area or a high poverty area various indexes were calculated.

Crime rates for 7 areas of the city were calculated using the total crimes for July, 1966, as well as total crimes for the entire year (Year to Date, July, 1966), but there is no difference in the ranking of the 7 areas. Crimes were calculated per 10,000 people (1960 U.S. Census), per 10,000 children 5-19 (1965 School Census), and per 1,000 families (1966 School Census).

Welfare registrations and relief caseloads were calculated for the same areas, assuming these figures to be indicators of poverty or lower economic levels. Total 1965 Welfare Registrations and January 1965 or January 1966 Relief Caseloads yield the same ranking of the 7 areas so that in the summary below not all calculations on welfare are presented.

	CRIME RATES			WELFARE
	July 1966/ 10,000 people (1960)	July 1966/ 1,000 children (1965)	July 1966/ 1,000 families (1966)	Welfare Reg. (1965)/ 1,000 families (1966)
HIGH	1) Area E - (Dexter/12th Street) 123.5	1) Area C (East of Woodward) 51.2	1) Area C (East of Woodward) 47.2	1) Area C (East of Woodward) 209.9
	2) Area B (West of Woodward) 112.3	2) Area B (West of Woodward) 47.1	2) Area B (West of Woodward) 39.1	2) Area B (West of Woodward) 152.0
	3) Area C (East of Woodward) 92.7	3) Area E (Dexter/12th St) 46.8	3) Area E (Dexter/12th St) 34.9	3) Area D (Kercheval-Penn) 140.8
	4) Area D (Kerch. Pennsylvania) 77.4	4) Area A (Delray) 25.1	4) Area D (Kerch. Pennsylvania) 27.4	4) Area E (Dexter/12th St) 102.3
	5) Area A (Delray) 65.1	5) Area D (Kerch. Pennsylvania) 24.4	5) Area A (Delray) 23.5	5) Area A (Delray) 55.0
	6) Area F (North-west Detroit) 36.8	6) Area F (North-west Detroit) 13.4	6) Area F (North-west Detroit) 12.0	6) Area F (North-west Detroit) 11.5
LOW	7) Area G (North-east Detroit) 28.0	7) Area G (North-east Detroit) 11.4	7) Area G (North-east Detroit) 8.7	7) Area G (North-east Detroit) 11.4

The above ordering of the 7 areas suggests a general correlation between crime and poverty, but not a perfect one. The reason may be that the measures are too gross, but there is also the danger of making erroneous causal imputations on the basis of such correlations. Other variables may be more relevant to crime and poverty than these

variables are to each other. As examples, the areas also differ in age composition, family structure, proportion of broken homes, and unemployment.

The position of the Kercheval - Pennsylvania area is of particular interest here in attempting to relate the hostile outburst to crime and poverty. If crime and poverty are indicators of possible areas of disturbance, other areas would seem more likely than Kercheval - Pennsylvania, and this may be another factor in understanding why the incident didn't become more serious than it was.

D. Smelser includes in the stage of "structural conduciveness" the climatic factor. Hot summer nights bring groups of people out of their homes and onto the streets where explosive situations are more likely to erupt as people come in closer contact with each other. This is true whether it is only citizen interaction, or citizen - police interaction. The psycho-physiological effects of hot weather on people's tempers, both citizens and police officers, should also be included here.

A factor that has been mentioned for quelling the Kercheval incident was the rainfall on the second night, August 10th, which kept people indoors.

E. Another element in structural conduciveness is the general employment level of the community. At a time of high employment, as Detroit generally was experiencing in 1966, there is less likelihood of riots, it may be said. (This is subject to some doubt since riots were not as common during the depression of the 30's as they have been during the prosperity of the 60's.) If Detroit should see a period of high numbers of layoffs from the automobile industry, it might result in a community more likely to favor hostile behavior, but if the social system were responsive and effective in dealing with such a situation, this theoretical approach would indicate other social action than hostile behavior would be seen as appropriate.

F. The Kercheval - Pennsylvania area is part of the 5th precinct which has probably the most active and successful police - community relations program in the city. The monthly meeting of the 5th Precinct Citizens - Police Committee at the precinct station with Inspector Rozman, is another channel for the airing of grievances that no doubt prevented the disturbance from mobilizing the support of the community. This is discussed further in subsequent parts of this report.

II. Structural Strain.

This stage includes the conflicts that develop within a community when the channels described in the preceding stage are blocked.

A. Not all of the community take advantage of, or are aware of these channels, as seems to be the case with some of the loiterers in the neighborhood and some members of the Afro - American Unity Movement. The AAUM with its companion organization, the Afro - American Youth Movement (AAYM), was formerly known as the Adult Community Movement for Equality (ACME). The headquarters of this group is at 9211 Kercheval, two blocks from the Kercheval - Pennsylvania intersection. Even when channels are available, they may not be perceived as effective. The main complaint of these individuals against the police department focuses on the loitering ordinance cited above. The loiterers have said that their grievances to the police department have been ineffective in bringing about change.

The police department, on the other hand, explains that many of the complaints come from Negro and white residents of the area who are interfered with and harassed by the loiterers blocking the sidewalks.

The following table summarizes the loitering tickets issued for 1965 and 1966 by precinct. The numbers in parentheses refer to the precincts' order in number of tickets issued:

Precinct	Adult tickets issued		Juvenile tickets issued	
	1965	1966	1965	1966
1	59 (9)	48 (10)	4 (13)	9 (13)
2	205 (2)	172 (2)	279 (2)	308 (1)
4	79 (6)	73 (8)	82 (7)	60 (7)
5 (Ker.-Pa.)	310 (1)	33 (13)	627 (1)	30 (11)
6	66 (8)	79 (7)	43 (11)	50 (9)
7	77 (7)	55 (9)	77 (8)	82 (5)
10	114 (4)	210 (1)	180 (3)	70 (6)
11	34 (12)	93 (4)	49 (9)	26 (12)
12	93 (5)	133 (3)	93 (5)	82 (4)
13	54 (10)	91 (5)	23 (12)	58 (8)
14	59 (9)	44 (11)	89 (6)	129 (2)
15	37 (11)	42 (12)	44 (10)	42 (10)
16	172 (3)	90 (6)	143 (4)	104 (3)
Other Units	54	24	77	62
TOTALS	1413	1187	1610	1112

That precinct #5 was the highest in loitering tickets in 1965 might indicate a source of strain between those loitering violators who constitute a small portion of the Kercheval - Pennsylvania residents, and the police department. A dramatic change is noted between 1965 and 1966 in precinct #5, but apparently the loiterers were unaware of any changes.

The Afro-American Unity Movement has been invited to express their grievances at the 5th Precinct Citizens - Police Committee meetings, but apparently do not see this as an adequate means of expression. They have also been invited by the Area Advisory Committee of the SE Community Action Center to attend meetings, but seem to prefer to remain outside of the established social institutions. Of course, to participate in them would be contrary to their *raison d'etre*.

F. In an attempt to determine what residents of the community perceive as sources of strain within the city the following question was asked on the interview:

QUESTION #7: "What do you think are the main problems facing you and your family here in Detroit?"

The question was sometimes misinterpreted by the respondents (referring to personal or family problems), but with a minimum amount of clarification the following replies can be summarized. The replies are categorized by race, but the small number of white respondents prohibits detailed comparisons.

Negro respondents (17 Negro respondents gave no replies or irrelevant ones):

- 1) Police - related, 13, of which:
 - a) Crime/ law enforcement: 4
 - b) Youth problems, 5, of which,

the relation between crime and Negro youth:	2
lack of respect for authority:	1
delinquency:	1
kids without fathers:	1
 - c) Police - community relations: 4
- 2) Housing, 13, of which:
 - a) finding adequate housing for their income: 5
 - b) finding adequate housing for their children: 3
 - c) "housing", not specific: 3
 - d) high rents: 1
 - e) urban renewal relocation: 1
- 3) Financial, 9, of which:
 - a) "bills" (not specific): 4
 - b) "financial problems" (not specific): 2
 - c) insufficient income from ADC: 2
 - d) insufficient income from social security: 1
- 4) Cost-of-living: 6
- 5) Employment, 5, of which:
 - a) finding an adequate job: 2
 - b) finding a better job: 1
 - c) prospect of layoffs: 1
 - d) unemployment: 1
- 6) School dropouts: 4
- 7) Quality of education: 3
- 8) Living environment: 3
- 9) Code enforcement: 3
- 10) Discrimination: 2
- 11) Better administration of ADC: 1

- 12) Need for help from social agencies: 1
- 13) Public transportation: 1
- 14) Noise: 1
- 15) "Getting ahead": 1

White respondents:

- 1) Racial problems: 4 (includes lack of communication; trouble with Negro youths)
- 2) Crime/ law enforcement: 4
- 3) Housing: 2
- 4) Quality of education: 2
- 5) Better administration of ADC: 1
- 6) Living environment: 1
- 7) Lack of parental supervision: 1
- 8) Indolent people: 1

The importance of the functions of the police department in the community is reflected in the above attitudes, as well as throughout this report, not just in the context of riot control, but in several contexts. As indicated above, the citizens reflect a common concern in the city regarding crime and law enforcement, youth problems and their relation to crime, police - community relations, and housing problems.

It has been noted in the literature on race riots that the degree of integration of minority groups into the police departments is a factor in the structural strain contributing to the riots. The McCone report pointed out that 4% of the Los Angeles Police Department were Negro. That this may have been a factor in the Kercheval - Pennsylvania incident cannot be ignored since at that time 2% of the Detroit police were Negro. In the seven months since the disturbance, the proportion of Negro officers has risen to almost 5%.

C. In an attempt to determine possible sources of strain within the Kercheval - Pennsylvania area, the following question was asked in the interviews:

QUESTION #8: "Do you think there are any particular problems facing you and your family in this neighborhood?"

Negro respondents:

Thirty-three of the 61 replies (54%) indicated "none". A slightly greater tendency for TAAP interviewers to record "none" compared to my interviews is shown in the following summary aimed at measuring any "interviewer effects":

TAAP:	6 of 10 interviews	gave "none"	(60%)
TAAP:	9 of 16	" " "	(56%)
TAAP:	1 of 2	" " "	(50%)
J.B.:	17 of 33	" " "	(52%)

The following responses were noted:

- 1) Condition of neighborhood: 12
- 2) Crime/ law enforcement: 5
- 3) Operators of "joints": 3
- 4) Lack of recreation facilities: 3
- 5) Housing: 2
- 6) Merchants prices: 2

- 7) Rats: 1
- 8) Cost-of-living: 1
- 9) "Jealous people": 1
- 10) Poor environment for child-rearing: 1
- 11) Changing socio-economic level of the neighborhood: 1
- 12) School dropouts: 1
- 13) Street lighting: 1
- 14) Police harassment: 1
- 15) Don't know (short time in neighborhood): 3

White respondents:

- 1) Crime/ law enforcement: 4
- 2) Condition of neighborhood: 3
- 3) Changing socio-economic level of neighborhood: 2
- 4) Fear of a repetition of riot: 1
- 5) None: 5 of 12 (42%)

Although the Negro - white comparisons are difficult without a larger sample, the above confirm my subjective impression that the differences in attitudes were not racial differences. I would hypothesize that modern urban conflicts have a stronger socio-economic component than a racial one.

D. To get an indication of strains in the community resulting from discrimination as seen by the citizens, the following question was asked:

QUESTION #9: "Do you think there are any problems of discrimination in Detroit?"
(If yes) "What are they?"

Negro respondents:

- 1) Employment, 14, of which:
 - a) Hiring practices: 5
 - b) Jobs, general: 5
 - c) Preferential treatment at work: 3
 - d) Promotions: 1
- 2) Housing, 8, of which:
 - a) Housing, general: 5
 - b) Lack of open housing: 1
 - c) Rents: 1
 - d) "Changing neighborhoods": 1
- 3) Prejudice in general: 6
- 4) Education: 5
- 5) Police: 4
- 6) "Negro prejudice exists, as well as white prejudice": 3
- 7) Some restaurants and bars: 3
- 8) Downtown shops: 2
- 9) Churches: 1
- 10) YMCA social club: 1
- 11) Unions: 1
- 12) Hospitals: 1
- 13) Neighborhood barber: 1

- 14) No reply: 1
 15) Don't know: 2
 16) "No": 12 (20% of 61 interviews; this may partly be the result of a white interviewer and a Negro respondent since 9 of the 12 are from my interviews.)
 17) "Yes", but vague reply: 14

White respondents:

- 1) "Yes", but vague reply: 4
 2) "No": 3
 3) "Negro prejudice exists, as well as white prejudice": 1
 4) Hostile response to question: 1
 5) Education: 1
 6) "Changing neighborhoods": 1

E. The McCone report considered at length various facets of the educational system in Watts. Its relevance as a possible source of strain was the rationale for including three questions dealing with "racial imbalance" in schools. The questions are given below:

QUESTION #12: "Here are several questions about what is sometimes called "racial imbalance". A school is said to be racially imbalanced when more than one half of the children are Negro. Would you tell me whether you agree or disagree with each of the following statements: Here is the first".

"Racial imbalance in schools hurts the education of children".
 1. Agree 2. Disagree

The results are tabulated below with percentages given for total agree/disagree replies:

Question #12:

White respondents			Negro respondents		
No answer	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	No answer
1	4	7 (64%)	29	29 (50%)	3

QUESTION #13: "Here is the second:

"Children should always go to school in their own neighborhood, no matter what."

Do you agree or disagree with this?"

1. Agree 2. Disagree

This question is not summarized because the respondents, in their comments, seemed to interpret it in various ways, interpreting it, at times, to mean an encroachment on their freedom to send their children to private, parochial, or not-crowded schools outside of their neighborhood, if they chose to.

QUESTION #14: "Negro children should be bussed to white schools to bring about racial balance". Do you agree or disagree?

1. Agree 2. Disagree

The results are tabulated below:

Question #14:

White respondents			Negro respondents		
No answer	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	No answer
0	0	12 (100%)	17	38 (69.1%)	6

The above replies show definite racial differences in these attitudes, but the differences are not as great as might have been expected.

Although no explanation is given, it should be pointed out that 7 Negro respondents gave what seem to be contradictory responses to questions #12 and #14. They thought that racial imbalance did not hurt the education of children (disagree on question #12), but thought that Negro children should be bussed to bring about racial balance (agree on question #14).

A comparison of the Negro responses on the two questions suggests that although the respondents are equally divided on the effects of racial imbalance (as defined above), the majority of the Negro respondents (about 70%) did not favor bussing Negro children as a solution to de facto segregation in schools.

An analysis of "interviewer effect" on question #14 is presented below, (the percentages are of total agree/disagree replies):

Question #14 - Negro respondents:

	Agree	Disagree	No Answer
a. Negro interviewer	2	7 (77.8%)	1
b. Negro interviewer	7	6 (46.2%)	3
c. Negro interviewer	0	2 (100%)	0
d. White interviewer	8	23 (74.2%)	2
TOTALS	17	33 (69.1%)	6

The above table indicates that there is some unexplained bias in the responses obtained by a Negro interviewer (b.) so that the total number of Negro respondents opposed to bussing as a solution might be closer to 75%.

III. The Growth and Spread of Generalized Beliefs.

The next stage in Smelser's value-added process is the function of "generalized beliefs". These are the ideas that activate participants to action.

A. According to Smelser, this stage is, in part, characterized by the numerous rumors that precede and accompany the hostile outburst. Rumors are seen as attempts to restructure ambiguous situations, and in order to avoid the spread of rumors during the Kercheval - Pennsylvania incident a rumor - control office was established at the TAAP headquarters by Wednesday night. Citizens who had heard rumors were able to phone the office to report and check on what they had heard.

A press office at the Command Post of the police department at central headquarters was another means of supplying accurate information regarding the events to the public. However, the overenthusiasm of reporters and TV cameramen is a factor considered a possible source of exacerbation in the FBI report on riots. Some police officers feel this was a factor in amplifying the Kercheval - Pennsylvania disturbance. It was reported that some residents of the area didn't know anything was taking place along Kercheval on the first night until they heard it on the 11 o'clock news and then came out to see what was going on.

B. Smelser conceptualizes "hostility" as a type of generalized belief that involves removing some agent or object perceived as a generalized threat or obstacle. According to his conceptual framework, hostility is a product of the anxiety resulting from strain or ambiguity (discussed as part of the preceding determinants of the value-added process), and the identification of this anxiety with some responsible agent. The generalized threat in this case was, for the minority that we can consider participants, the social system, including the police department.

It should be emphasized again, that a minority in the community considered a hostile outburst as an appropriate response to structural strain. As Smelser writes, "Collective behavior is a 'compressed' way of attacking problems created by strain".... "It is the action of the impatient".

Although the mass media are also part of the later stage of "social control" the role of newspapers and other types of literature are relevant here in the encouragement of hostility as an appropriate reaction to conflict.

A newsletter titled "We, the People" was printed and distributed in 1965 by the Adult Community Movement for Equality (ACME). The July 1, 1965 issue contains a reply by Mr. Alvin Harrison to an editorial by Bishop Richard Eurich. Arguing against the doctrine of moderation and tolerance, Harrison writes:

"Speaking as a member of that race of people which has been forced to submit to the most devastating crimes ever committed, I have only to ask the good Bishop: How long, sir, do you suggest that we be patient? What is the virtue of patience when one is patient with unspeakable evil?"

An editorial in a different issue of the same newsletter at the time of the Watts riot wrote:

"This riot will be stopped, I know, and maybe it won't win what the people want. But I say it is a good riot, well-planned and well carried-out. And if there's one plan for nationwide activity....hand me my gun. For when pickets, sit-ins, stall-ins, lay-ins, letters, prayers and everything else can't express our feelings enough so that the man knows we mean business then there's no where else to turn to but violence".

In the August 20, 1966 issue of the Negro weekly, "The Michigan Chronicle", the following appeared (subsequent to the Kercheval - Pennsylvania incident):

"How can we condone Molotov cocktails? But the closer you are to facing the day to day humiliations of police who won't let you stand on your own corners when there is nowhere else to go, of shopkeepers who call you 'boy', of teachers who read newspapers in class because they think you're too dumb to learn because you're black, the closer you feel to the boy who heaves one".

The above quotations present a biased viewpoint, but nevertheless, a viewpoint which is relevant in the context of this episode. In fairness to The Chronicle it should be pointed out that the paper is characterized most of the time by more responsible journalism. The above viewpoints may not represent a majority, but only a minority is necessary for the initiation of hostile outbursts and riots. While the earlier non-violent civil right groups looked to Gandhi as their model, the more militant groups look to the Nuremburg trials for a justification of their moral right to resist an immoral system.

The answer to this threat to the social system, it seems to me, is not in outlawing deviant groups, but in examining the issues that deviant groups force the society to be confronted with. But the deviant social group serves a positive function only if its confrontation is carried out within the legal-rational bounds of the society.

IV. Precipitating Factors:

A. The FBI report on riots in 1964 points out: "Whatever the cause, in each instance there was first violent interference with the policeman on the scene, followed by the gathering of a crowd".

This was true in the Watts riot and was also true in the precipitating incident at Kercheval and Pennsylvania as is described above.

There is no evidence that the police cruiser did anything improperly or in any way different from the 3,020 other adult loitering tickets issued in 1965 and 1966, or the 2,299 loitering tickets issued to juveniles in that period.

By coincidence, in reading through the Youth Bureau records of one of the juveniles arrested during the Kercheval - Pennsylvania incident, a Youth Bureau report concerning an incident in June, 1964 describes this youth as stealing a cue ball from a bar in the same immediate area. As two men from the bar gave chase, the boy was seen by a police car who apprehended him and returned him to the bar. A large crowd had gathered as the precinct inspector and a lieutenant arrived at the scene. Quoting from the Youth Bureau contact record: "All officers stated that it looked like the whole affair could have broken out into a riot. This is the same general area where all the groups of older boys have been hanging around and having dice games going on and a lot of general destruction of private property".

In the theoretical framework of this report, we would conclude that the necessary determinants had not been activated for that incident to produce a riot. But whether the missing factors were in the category of "strain", or "mobilization",

or some other category, would be mostly speculation.

The importance of police officers dealing with crowd situations in a professional way is stressed in the Detroit Police Department's training program and was a central focus of the Detroit Police Department - Commission on Community Relations - TAAP training seminar in the Fall of 1965. This training of 1300 officers was another factor in preventing this disturbance from becoming more serious.

B. To determine the neighborhood residents' opinions on what produced the Kercheval - Pennsylvania incident the following question was asked in the interviews:

QUESTION #10: "In the beginning of August, we had a situation in the Kercheval - Pennsylvania area that we would like to understand better. What, in your opinion, produced these incidents?"

The opinions expressed by the Negro residents of the area were heterogeneous, as is the neighborhood itself. The opinions, however, can be conveniently summarized within the same analytical categories as the rest of this report.

The opinions of the Negro residents were not so different from the white residents, but they are treated separately in order to control this variable.

I. In Smelser's analytical framework the first stage leading to the "hostile outburst" is "structural conduciveness". In this category I would include the following response to question #10:

a) unemployment and inequality: 1

II. Once the social system provides the setting for the hostile outburst the next stage is that there must exist within the social system "structural strain", (conflicts, etc.). The residents referred to the following factors that are included in this category:

a) police brutality and harassment in the past: 4; of which two interviews were with arrested members of the AAUM and another is of one member's family.
b) consumer - merchant conflicts: 1

III. Next in the value-added approach is the concept of "generalized beliefs". In this category are included responses to the above strain that are considered appropriate. Does the person respond to strain by rioting or by going to the proper agencies who are authorized to deal with these conflicts? I would include here the responses of the people who did not really answer the question, but instead expressed the following kinds of disapproval of this type of collective behavior:

a) "senseless", "ignorant", "uncalled for": 6;
b) "because it was being done every place else": 2;
c) "if you could find out who was at the bottom, they should be electrocuted": 1.

Those who considered hostility a proper response to the above strain would be the individuals who were also seen by the residents of the area as involved in the precipitating incidents, and these opinions are dealt with in the next category.

This conflict between "loiterers" and the majority of the neighborhood seems to be brought before the police department in the form of complaints against loiterers. The number initiated by the residents; compared to those acted on by the police without a citizen complaint is not known. But the situation is perhaps reflected in the

exasperated comment of a detective sergeant: "You're damned if you do, and you're damned if you don't".

IV. "Precipitating incidents" include the beliefs that the following types of persons were responsible:

- a) "loiterers", "punks", "winos", "ex-cons", "dope-addicts", etc.: 13
- b) youths "with too much time on their hands" and teenagers: 6
- c) Black Nationalists, Negro segregationists: 2
- d) angry people acting-out hostility: 1
- e) "guys just having some fun": 1
- f) "I feel like they don't have enough love & understanding": 1
- g) "couple guys just trying to get smart": 1

Four respondents felt the police precipitated the incident by improperly dealing with the initial loitering incident that evening. But these four replies when examined more closely reveal the following:

- a) one respondent thought the precipitating factors to be both a "bunch of loudmouths", and also the way the police dealt with them in the initial incident;
- b) "some of citizens' right abused by tactics unbecoming an officer": 1 ;
- c) two of the four respondents were part of the immediate family of one of arrested AAUM members (mentioned in IIa, above). They felt the police dealt with the loiterers in the wrong way, but one of these respondents inaccurately stated, the police "beat a man half to death".

V. The above references to the people responsible for the precipitating factors would, in Smelser's framework, also be included under the category, "the mobilization of participants for action". Cries of "police brutality", etc., would be part of the immediate situation which helps get a hostile outburst going, even when there is no prearranged plan.

Not stressed in Smelser's approach is the influence of "outsiders" on the social system in the precipitation of violence. The police department investigated numerous rumors, but no evidence was found of this. One Negro respondent attributed the disturbance to "outsiders", while 4 white respondents felt the incident was caused by "outside agitators". These seemed to reflect unfounded rumor.

The white respondents answered in a similar way as the Negro respondents, but no detailed analysis or comparison is possible due to the small sample:

- a) outside agitators: 4
- b) lack of respect for authority: 1
- c) influence of mass media: 1
- d) Negro segregationists: 1
- e) loiterers: 1

"Don't know" accounted for 28% of the Negro and 25% of the white responses. Some "interviewer effect" on the proportion of "don't know" Negro responses is suggested by the following:

TAAP interviewer:	30%	(n=10)
"	"	: 38% (n=16)
"	"	: 50% (n=2)
J.B. :	21%	(n=33)

The influence here may be more a matter of interviewing technique and experience, than race.

The respondents' opinions regarding "social control" are dealt with later in this report.

V. Mobilization of Participants for Action.

Smelser points out that once the initial outburst has begun (the initial or "real" phase), the situation becomes structurally conducive for the expression of hostility (the "derived phase"). This underscores the importance of how the police officers respond to the initial incident.

A. In this stage, the behavior of leaders in the crowd and their ability to stir and recruit participants is important. Action may be triggered by shouts of "police brutality", "Whitey is going to kill us", or "this is the start of the riot".

It has been pointed out in studies of the Chicago and 1943 Detroit riots that there was a differential participation of the crowd or mob with an active nucleus of as few as 3 or 4 members with perhaps 150 spectators. This type of organization was noted at the time of the Kercheval - Pennsylvania incident.

B. Once the outburst has begun it tends to attract certain elements in the community, and the following section attempts to compare three groups of people: the residents of the neighborhood, the arrested adults, and the arrested juveniles. The comparisons are exploratory since comparable information is not available in all cases. The data on the residents were obtained from the interviews, the information on the arrested adults and juveniles was obtained from various police department records.

Chart II shows the age distribution of the persons arrested and dramatically illustrates the preponderance of 17 year olds.

The lower part of Chart I indicates certain characteristics of the adults and juveniles arrested, as well as the time at which they were arrested. The relatively few arrests on the first evening, Tuesday, August 9th, were the result of police department policy to avoid making any arrests except those on serious charges on the first night.

Certain patterns seem evident from the chart. Almost all of those persons arrested the first evening were adults, and 7 of these 13 had previous police records, six of them with convictions including second degree murder, breaking and entering, and armed robbery.

On the second evening, August 10th, 45 adults were arrested, 28 of them with prior police records, including 20 with previous convictions. The chart also suggests a time sequence for this evening where the older adults with prior convictions initiate the disturbance, tend to be followed by the adults without police records and older teenagers with extensive youth bureau contacts, and they are followed by the older teenagers and adults without police records. The juveniles (less than 17 years old) with and without previous police contacts don't seem to have been active according to any particular pattern.

B. Of the 21 juveniles arrested during the five nights, 19 are Negro, 2 are caucasian; Chart III indicates various social characteristics of these boys as ascertained from Youth Bureau records. Eight boys had had no previous contacts with the police department, or only one contact prior to this disturbance. The other 13 (62%) had had 4 or more contacts, with the majority having from nine to fifteen previous youth bureau contacts. The seven boys with extensive police records have, since the Kercheval - Pennsylvania disturbance, been responsible for 12 subsequent violations. Some have been confined to State or County Training Schools.

Although no statistics were assembled, an unfortunate life sequence that some of these boys seem headed for is this: trouble in school → transfer to "special schools" within the public school system → commitment to Training Schools → confinement in penal institutions → careers in crime.

A major problem seems to be to reach these boys in order to divert them from this kind of future. Youth Bureau officers with many years of experience have observed that simply building additional recreational facilities is not the answer since the boys who are most likely to get into trouble, are the ones who are least likely to be taking advantage of already existing recreational facilities. There appear to be various subcultures of boys in the community. It was noted that during the past summer the Detroit Police Department and the Neighborhood Service Organization successfully recruited boys into the Youth Service Corps, and that almost without exception these youths were not involved in the Kercheval - Pennsylvania incident. The YSC worked with police officers on various civic - police work projects and this is a positive means of socialization of youths into a constructive, rather than destructive, style of life. But even with the YSC, or similar organizations, it remains to be seen how successful they can be with the "hard-core" juvenile delinquents. The following is a speculative and exploratory attempt to identify several subcultures of youths, relating the juvenile offenders or non-offenders to certain general types of organizations.

	Anti-social/ Radical Groups	Social Groups	No Groups
Delinquents	Potential criminals; hard to reach.	Have been reached; hope for them.	Potential criminals; try to reach.
Non-delinquents	Potential delinquents; try to reach	Average guys	Non-social, non-average guys.

A renewed effort should be made to reach the potential delinquents or criminals. The Youth Service Corps is just one way, and it might be expanded to include boys with police records. When boys have been labeled uneducable by schools, uncontrollable by their families, and unrehabilitable by the authorities, their alternatives to crime are limited. In the absence of a male in their families with whom to identify and lacking a place in society, the youths might be provided better models for a self-identity than pimps with Cadillacs. Neighborhood work projects would be a means of teaching skills to youths, and at the same time, improving the neighborhoods. Neighborhood youth leaders, project directors, recreation leaders, as well as good police officers, can provide fatherless boys with models for self-identification, as well as guides to self-discipline when necessary.

C. In attempting to make certain tentative comparisons, I have utilized Chart III - Arrested Juveniles, Chart IV - Arrested Adults, and Chart V - Neighborhood Residents. My observations are more in the nature of hypothesis-generating, than conclusive, particularly in view of the lack of comparable data in some cases. Only the more salient variables are discussed below.

Employment: Comparing arrested adults (n=60) with the neighborhood residents interviewed (n=73), it seems that these arrested were more likely to be unemployed or laid-off: 25% (15) of those arrested, compared to 4% (3) of the neighborhood, were unemployed or laid-off.

Excluding the housewives from the neighborhood sample (n=51), only raises the proportion of unemployed in the neighborhood to 6% .

Of the 55 single adults and heads of households interviewed in the Kercheval - Pennsylvania area:

a) head employed:	32 (58%)
b) have two employed persons:	8 (15%)
c) head on pension, soc. sec., or both:	8 (15%)
d) head on welfare or ADC:	6 (11%)
e) alimony:	1 (2%)

The above table is an indication of the heterogeneous socio-economic characteristics of the Kercheval - Pennsylvania area. Another indication of heterogeneity is given by the distribution of income per year for households or single adults, as shown on Chart V under "Income". For 23% (13) of the 56 cases, annual incomes were not ascertained for various reasons. Of the remaining 43 cases, 33% (14) were living with incomes of less than \$3,000 which is usually considered at a level of poverty. However, the median income of all 43 cases is \$4,900 .

Marital status: This variable is so influenced by the different age distribution of the arrested adults sample and the neighborhood sample that any comparison would be misleading. The much larger proportion of single persons in the arrested adults group, is to a great extent influenced by the large number of older teenagers in this group.

But these factors, age and marital status, as well as employment, may suggest another variable --- that of having a definite role and status in the social system. A single, young, unemployed male is more easily mobilized to participate in a hostile outburst than is an older, married, employed man who has some vested interest in the social system.

Property relations: This variable was ascertained only for the neighborhood residents but is also part of the dimension of "vested interest".

The following table offers some interesting comparisons of the Negro and white households in the area of the interviews (assuming the number of white households is adequate for valid comparisons):

	TOTAL	NEGRO	WHITE
Owners/buyers	21 (40%)	13 (40%)	3 (43%)
Renters	30 (58%)	26 (58%)	4 (57%)
Owners	8 (15%)	5 (11%)	3 (43%)
Buyers	13 (25%)	13 (29%)	0 (0%)
Buyer/renters	43 (93%)	39 (87%)	4 (57%)
Not ascertained	1 (2%)	1 (2%)	0 (0%)

The owners/buyers category is included in the U.S. Census as "home-owners", and the figure is very close to the 1960 Census statistics for this area, although the Negro proportion has increased since then. In terms of owners/buyers or renters the Negro and white households are almost the same proportion. The significant difference is

in the per cent white and Negro households that are home-owners or home-buyers. This difference is what results in a significant difference between white buyers/renters compared to Negro buyers/renters. In other words, 67% of the Negro households must allocate part of their household budgets for rent or payments on homes, compared to only 57% of the white households.

This difference is a function of the age of the people, (the white respondents are older) and consequently their different stages in life. The similar proportion of whites and Negroes who are owners/buyers indicates that all things remaining equal, by the time the Negro respondents are comparable in age to the white respondents, they will be owners instead of buyers.

This summary only briefly deals with the problem of household economics; a more detailed analysis would require a consideration of the white home-owners expenditures on property taxes and property maintenance; Negro/white differentials in income, family size, rental payments, number of employed members in the family, etc. Some of these data can be obtained from the questionnaire administered, but is not part of the present report, except to point to possible sources of economic strain and cost-of-living considerations.

Whether these sources of strain are factors in the occurrence of this hostile outburst in the Kercheval - Pennsylvania area rather than somewhere else, would require the accumulation of the relevant information from other parts of the city for comparison. The relatively high proportion of owners/buyers (about 40%) may have been a decisive factor in not generating support for the disturbance from the neighborhood residents.

Family structure: The arrested juveniles come preponderantly from families with no male in the household. Twelve of nineteen boys (63%) have no male at home with whom to identify and interact and from whom to receive the proper discipline. This is especially significant when related to the "financial status" category on Chart III. If the father is divorced, separated, or deceased, and the mother or both parents are employed, the boy is very likely to receive little home supervision. The data suggest that 10 of 19 boys come from such minimal supervision homes. The information is incomplete, however, and if 5 of these boys with fathers who are separated or divorced have mothers at home on welfare they might be receiving more supervision. However, this comment from mothers and parents on the Youth Bureau records was noted frequently, "I just can't control him."

It is difficult to compare these subsamples on the basis of "family structure" because the information is incomplete, but comparing the arrested juveniles and the neighborhood residents suggests that while 63% of the arrested juveniles come from homes without a male, 33% of the children living in the neighborhood are at the time of this survey in households without a male (11 of 33 households).

Urban migrants: It has frequently been suggested in the literature that migration to the urban environment results in problems of adjustment and disorganization. Although the data between the interviews of neighborhood residents is not exactly comparable to the information from the police records on arrested persons, this factor of migration is considered here.

In terms of place of birth, 53% of the juveniles (10 of 19) were born in Detroit, compared to 49% of the arrested adults (30 of 61). The question asked on the interview of residents of the neighborhood was instead of "place of birth", "How long have you lived in the Detroit area?" In response to this question 21% of the neighborhood respondents (15 of 73) said "all my life". The difference between those arrested and

and the neighborhood residents seems the reverse of what might have been predicted, but this may be the result of lack of comparable figures.

Considering those arrested persons who were born in the South, and those neighborhood residents who were asked, "Where did you mainly grow up?" (answered by giving a Southern State), we can make the following comparisons:

arrested juveniles:	42%	(8 of 19),	born in South
arrested adults:	44%	(27 of 61),	born in South
neighborhood residents:	55%	(40 of 73),	grew up in South

According to this information, the migration from South to North was more common among neighborhood residents than among the arrested persons.

The above comparisons, perhaps because of the nature of the data and the presence of other variables, yield differences for which no conclusive interpretation will be attempted at this time.

Education: A consideration of the number of dropouts involved is not possible because of the nature of the data and the age distribution involved. Many of the 17 year olds were in the 11th grade at the time, and it is not known if they had left school or planned to return in the Fall.

The juvenile delinquents did reveal a significant number, (8 of 19 or 42%), whose last known school was some type of special school for youth with problems of learning or social adjustment.

It should also be pointed out that of 58 arrested adults, 10% (6 of 58) had had some college.

Residence: To determine what areas the arrested persons were drawn from, their home addresses were plotted on a map and are summarized on Chart I. Only about 50% of the arrested adults and juveniles live in the Kercheval - Pennsylvania area. The others are concentrated in the various areas indicated on the chart, and at least two of these areas seem to have supplied participants at specific times during the disturbance.

This is another indication that to look for the causes of the disturbance in the immediate Kercheval - Pennsylvania area may be less significant than to look for the reasons behind the lack of support for it.

VI. Social Control.

According to Smelser, this last stage, social control, involves "the institution-izing of respect for law and for orderly means of expressing grievances". It includes the manner in which force is exercised in maintaining law and order in the community.

A. The literature on the control of collective behavior, particularly riots and hostile outbursts, stresses the importance of authorities acting quickly and decisively.

That the Detroit Police Department did so was partly the result of a clearly defined set of procedures that Commissioner Girardin had prepared when he was appointed Police Commissioner. "Plan A" was put into effect and called for a) cancellation of all days off, b) the use of the 3rd floor of the DPD as a Command Post, c) converting to 12 hour shifts, d) the use of 4 man patrol cars. Early on Wednesday evening a Press Release Center was opened adjacent to the Command Post to provide accurate information to the news media. By Thursday, August 11, the four-man patrol cars were reduced to 2-man units on the day shift, and by Saturday, August 13, the scout cars were reduced to 2-man units. The police department resumed normal activities by Monday morning, August 15.

The effectiveness of the police work was partly a result of the special training that the Tactical Mobile Unit and the riot squad of the Motor Traffic Bureau receive in crowd control. The prompt arrival of the TMU in the Kercheval - Pennsylvania area was partly accidental. Inspector Bertoni and the TMU were on duty at the Central Methodist Church for a possibility of a disturbance there as a result of an Anti-Viet Nam demonstration, and when the inspector drove through the Kercheval - Pennsylvania area to investigate a report heard over his radio, his car was stoned. The TMU and the MTB riot squad were assembled in the 5th precinct promptly, and the effectiveness of a "sweep" by helmeted police officers with guns and bayonets down Kercheval Avenue can be seen on Chart I under the categories of rock-throwing. The effectiveness of the police training is shown in the restraint and self-control exhibited by the marching officers, (some of them with only 1 or 2 years on the force), in the face of verbal abuse and a barrage of projectiles.

Mayor Cavanagh instructed the commissioner not to over-react to the situation, and the Mayor purposely refrained from making any public appeals through the news media.

What is mentioned above as the "derived" phase might have been precipitated through any number of incidents to either the police officers or the citizens. The officers, in spite of a high threshold resulting from their training, might not have shown such restraint if an officer had been shot by a citizen. The community threshold, on the other hand, might have been exceeded if an officer had beaten or fired on a citizen. To avoid these kinds of "derived" incidents, Commissioner Girardin's order to the officers to avoid physical contact with the citizens seems well-justified. Arrests on the first evening were kept to a minimum.

Prior to the incident the AAUM had been kept under surveillance; although the implication of the group has not been conclusively proven, there are certain indications that link the AAUM to some of the events. Two juveniles have testified in court that they were instructed on the preparation of molotov cocktails by members of the AAUM, while the latter deny it, saying that the youths were intimidated into so testifying by the police.

At about 2 a.m. of August 10th, 4 men were seen leaving AAUM headquarters carrying bundles. Their 3 cars were stopped after they had left the area, on the basis of a

tip to the FBI by an unidentified informant, and found to contain guns and knives. Two of the four were subsequently found guilty for the felony, carrying concealed weapons in a motor vehicle, one man was acquitted, and the fourth case has been taken under advisement by the court.

Of the 120 arrests made from August 9 to August 14, many, following the first night, were of people seen throwing rocks and the purpose of the arrests seems primarily to have been to remove the offenders from the scene. The official police department summary indicates that of 93 arrested adults, 50 warrants were obtained.

Another factor important in the professional conduct of the police department was the police - community relations training seminar that 1800 officers had attended in the Fall of 1965. An analysis of the number of arrests made by different units of the DFD reveals that the largest proportion were made by the highly trained TMU (33%) and the high proportion of these officers who had attended the seminar may have been an important factor in avoiding the kinds of "derived" incidents that lead to an enlargement of a disturbance rather than its containment.

Throughout the disturbance, police officers were rotated frequently in order to avoid the kind of fatigue that might have produced short tempers. It is unfortunate that manpower shortages prevent this procedure from being employed in "normal" summer months as well. An officer on duty all night, who must spend all day testifying at court or waiting to testify, is expected to still be polite and patient when he reports on duty in the afternoon.

B. References have already been made above to the influence of the mass media in developing a proper respect for the law within the community, another aspect of "social control". The Negro press, as well as the white press, should be constantly striving for responsible reporting before disturbances occur, as well as during and after a disturbance has taken place.

As another example of journalism that supports violence rather than discourages it is the following taken from the editorial page of The Michigan Chronicle, August 27, 1966:

"Negroes are taking the whole blame in Detroit's Eastside, too, although one wonders if the 'curious' whites who drove into the area, certainly provocateurs, didn't get what they deserved when their windshields were broken, etc."

The reporting to the public of the life-saving cases police officers are involved in, and the babies they deliver (Negro and white), would do much to both raise the public esteem of the police officer's work and improve police - community relations.

To determine what kinds of news media the neighborhood residents expose themselves to, and how often, several questions were asked regarding exposure to newspapers, magazines, news on the radio, and news programs on television. The following is a

summary of this information:

	Negro respondents (n=60)	White respondents (n=12)
a) No paper or seldom	11 (18%)	1 (8%)
No magazines or seldom	23 (38%)	2 (17%)
No radio or seldom	15 (25%)	2 (17%)
No TV or seldom	8 (13%)	7 (58%)

This suggests (within the limits of this sample size) that the primary source of news information for the Negro respondents is television, while for the white respondents it is through the newspapers.

b) Negro respondents and newspapers (n=60):

Michigan Chronicle and Daily newspapers: 24 (40%)
 Only Michigan Chronicle: 1 (2%)
 No newspaper or seldom: 11 (18%)

c) Negro respondents and magazines (n=60):

Only Negro magazines: 7 (11%)
 No magazines or seldom: 23 (38%)

Types of magazines (n=35 items)

Negro magazines (Ebony, Jet, Tan, etc.): 30 (35%)
 News magazines (Life, Time, Newsweek, etc.): 19 (22%)
 Family/Home-makers' magazines: 13 (15%)
 "Sensational" magazines (True Confessions, Lowdown, Enquirer, etc.): 9 (11%)
 Fashion magazines: 5 (6%)
 Religious magazines: 3 (4%)
 Sports magazines: 3 (4%)
 Miscellaneous: 3 (4%)

d) Caucasian respondents and newspapers (n=12):

No paper: 1 (8%)

e) Caucasian respondents and magazines (n=12):

No magazines or seldom: 2 (17%)

Types of magazines (n=24 items):

News magazines (Life, Time, Newsweek, etc.): 14 (58%)
 Family/Home-makers' magazines: 5 (21%)
 "Sensational" magazines: 1
 Fashion magazines: 1
 Religious magazines: 1
 Comic books: 1
 Shop/mechanics: 1

C. At the time of the disturbance, and frequently when communications and information are distributed to the community, certain organizations are utilized as the points of contact. The sample of residents interviewed in the Kercheval - Pennsylvania area were asked a question about their membership in organizations or clubs and the following replies were given. Whether this information is typical or anomalous cannot be determined without comparison with other areas of the city. Almost 33% of the Negro

respondents did not belong to any groups, compared to 42% of the white residents.

Negro respondents:

Churches, 29, of which:
 Baptist Churches: 11
 No denomination given or other: 18

Unions: 14

Block clubs: 6 (several showed an interest in organizing one)

Private social clubs: 3

Eastern Star: 3

Masons: 2

PTA: 2

Afro-American Unity Movement: 2

Cub Scouts: 1

NAACP: 1

Torch Drive Volunteer: 1

None: 20 (32.8% of Negro respondents)

White respondents:

Church: 3

Unions: 3

Professional clubs: 2

Social clubs: 2

Block club: 1 (several showed an interest in organizing one)

Co-op Nursery School: 1

None: 5 (41.7%)

D. During the Kercheval - Pennsylvania incident other elements in "social control" or appeals to the community for restraint were made over the radio and television by Negro Councilman Nicholas Hood, and Robert Tindal of the NAACP.

Beginning on Wednesday evening, August 10th, clergy of both races formed "peace patrols" and circulated in the area urging the people on the streets to return to their homes.

E. Finally, to determine what aspects of social control the citizens of the neighborhood considered most effective, the following question was asked in the interviews:

QUESTION #11. "What do you think kept this from becoming a more serious disturbance?"

Although many respondents had no opinions about what caused the disturbance, only 3 of 73 answered "don't know" to this question.

The responses to this question are dealt with under the general heading of "social control", but include two main aspects. The total responses deal primarily with the formal agency responsible for social control, the police force, as well as the community's lack of support for this disturbance. The latter might also be included in the "structural strain" and/or "generalized beliefs" categories. Although the Negro and white responses don't seem to differ significantly they are summarized separately. Their more detailed replies are given below the following chart:

	Negro respondents (n=61)	White respondents (n=12)
Police	32 (52%)	7 (58%)
Community	17 (28%)	3 (25%)
Community & Police	10 (16%)	1 (8%)
Don't know	2 (3%)	1 (8%)

Negro responses:

- 1) Police, 32, of which:
 - a) Police action (not specific): 16
 - b) Police did a "good" job (or "wonderful", "very fine", etc.): 8
 - c) Arrest of instigators: 3
 - d) "Prompt" police action: 2
 - e) Fear of police: 1
 - f) Fear of police, prompt police action: 1
 - g) "When police started patrolling the street, they saw they really meant business": 1
- 2) Community, 17, of which:
 - a) No community support: 13
 - b) "Just quieted down": 2
 - c) Lack organization & leaders: 1
 - d) No community support, "just blowing off steam": 1
- 3) Community and police, 10, of which:
 - a) No community support, and police did "a very fine" job (or "good", etc.): 5
 - b) No community support and police action: 2
 - c) Community restraint, and "the ordinary people on the street because they recognized the police were prepared to come in and have a bloodbath": 1
 - d) Prompt police action and "some of the guys backed out about the whole thing": 1
 - e) Police action and "the people themselves knew how far they wanted to go": 1
- 4) Don't know: 2

White responses:

- 1) Police, 7, of which:
 - a) Police did a "good" job (or "wonderful"): 3
 - b) "Prompt" police action: 2
 - c) Police action: 2

- 2) Community, 3, of which:
 - a) No community support: 2
 - b) Still a dormant matter: 1
- 3) Community and police:
 - a) No community support, and prompt police action: 1
- 4) Don't know: 1

Conclusions and Recommendations:

The difficulty in making recommendations following a study such as this, it seems to me, is that social support is thereby given to violence as a means of airing grievances and calling attention to issues. As Daniel Moynihan stated before a Senate subcommittee, "The American people will not be cowed into doing what is right!" But nevertheless, it must be admitted that this report on a Negro neighborhood might not have been done, except for a near-riot in the area. The following recommendations are made in the context of improving conditions and attacking issues that are of common municipal concern.

1) New and creative efforts should be made to work with the youth of the city who may produce the future delinquents and criminals. According to the 1966 Youth Bureau Annual Report, of 8416 contacts, 6027 (71.6%) were non-white juveniles and 2389 were white.

More research is needed into the causes and treatment of delinquency and crime.

2) Municipal government should consider the use of survey research as a means of keeping in closer touch with the attitudes of citizens, and as a means of providing information to the citizens regarding city agencies, ordinances, etc. In addition, or as an alternative, neighborhood storefront agency offices might be a practical alternative to surveys in order to maintain and establish communication with, and provide services for, the community.

3) The importance of good police - community relations cannot be overemphasized. This is a continual effort by the Detroit Police Department and the Detroit Commission on Community Relations, and can be assisted by the Negro and white mass media. Efforts are being made to recruit more Negro police officers.

The daily in-service training of the Tactical Mobile Unit might be extended to all sections of the DPD in frequent contact with the community.


In addition, weekly small discussion groups of police officers within the precincts to compare and discuss the skills and practices of a professional police officer might be attempted.

4) The specific issues that are a source of strain within the Kercheval - Pennsylvania area, indicated in the body of this report and reflected in the above recommendations, don't seem to be unique to this particular neighborhood, but are of city-wide and nation-wide concern. They include:


- a) police - community relations;
- b) crime prevention/ law enforcement, including the problems of youthful offenders;

- c) adequate housing;
- d) adequate employment;
- and e) neighborhood improvements.

Official channels for airing grievances and dealing with strain in the community will be utilized as long as they are seen as effective.



Enclosure I



POPULATION per RECREATION FACILITY with LEADERSHIP
 (Sources: 1960 U.S. Census
 1966 Dept. of Parks & Rec. Summer Bull.)

Enclosure 2

RATIO TO THE 1/2 INCH
 KEFEL & ESSER CO.
 REGISTERED
 PATENTED
 PERSONS
 MADE IN U.S.A.

(N=113)




CHART II: AGE




CHART II - INTERROGATION RECORDS - ARRESTED ADULTS (n=66)
(60 CAUCASIANS)

